The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541

The Advance of the Ottoman Army to the Battlefield. Disorientation of the Supreme Command

As mentioned before, on August 28 the Ottoman army encampedon the northern banks of the Karasso. In the afternoon it wasannounced that the battle would be fought on the following day. Weknow from Djeladzade that in the evening the imams held rousingsermons, the camp was lit up, and the bands played martial music.

On the 29^th the army began to deploy right after the morningprayers, that is around 0500 hours. Although there are a few discrepancies in their accounts, all the Ottoman chroniclers agree thatthe troops started off loose formation, in battle order. According toKemal Pashazade, as soon as dawn began to smile announcing victory, and the breeze ofsalvation began to rise, the troops, burning from the desire to fight,went into motion like the sea, raising the banners and the horses' tails.The infantry and the cavalry were at the center of the invincible host,and the separate corps, fully equipped, were in line of battle on theright and left wings.

According to Ferdi, Djeladzade, and Pechevi, the Rumelian armywith the 4,000 janissaries and 150 pieces of artillery attached to it,as well as the akindjis, started off first, under the command ofIbrahim. There may have been two reasons for this: one, that theRumelian army had to cover a far greater distance (12-13 km) toreach the terrain between Majs and Foldvar than the Anatolianarmy had to cover to reach the area of Buziglica (6-8 km); the other,that Ibrahim as commander-in-chief had to survey the terrain andsort out the lineup for the battle.

Regarding the manner of deployment, we find information inSuleyman's diary, relevant to the issue: "the entire victorious host,mounting their horses, began to advance and gradually, halting andmoving in turns, arrived on the field of Mohacs" before 1400 hours.Thus the advance in loose formation of the order of battle was slow,and the army had to stop several times, probably in order to rectifythe lines.

In and of itself this does not explain why the army arrived at theterrace so late. If we assume that the rate of advance in battleformation was 2.5 km/h and given the fact that the Rumelian contingent got an early start, the whole army should have reached theterrace by 1000 hours at the latest. Instead, the Rumelian armyreached it at noon, the center under the sultan between 1300 and1400 hours, and the Anatolian army between 1400 and 1500 hours.

The advance was not only slow, but exhausting as well. Suleyman's clerk noted that when the army reached the terrace "man andbeast were tired.,' That an army should be tired after a march ofmerely 6-12 km is practically unheard of in military history. It seemsclear that the slow and arduous advance was due to the terrain andpossibly to the fact that there were jams before reaching the terrace,on account of the narrowness of the section between Buziglica andMajs. It is possible that the entire army had to be regrouped.

To make a long story short, the Ottoman army arrived late andtired within sight of the Hungarian army; even more important, itwas not together. Map 9/a indicates that at 1200 hours the threecomponents of the army were some 2-3 km apart.

Once they reached the terrace the Ottoman high command metwith yet another unpleasant surprise: it became obvious that theassault against the Hungarian army standing on the field of Mohacsbelow could not be launched from the slippery slopes of the terrace.The attackers had to lower themselves to the field, where the troops,necessarily in disarray, would have to be once again set in orderbefore the battle could start.

Some of the Ottoman sources reflect clearly the confusion whichseized the high command as a result of these difficulties; othersources, however, invent a fantastic story, precisely to cover thisconfusion and the initial lack of success of the Ottoman forces.Almost all the Ottoman sources mention that the leaders held acouncil when they reached the terrace, but they relate the discussions in different ways. Lufti's account seems the most authentic,even if parts of it are unclear, at any rate in the translation at my disposal. Although parts of his text have already been quoted, let meintroduce here the entire section:

Sultan Suleyman started off in the morning with his innumerable host; 12,000 musketeers and 500 zarbuzan marched in front of him . As soon as he reached close enough to see the dark mass of the djaurs, and a spy brought the news that in addition to their large numbers they were also digging a wide trench that could not be crossed, one end of which reached as far as a mountain and the other to the Danube, Sultan Suleyman, upon hearing this news, assembled his vezirs and asked what was to be done? The vezirs answered "Oh padishah who you are the refuge of the entire world, the hope of all Muslims! Before attacking the infidels we must have recourse to reflection and planning, because there are so many thousand djaurs, so much cavalry, so much artillery and so many muskets and moreover there is a trench; it would be most risky to attack without plan and foresight. It would be entirely appropriate to consider whether the Majestic Lord has indeed decided in favor of our salvation. "Finally they decide to set up camp, test the trench, and try to engage the infidels in battle. Since the enemy was at a distance of one day, the army was ordered to pitch their tents.

We must trust Lufti's account all the more since its most important assertion, that the battle was postponed, is confirmed by Suleyman's clerk. The clerk's record preserves the Ottoman perception inthe moment when the Hungarian army launched its attack.

The infidels of depraved life fired a few cannonballs, one of which fell on the right wing; then they lined up in front of their camp in several ranks. On our side we remained calm since the time had not yet come and men and animals were tired. Just when it was decided around the time of the afternoon prayer, to engage in battle the next morning the base infidels suddenly set in motion and advanced towards us.

Kemal Pashazade also writes that orders were given to pitch thetents.

At the war council it was also decided that Bali beg and Khosrevshould take up positions on the flanks of the Hungarian army withtheir cavalrymen. After they set out--as we learn from KemalPashazade--the grand vezir rode away "in order to inspect thecavalry set up in ambush." It is strange, however, that a commander-in-chief should leave in order to inspect a component entrusted with an auxiliary task; therefore we cannot give KemalPashazade credence. Perhaps the grand vezir left to survey theterrain precisely because he felt the area in front of the terrace ofMajs and Buziglica was inappropriate for a battle, and he wouldhave preferred to fight it elsewhere. Ibrahim's departure entitles us to yet another assumption: not in his wildest dreams could he havethought that the Hungarians, with their handful of troops, wouldlaunch an attack.

Some of the Ottoman chroniclers present matters in an entirelydifferent light, fabricating a whole story to cover up the mistakes ofthe high command. This was the origin of the misconception aboutthe Ottomans having set up an ambush against the Hungarians atMohacs: by opening up their ranks the Hungarians were lured infront of their guns. According to Kemal Pashazade, when Ibrahimreached "the vicinity of the future battleground" and saw the Hungarians, he asked Bali beg, "the wise lion", for advice. Because theHungarians were covered in "steel from head to toe" and could breakthrough any army "no matter how strong" with their assault, Balisuggested that instead of awaiting the assault they open up theirranks, allow them in, and attack them from the flanks. Let thereforeIbrahim, "the young lion", learn from Bali, the "old wolf." The sceneis also described by Djeladzade in almost these exact words.

There was, however, an obstacle to such an ambush, namely, thefact that behind the army was the baggage train; therefore, writesKemal Pashazade, "our ranks cannot open up to give way to thecharging cavalry--they cannot be allowed in our midst...." Djeladzade writes:

"What would be the most appropriate plan in this instance?" asked the pasha, who was amazed. They pondered for a while. Finally, thanks to divine inspiration, they agreed on a plan to postpone the time of the encounter for the hour of the ikindi, send the baggage train further to the rear, and the fighters, according to custom, would divide up and attack the contemptible infidels in the back.

According to Kemal Pashazade, Ibrahim arrived at the idea byhimself, and Bali thereupon commended him "for this plan of profound wisdom...conceived in the lucid mind of the pasha blessedwith a talent for military leadership."

All this, however, is pure fabrication. The trouble starts when weread in the diary of Suleyman, the most authentic account, that thebattle was postponed not until the hour of ikindi, but until thefollowing day. Moreover, while the "young lion" Ibrahim may havelacked experience, he must nevertheless have known that the baggage train must always be sent to the rear at the time of battle; thisis such a routine operation in every army that it required no warcouncil, for every subordinate commander would do it as a matter ofcourse. Finally, the "plan of profound wisdom" not withstanding, the baggage train remained where it was and even started to set upcamp. This is reported by Kemal Pashazade himself, in a passagefollowing our quotation. Thus, obviously no ambush of any sort wasplanned, and the whole story of the "division of troops', merelyserved the purpose of covering the confusion of the high commandand the initial losses of the Rumelian army.

What happened after the war council? The Rumelian army lowered itself onto the plain of Mohacs and began to bivouac, whereasthe cavalry under the command of Bali and Khosrev started towardsthe flanks of the Hungarian army, followed by Ibrahim (see Mapsketch 9/b).

The situation of the artillery assigned to the Rumelian armydeserves special attention. Brodarics's account implies that the artillery was positioned in some kind of depression, so that when thefiring started, the cannonballs sped above the heads of the Hungarians. [468] The same fact emerges from Suleyman's diary: "they startedto fire the guns, but could cause no damage." Everything points to anunheard-of situation: the artillery had been ordered into a positionfrom which it could not fire out! Since the Ottoman artillery was inno way inferior to European artilleries, it is inconceivable that thiswas the result of ignorance or neglect. Two circumstances mayexplain the paradox: the order to set up camp and the terrain. Whenthe artillerymen received the order to set up camp they must havestopped wherever they happened to be and placed their guns infiring position. They apparently settled in a depression in front ofthe terrace, where the difference between the high and low spots wasas much as 4-5 m. Consequently, the cannons had no firing range orcould fire only in a raised position and could not sweep the area infront of them. The artillery commander was undoubtedly worried bythese conditions, but could do nothing, since it would have been mostrisky to drag the cannons further forward to the next rising, so closeto the Hungarians. The fact that they built a practically unpenetrable obstacle in front of their batteries also indicates that thesituation arose not from ignorance or neglect but because the inappropriate terrain for setting up camp.

Thus what came to pass was precisely that which I argued thatTomori and companions had been counting upon: the Ottoman armydid not reach the battleground all at one time; hence it could notmake use of its numerical superiority. Indeed, the situation developed even better than expected, since the Ottomans began to set up camp which, as we know, constitutes a moment of weakness in thelife of any force.

The First Hungarian Attack. Tomoris Battle Plan: A Reconstruction

August 29 was a "clear and rather bright day." The Hungarianarmy assumed its order of battle after sunrise. The palatine led theking around among the troops and encouraged the soldiers. TheOttoman vanguard rode their horses back and forth on the plain ofMohacs, clashing time and again with the Hungarian light cavalry."The enemy was...still behind the hills", writes Brodarics, and itsintentions could not be known--whether it wanted to lure the Hungarians into "an unfavorable position", whether it was preparing fora surprise night attack, or whether it simply meant to exhaust theHungarians. But, as we have seen, its intention was none of these.

During the wait, "when the sun was already beginning to leanwestward", they noticed "the troops of the enemy to the right, in thevalley beneath the hills, as they were advancing quietly, only thesunlight reverberating from the tips of the lances betraying theirpresence." These were the troops of Bali and Khosrev. The unusualterrain explains why only the tips of the lances could be seen fromwhere Brodarics stood; Tomori, who stood 1 to 1.5 km farther fromhim, was able to assess correctly that this was not the main body ofthe enemy, and he dispatched only a negligible force, a few hundredcavalrymen, against them.

Brodarics describes the scene as follows:

The friar [Tomori] suspecting the truth, that these were sent either to occupy our camp or to surround us, rode posthaste from the first echelon to the king and ordered Gaspar Raskay, along with the other two who had been entrusted to guard the person of the king, to reconnoiter and find out w hat the Turks had in mind, then, if possible, to turn them aside from the direction in which they were heading. Raskay, in view of the task assigned to him earlier refused this assignment. But since the friar insisted, and the king did not contradict the friar's orders, he spurred his horse and galloped along with his companions and troops under him to where he was sent, so that he might not be accused of cowardice or timidity...

Tomori probably dispatched Raskay as a standing flank defensewith the task of merely keeping an eye on the enemy.

In the meantime, the Rumelian army must have started pitchingtheir tents on the field of Mohacs, but Brodarics says nothing aboutit, which is a]i the more curious as this happens to be the mostimportant episode of the whole battle. Thereupon the barons whowere with the king, "bored with the protracted wait," suggestedheading back to camp, no doubt because seeing the Ottomans bivuacing, they must have felt there would be no fighting that day.The king, following their advice, sent orders to Tomori to return tocamp. Then Tomori, along with Gyorgy Szapolyai, rode up to theking "and warned him that the battle must not be postponed at anyprice, because there was less danger in fighting part of the enemy'sforces today than in fighting the whole army on the morrow; therecan be no doubt about victory now." Upon this advice the king"immediately" ordered the attack.

The attack was launched, and with enormous success: it caughtthe Rumelian army, busy pitching its tents, completely by surprise.They fled in panic from the field at breakneck speed.

Everything said so far contradicts the generally held view thatTomori led the Hungarian troops without much thought or competence. Just the opposite was the case; the plan of attack, as far as onecan reconstruct from indirect data, was both bold and brilliant.

The sources clearly indicate that the deployment of the Ottomanarmy met with difficulties and that the army did not reach thebattlefield at the same time. It is reasonable to suppose that Tomoriand his companions were counting on these facts. This assumption isreinforced by the fact that the Ottomans believed that Tomori wasacting on such expectation. Lufti, well informed in military matters,paraphrases Louis II's decision at the Hungarian war council in thefollowing lines:

When [the Turk] reaches Mohacs tomorrow And strikes up his tents there; At this favorable opportunity we shall attack him; When he sets up camp we will rush him and fight.

The he writes of the launching of the Hungarian attack:

While we were engaged in pitching our tents, some removing their luggage, others occupied in diverse ways, the king spoke to the Polish and Czech bans as follows: "The Turks set up camp because they are afraid of us, and want to ask for mercy." Having said this he became overconfident and divided his army into three groups. He sent one group against the Rumelian army, another against the Anatolian, whereas himself, with his army of hundreds of thousands, all helpmates of the devil, fell straight upon the middle army of Sultan Suleyman, like a mountain of iron.

What Lufti describes here is probably the conclusion the Ottomancommand derived a posteriori from the analysis of the battle, perhaps confirmed during his interrogation by a captured subordinateofficer of Tomori who knew about the plan. Our supposition aboutTomori's plan is strengthened both by the order of battle of theHungarian army, which, as mentioned, was suitable only for adesperate assault, and by Raskay's mission. From the latter one mayrightfully conclude that Tomori was quite certain the Ottomanswould not attack; hence the person of the king was in no danger.Otherwise it seems unlikely that he would assume the enormousresponsibility of leaving the king without a guard.

Istvanffy keeps quiet about an essential factor which had decidedly catastrophic consequences, namely that the king and his entourage wanted to return to camp. He writes:

At the same moment a terrifying blast of the horns and a loud battle-cry arose from the camp of Suleyman, the enormous and awe-inspiring army of cavalry and infantry guards began to descend from the hill and advance straight against us. Then both commanders-in-chief sped to the king and reported that the enemy was marching to battle, that we must meet them, and there could be no doubt about the prospects for victory. The king, neither frightened nor hesitant upon receiving this report, gave out orders to call upon Christ the Savior, raise the banners blow the trumpets, and roll the drums. [470]

The order to return to camp and its reversal played a decisive rolein the failure of Tomori's plan. In all likelihood Tomori and Szapolyai had some difficulty convincing the king and his entouragethat battle must be launched. It is hard to believe what Brodaricswrites about the king immediately giving orders to that effect. Thiswas a matter of considerable importance, and if Tomori had to presentarguments, no doubt the lords had some arguments of their own,engendering a discussion, which naturally took some time. To thiscame the fact that if the plan to postpone the attack was droppedonly after some debate, the king and his entourage had to readythemselves once again for battle.

Taking together the information from all available sources, itbecomes clear that the Hungarian assault was launched belatedly.Even though Brodarics does not mention the arrival of the Rumelian army, he describes the appearance of Bali's forces accurately. Thetwo events must have taken place more or less at the same time. Hisfollowing statement, however, fixes the moment when the attackwas launched, by which time the central army under Suleyman hada]so made its appearance on the terrace and even had begun itsdescent. It is clear that the lords around the king wanted to return tocamp because the Rumelian army had started to pitch their tents.Tomori intended to launch his attack exactly at that time, but thiswas the moment when he received the king's orders to return tocamp. We cannot suppose that the army of the sultan was alreadyvisible at this time, or else he would not have argued that they needclash only with the smaller portion of the enemy forces. As we haveseen, the army of the sultan was at least one hour behind theRumelian army, and apparently it caught up only partly during thediscussions among the Hungarian leaders. This is also suggested by Kemal Pashazade's text:

The djaur army's evil leader, King Lajos, like another Siavus, rushedinto the frightful fire of the fray, and while some of his heroic begs andbrave leaders fell, and others were captured, he stood his ground on thebattlefield. In the meantime the troops accompanying the person of theworld-conquering sultan, consisting of innumerable cavalry and infantry, servants and freemen--who formed the environment of the courtwhich served as refuge to the world, arrived on the scene. The bannerssignifying victory--like the veil of the charming goddess victory--andthe flags at the tip of the lances in the hands of the heroes completelydarkened the horizon. When the padishah reached the edge of thebattlefield, in accordance with the law and plan of wisdom he stoodstill, like an unmovable mountain, then pushed forward like a floodedstream .

Djeladzade's narrative tallies well with this:

When they [the Hungarian right wing] tried to encircle the Rumelianarmy, they noticed that the padishah ruling the world was approachingwith an army in battle order and with unfurled banners, at the sight ofwhich panic seized the djaurs. Upon this, glancing at the vision of theirlife in the mirror of death, they turned upon their heels that veryinstant and suffering defeat, joined the troops which had remained onthe banks of the Danube.

The sequence of events and of changes in the plan can be reconstructed as follows:

1) The Rumelian army began to advance along the slope,while Bali's troops started towards the flank of the Hungarian army.

2) Tomori galloped back to the reserves and ordered Raskayon a mission.

3) Tomori returned to the first echelon and noticed that theRumelian army had begun to pitch its tents. The situationhe was hoping for had come about: only one-third of theOttoman army, two-fifths at most, was on the battlefield,and even that segment about to camp. Here was themoment propitious for the attack! The king's entourage,on the contrary, felt that the battle must be postponed,since the Ottomans were not inclined to fight. They persuaded the king to order the return to camp, and theybegan to remove their armor.

4) Tomori received the king's order to move to camp.

5) He galloped back to the king, along with Gyorgy Szapolyai. A discussion ensued, but since Tomori's standprevailed in the end, the king and the lords had to dontheir armor. The king sued the order to attack.

6) Then the central army under the lead of the sultan appeared on the horizon.

7) Tomori returned to his position and, although the situation had altered considerably, he opted in favor of theassault nevertheless. He could not have done otherwiseunder the circumstances. There was still the hope thatthey might have routed the Rumelian army by the timethe sultan's army deployed for battle in front of the terrace.

8) Although the assault against the Rumelian army wassuccessful, the Ottoman central army was already in battle formation at the foot of the terrace and preventedTomori from wheeling around and bending to attack theartillery and the janissaries in the back.

Quite clearly, the Hungarian army launched its attack with a loss oftempo which resulted from the delays and hesitations caused by theorder to return to camp. This time lag proved fatal, because itcompletely upset Tomori's plan.

The weakest point in our chain of assumptions is that Brodaricsmakes no mention of any plan by Tomori. There can be but oneexplanation for this; neither he nor the king knew of it. This hypothesis may seem weak, but knowing about the contradictionsbetween the court and the professional soldiers, including the nobility, it becomes very possible indeed. It is certain that if Tomori's planwas the one reconstructed above, the king could not have knownabout it, or else he would not have issued the order to return to camp.But why would Tomori have kept his plan secret even from the king?Most probably because of the need for discretion--since the basicelement of the plan relied on surprise. After what we have learnedabout the proceedings of the war council, especially that it took placein the midst of a "populous assembly," we can have no doubt that hadthe plan been made known the efficient Ottoman intelligence wouldsoon have found out. That Tomori did not communicate his plan withthe king at least in a private conversation may have been because hefeared the young and indecisive Louis would be unable to keep asecret.

Considering all this, Tomori's strange behavior during the lastwar council becomes more understandable. Since he could not present his only convincing argument--i.e., the secret plan guaranteeing success--he had to come up with a justification which he himselfmust have known to be spurious: the oft-mentioned underestimationof Ottoman strength. Or did he already count on the hope, albeittacitly, that the battle might be fought against a fraction of thesultan's army?

The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541