The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541

CHAPTER IX
THE BATTLE

Although the second part of this book is entitled "the Battle ofMohacs", the chapter dealing with the battle itself is bound to be oneof the shortest, since it is impossible to reconstruct its course accurately from the available sources. There are but a few firm points ofreference. The best one can do is to set the significant data into alogical order and as far as possible, avoid guesswork.

No Hungarian or Ottoman sources have yet been found whichwould cover the entire battle with all its episodes. The Ottomancommand seems to have done some kind of evaluation after thebattle, as reflected in Lufti account, but whether this evaluationwas ever recorded and, if so, whether the record still exists, isunknown.

All the eyewitnesses reporting on the battle could observe onlyparts of it, since it was fought along a front 5-6 km wide. Moreover,the accounts dealing with specific episodes of the battle were written, with few exceptions, not by professional soldiers (hence thewhole battle was for them nothing but chaos and confusion) or weredeliberately distorted for one reason or another. Brodarics's lack ofexpertise mentioned several times; similarly, neither Djeladzadeand Kemal Pashazade was an expert in military science, and theircredibility is often doubtful.

The First Phase

At the start of the battle the Ottoman army was deployed asfollows. The bulk of the troops under Bali and Khosrev avoidedRaskay and did not engage in battle, especially since they were notslated to fight that day. The Rumelian army was down on the plainof Mohacs, preparing to camp. The units under the Sultan weredescending from the terrace at Foldvar, the Anatolian army furtherbehind. After receiving the order to attack, the Hungarian artillery began to fire, and the right wing, with Tomori in the lead, charged atfull speed. The infantry too launched an attack but, naturally,remained far behind the cavalry. The right wing aimed at the centerof the Rumelian army, whereas the infantry was heading for thejanissaries and the artillery on the right flank of the Rumelians. Wehave no information at all regarding the infantry's attack; nevertheless, we may take it for granted that they took off at the same timeas the right wing, and, since they had to march for at least half anhour, they might have reached the janissaries and the artilleryroughly at the same time as the second echelon. (See Map 10). Thereserves and the left ~sing under the command of Perenyi stayed putwhich was to be expected, since the Anatolian army in front of themwas not even in sight yet.

The charge by the right wing had enough power to effect a breakthrough. The Rumelian army, busy setting up its tents and perhapseven unbridling the mounts--the camel train and camel drivers,mules and muleteers awkwardly bustling among them--was caughtentirely by surprise. Seized by panic, it fled at full speed from theHungarians. The reticent communication in Suleyman's diary provides clear evidence of this: "And since the Rumelian army wasdispersed it was unable to resist and part of it fled in the direction ofthe ruler." According to Kemal Pashazade, two Hungarian knightsgot within reach of the sultan before they were chopped down. Itmust have been at this time that Tomori, fighting in the front ranks,sent Andras Bathory back to the king with the message that "victorybeing ours", he should start with the second echelon in hot pursuit ofthe enemy. Let us quote once more Brodarics:

Then we hurried forward on this sometimes flat sometimes uneven terrain.... Our heroes stood their ground and fought bravely against the foe. While the king's formation advanced in great haste as hastily as possible in full armor, the right wing began to retreat, and many fled; I believe the guns of the enemy must have terrified them, as it was only at this time that they began to fled. The rapid fire and the cannonballs whistling above the heads of those of us next to the king aroused great fear in everyone.

Thus the attack by the right wing ultimately failed. But why? Onething is certain: the cause of the failure was not the fire of the enemyartillery. Brodarics only "believed" that the right wing was terrifiedby the fire of the artillery, but he also noted that the cannonballssped above them, in other words, missed their target. While the 150pieces of artillery opening fire at the same time might indeed have had a terrifying effect, it is nevertheless difficult to believe that theHungarian soldiers who had lived through so many battles wouldhave been frightened to the point of fleeing, especially if the projectiles did not even strike their ranks. Moreover, the artillery did notfire at the right wing, since that wing was attacking to the left of it,but rather at the second echelon arriving in front of it, and presumably at the infantry as well. This is obvious from Brodarics's account;he states that the cannons began to fire only after the second echeloninitiated its assault, which must have happened 15-20 minutes afterthe attack by the right flank. Another statement by Brodarics alsoseems to imply a causal relationship between the artillery fire andthe rout of the right flank. Writing about the movements of the kinghe states that Louis was no longer with his division: "I am certainthat he disappeared from our ranks when the guns of the enemybegan to fire and the right flank began to flee." Yet this sentencehints at simultaneity rather than a real cause and effect.

Having ruled out artillery fire as the main cause of failure, wemust search for another. We know from different sources that thetroops on the right flank began to collect booty after their successfulcharge. Also, if a few Hungarian warriors indeed got in the vicinityof the sultan, this would indicate that at least one contingent continued the attack. The real reason of failure was that by this time thebulk of the Ottoman central army, including the janissaries, hadreached the bottom of the terrace and had fired volleys at theHungarian soldiers engaged in collecting booty and at those whowere still fighting. This shooting, unlike the firing of the artillery,had not only sound and fury, but impact as well: it caused havoc inthe ranks of the Hungarians. According to the diary of Suleyman:"The division of the janissaries attacked the contemptible djaursthree or four times with musket fire and tried to force them back.,'According to Kemal Pashazade, the janissaries "distributed bulletslike hailstorm." According to Pechevi the janissaries "fired in unisonand so accurately that the bravest among the infidels fell during thevery first assault." Although all three communications report shooting by the janissaries as taking place at the same time as theengagement of the Anatolian army, it is most likely that the musketfire also supported the Rumelian army. At this stage the Hungarians, loss of tempo took effect. The failure of the right flank's chargemeant nothing less than that the battle was hopelessly lost. It alsoappears that Tomori died a hero's death at this point.

The Second Phase and Conclusion

It is even more difficult to unravel the subsequent episodes of thebattle than the initial ones. Brodarics, who could not identify themost important aspects of the battle in his calmer moments, musthave lost his head completely when the cannons began to roll and hehad to struggle with his mount, which went wild at the sound of thefiring. He projected the terror that seized him onto the entire Hungarian army and from here on his account can be taken only with thegreatest reservations. For instance, he says nothing about the involvement of the infantry and of the left flank. Unfortunately on thisstage we receive no specific information from the Ottoman chroniclers either. We have nothing to rely on but suppositions regardingthe second phase.

We may take it for granted, however, that neither the infantry northe reserves were able to fight their way through the obstacleserected by the Ottoman artillerymen and janissaries. A bloody fighttook place which the cavalry was unable to withstand for long. Itturned back. Only the infantry continued to fight at the center. Thecavalry renewed its charge, but was beaten back once again, andnow the flight became general. Brodarics blames everything on theintense fire of the artillery and the dense smoke; of course, this is nota sufficient explanation.

We can find out somewhat more from the Ottoman sources, although their presentation is far from unequivocal. They indicatethat once the attack of the reserves was thwarted they continued bybending towards the right or the left. According to Lufti and thediary of Suleyman the king's troops bent towards the Rumelianarmy, but according to Djeladzade and Kemal Pashazade theyturned towards the Anatolian army. Both statements are probablycorrect: the reserves, divided, continued their attack in both directions.

Ottoman sources provide a fairly detailed account of the attack bythe left flank under the command of Perenyi. This flank, as we haveseen, was held back by Tomori; it could only launch its attack oncethe Anatolian army appeared at Buziglica. The second echelon musthave joined the fray after this. The janissaries took the brunt of thefight here, decimating the ranks of the Hungarians with murderousvolleys. The Ottoman chroniclers themselves admit that the leftflank fought well: Lufti writes that it "continued to fight for a goodwhile", and Ferdi adds that the battle was decided only after a "few attacks and retreats." Still, there was no chance of success againstthe superior forces--the battle had to be lost.

The infantry at the center fought the longest. These tough, experienced mercenaries knew well they could find no place to hide fromthe Ottoman cavalry by running away, and gave their lives dearly.Apparently they fought in some kind of quadrangle or square formation, presumably because they were already surrounded by theOttomans on all sides. The infantry perished almost to the last man.

For all practical purposes the battle ended with the virtual annihilation of the Hungarian army. The king, 28 magnates, 7 prelates,about 500 noblemen, 10,000 infantryman and 4,000 cavalrymen losttheir lives. [472] In conclusion one thing has to be said about the gravelosses suffered by the aristocracy and the county nobility. They mayhave been narrow-minded, selfish, irresponsible, and foolhardy men,but they certainly rode heroically in the forefront of that fatal attackwhich carried the country to its destruction!

The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541