From Trianon to the First Vienna Arbitral Award

At home in Hungary 105 Slovaks, 56 of them local persons, gathered in T. Sv. Martin (Turocszentmarton) on 30 October, 1918. They agreed to join the Czechs for ten years in a new common state. At the end of that period, the stipulation said, they would have an opportunity to express themselves concerning their political association with the Czechs. Two weeks prior to this meeting, the proclamation of the emperor in Vienna announced the transfor- mation of Austria into a federal state. This imperial decree came late

and could not prevent the collapse of the Monarchy which had been decided earlier by the entente governments during the war. The nationalities with foreign encouragements rejected this plan and they wanted to take their demands to international forums. According to the Czech political leaders, the Slovak and Czech problem became an international question. On 28 October, 1918 the Czech National Council in Prague proclaimed the Czecho-Slovak republic. The Austrian government, in order to avoid bloodshed, did not intervene to prevent this manifestation of constitutional change. The Czecho-Slovak question remained an international problem even after the collapse of the first CSR in 1938.

The Czech agents in exile did not concentrate their efforts exclusively on their own case. They were the moving force behind the congress of oppressed nationalities of Austria-Hungary, convened in Rome on 8 April, 1918, where beside the largest Czech group there were also present Serbs, Rumanians and Italians. The historical rights of Hungary were destroyed from abroad with the help of the Western democracies. The Czechs showed incredible tenacity in pursuing their political program. They invented the fiction of a Czecho-Slovak national unity and demanded a new state for it. Similarly the fictitious Serbo-Croatian national unity emerged to place the Southern Slavic people in a new enlarged state --Yugoslavia--under Serbian rule. These fabricated national unities did not work in practice, and Czechoslovakia and Yugos- lavia fell apart in roughly two decades after their inception. With the encouragement of the entente governments, other national councils in Hungary followed the Czech example of self rule. The Croatian Diet on 29 October, 1918 proclaimed the cessation of the thousand- year old constitutional connection with the Hungarian kingdom. The Serbs of Hungary met on 25 November at Ujvidek (Novi Sad), and the armed Serb bands demanded the annexation of South- ern Hungary to the enlarged Serbia together with the non-Serbian population of the area. The Rumanians at their meeting at Gyu- lafehervar (Alba Iulia), on 1 December, demanded the union of Tran- sylvania with Rumania regardless of the composition of the popu- lation of that Hungarian province. The non-Rumanian population was excluded from the deliberations. The unrepresented people of Transylvania at Alba Iulia had their own meeting at Kolozsvar (Cluj) and expressed their wish to remain in Hungary. The Magyaro- phile Slovaks held a meeting at Kassa (Kosice, Kaschau, Cassovia) to manifest their loyalty to Hungary. In such an atmosphere the last meeting of the Hungarian Parliament

took place on 23 October, 1918. The Hungarian deputies were willing to allow liberal concessions to the nationalities; however, the answer from the representatives of the ethnic groups was a refusal to the Hungarian initiative under pressure from the entente powers, and the neighbouring countries. The Hunga- rian government resigned on 31 October, 1918, but a week earlier, un- der the influence of radical demonstrations the Hungarian National Council was formed under Count Michael Karolyi. Hungary was

now detached from Austria. In the following month, on 16 November, the Hungarian republic was proclaimed and the Parliament dissolved. Karolyi became the head of the new government. This change in government and constitution did not earn international syrnpathy for the democratic government in Budapest, and did not prevent the planned mutilation of the thousand-year old land of the crown of St. Stephen. The last document of the Dual Monarchy was the signature of the armistice treaty for all the fronts. The new governments of the would-be successor states in Belgrade, Bucharest, Prague and Warsaw were barred by the armistice agreement from indirect occupation or annexation of territories from Austria-Hungary. However, with French diplomatic help and thanks to the intervention of the entente military missions, the organization of new states on Austro- Hungarian soil soon began. After taking over the government, Karolyi went to Belgrade where he concluded a separate armistice or rather a military convention with the head of the allied mission, the French general Franchet d'Esperey. This convention left the northern demarcation line of Hungary open. Karolyi ordered the Hungarian soldiers returning from the battlefields to lay down their arms in a naively idealistic gesture, hoping that the enemy would follow suit after four years of warfare. This was an invitation for creating a fait accompli on the part of the neighbours for the occupation of the Magyar land. The Belgrade military convention delimited the southern line for Hungarian evacuation. It left the Northern demarcation line with the Czechs open for the peace con- ference. The armistice did not stop military operations from the enemies of Hungary. In Paris, Benes negotiated a demarcation line with Marshal Foch for the future Czech state and he pressed for the occupation of certain strategically important points in Upper Hungary before the peace conference could make a decision in that matter, and to keep those Hungarian regions under Czech control. According to Lt. Colonel Vyx, the French liaison officer of the allied mission in Budapest, the Czechs were entitled to occupy the territory of Upper Hungary inhabited by the Slovaks. The Czechs themselves did not know how much territory they should claim from Hungary. Independently of Benes, the Karolyi government negotiated with the envoy of the Prague government, Milan Hodza, a demarcation line between Hungary and the would-be Slovakia. This agreement gave less to the future Czechoslovak republic than the Benes-Foch plan. The cities of Pressburg and Kassa and the lowland settled by Magyars were not included in the Hodza-Karolyi plan. The French government was very anxious to extend its zone of influence through its newly acquired protectorate, Czecho-Slovakia, and sent a diplomatic note to Karolyi on 21 December, 1918 asking for the evacuation of Upper Hungary according to the Benes-Foch plan. The Czechs succeeded in the annexation of the desired territory even before the peace conference began its discussion of the boundaries of the first Czechoslovak republic. After the Slovak

declaration of 30 October, 1918 in T. Sv. Martin, Czech bands slowly infiltrated Upper Hungary, the new Slovak province of Czecho- Slovakia which was left unprotected without any armed forces by the Karolyi government. They moved into Kassa on 30 December, 1918, into Pozsony (Pressburg, Posonium, renarned Bratislava) on 11 January, 1919, into Ungvar (Uzhorod) on 12 January, 1919, by the end of February they occupied Csallokoz (Gross Schutt, Velky Ostrov Zitny), Ersekujvar (Neuhausel, Nove Zamky), Losonc (Lucenec), Rozsnyo (Rosenau, Roznava), and according to the Vyx note of 20 March, 1919, they penetrated more deeply in Hungarian territory. In the spring of 1919 the Hungarian Soviet Republic tried to take back a part of Upper Hungary. The Czech armed bands retreated from the Hungarian red army units.(l4) However, in Paris, the peace conference decided on the borderline. Benes expounded the Czech wish at the peace conference on 5 February, 1919 based on purposely erroneous data and distorted moral principles.(l5) The borderline between Czechoslovakia and Hungary was determined in Paris on 12 June. The occupation of Upper Hungary, ordered by the dictated peace, was completed by 24 July, 1919. The Czech armed bands from the first day of their appearance introduced a bloody terror in the Hungarian communities amidst the defenceless and unarmed population. With the annexation of Upper Hungary to the CSR, the tribulation of the Hungarian minority began.(16) The territory in question was inhabited by 1,703,000 Slovaks and 2,860,000 non-Slovaks. The Hungarians attached to the CSR lived along the border on a 40-50 km deep strip of land in the immediate vicinity of Hungary. Statistics of the Hungarian population on that territory, according to censuses taken in different years and state sovereignties, were as follows: in 1910-- 1,070,772; in 1921-- 738,617 and in 1930--681,460.(17) The rapid decline of the number of Hungarians in Czechoslovak statistics indicate complete unrelia- bility and sinister intentions of the Prague government.

The temporary occupation of Upper Hungary during the armistice became a permanent occupation for twenty years. The American diplomacy was not able to secure the much publicized principles of Wilson for the self-determination of the peoples in Central Europe. America's untrustworthiness and ignorance of Central European affairs left the terrain open for the intrigues of Benes and to the apparent interests of the French foreign policy which wanted to have a satellite state in Central Europe. Benes remained in Paris and did not return to Prague on 14 November, 1918 upon his appointment as the first foreign minister of the new state. On the same day Masaryk was elected president of the republic. Benes, presence was needed at the peace conference for political manoeuverings and secret deals. He wanted to persuade the French government to dispatch troops to Bohemia and Moravia for the protection of those provinces from a possible German attack and to assist in the occupation of Upper Hungary.(l8) The German population in Bohemia and Moravia made known its wish to remain

in Austria. Benes requested French troops for the occupation of his own country, Bohemia and Moravia, to prevent the self-determi- nation of the German population living in those provinces. He did not get French occupational forces but a French military mission went to Prague to train the would-be conquerors and to accept French military control over the nascent Czech army.(l9) There was a second demarcation line drawn and handed over to the Karolyi government by Lt. Colonel Vyx on 19 March, 1919. This was more advantageous for Czechoslovakia than the previous one.(20) As a result of it, the Karolyi government resigned and, in the great confusion on 21 March, 1919, the Hungarian Soviet Republic was proclaimed, lasting for 133 days.

On 5 February, 1919, Kramar and Benes submitted a report to the Council of Ten on the Czechoslovak demands. They asked for recognition of the three main lands of the Czech crown: Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia in their historic frontiers and some rectifica- tions on the Prussian, Bavarian and Saxon borders, a part of Kladsko and Upper Silesia and a part of the Moravian Field. Bohemia was economically the strongest state of the former Austria-Hungary having on its territory 75% of the chemical industry, 92% of glass industry, 75% of woollen industry and c., 60% of iron works of the extinguished state.(21) Furthermore, they asked for the annexation of Upper Hungary, under the name of Slovakia and Ruthenia, to the Czech lands. They also requested the resolution of the question of the Sorbians in Lausitz, the protection of the Czech population in Vienna, and connecting Czechoslovakia with Yugoslavia with a corridor, as well as the internationalization of some main rivers and railway lines. The Council of Ten appointed a commission for Czechoslovak affairs which in one month fulfilled the Czech demands with a few exceptions: the question of the Sorbs in Lausitz and the corridor to Yugoslavia were refused.(22)

Besides the territorial demands, Benes spoke of a three hundred- year Austrian oppression, of the existence of a Czecho-Slovak state in the teenth century, of the sentiments of the population in the involved area, and of their common language and religion. All of these words were pure inventions. The whole affair is without precedent in the history of peace conferences.(23)

The Paris peace conference was officially opened on 18 January, 1919 and Hungary and her neighbouring successor states were notified of their future borders on 13 June. Between those dates, in spite of the armistice or several armistices, the war continued on Hungarian soil. The invading Czechs intimidated the peaceful population by executing prominent citizens upon their arrival in Hungarian communities. Benes wanted to persuade the French authorities that the Prague government represented an order and peaceful development, a return to industrial production and a bulwark against Communism in Central Europe. "At the beginning of 1919, the Czechoslovak propaganda instigated against the Jewish-Hungarian Communist state. When in Hungary the

national and Christian trend arrived at power... the Jews, disillusioned, ran away from Budapest. Slovakia was filled up with refugees who started their anti-Hungarian activities."(24) France did not recognize the Karolyi government and refused to receive its representatives in Paris. Consequently, Benes had the field reserved for himself. He influenced the peace conference when it dealt with the delimitation of the Hungarian-Czecho-Slovak border. It was a great personal success for a Czech dissident who, three years after his escape from Prague, sat together with the representatives of France, Britain, U.S.A., Italy, Japan, Serbia, Greece, Belgium and Portugal and played a role in determining the fate of Kaiser Wilhelm and Emperor-King Charles as well as participating in the planning of the political borderlines of post-war Europe. Benes negotiated with Foch that frontier of Slovakia which cut deeply into the Magyar ethnic territory. This was not enough for the Czech imperialists but they also claimed Ruthenia. The Czech occupiers moved deeply into Upper Hungary until they did not meet any resistance from the Karolyi government which observed the armistice and laid down the arms. In Paris the French government circles and the agents of the national minorities of pre-war Hungary masterminded a forcible dismemberment of the Hungarian kingdom and the annexation of 3.5 million Hungarians. They organized an armed invasion and arbitrarily prolonged the war, what suited the French assertion to the inheritance of the Habsburgs in Central Europe. Under this pressure the Karolyi government resigned and in the great confusion the Communists took over the power. Benes emphasized that the events proved him right because he always emphasized the red danger in Budapest and Vienna. The Czech invasion of Hungary forced the Communist government in Budapest to defend the country, and the Czech march was halted. The Czeehs answered this move with terror and the minister appointed by Prague for the administration of Slovakia declared martial law for the entire territory of that province.(25) The borders of Slovakia at that time were not yet determined by the peace conference. French military missions in the newly formed states suggested a combined attack on the Hungarian red army.(26) The ill-equipped Hungarian army liberated the greatest part of Slovakia and cleared it from the Czechs. Clemenceau, the president of the peace conference and great supporter of Masaryk and Benes, on 10 June, 1919 sent a diplomatic note to the Kun government in Budapest in which he assured him that Hungary would be invited to plead her case before the conference for just borders. At the same time Hungary was asked to cease the attacks against the Czechs, or face military measures by the entente governments. He de- manded a reply in 48 hours.(27) The French policy makers did not want to admit that their allies did not respect the armistice. Hungary was obliged to fight on several fronts, and Kun had to agree to the cessation of hostilities. The French and Czech political ideas were in complete accordance for the domination of the

Danubian basin. The British and American representatives demonstrated complete apathy and impotence concerning this goal. Central European ethnography, economics and history were unknown to the peace makers. They did not want to hear of the stabilizing force of the Hungarians in the Danubian basin area.

The Czechoslovak-Hungarian Frontier

At the Paris peace conference officially Kramar, the prime minister, led the Czech delegation but in reality Benes, the foreign minister, was the spokesman. They benefited from the immense hatred of the French against Germany and Austria-Hungary and from the unpreparedness and surprising unfamiliarity of the entente and American representatives with the issues involved. Benes preached of a democratic national state of the Czechs and Slovaks and was against a plebiscite on the claimed territory from Austria-Hungary. The would-be national state wanted to annex Sudeten Germans, Slovaks, Hungarians, Ruthenians and Poles. During the peace negotiations Andrej Hlinka, a parish priest, leader of the Slovak Catholic Populist Party, went to Paris through Poland and with Polish assistance to the peace conference. He was accompanied by Francis Jehlicka, another Slovak political leader, to counteract Benes, and demand autonomy for Slovakia according to the Pittsburgh convention and the declaration of T. Sv. Martin (Turocszentmarton). Benes with his excellent French connections had the Slovak representatives expelled from France as Habsburg agents. Hlinka upon his return to the CSR was imprisoned for eight months in Moravia, Jehlicka remained in exile and fought for the autonomy of Slovakia from abroad. France, the friendly supporter of Czechoslovakism, sanctioned the Czech expansionism thus adding more difficulties to the ethnic problems of the new republic.

The treaty of Trianon, signed on 4 June, 1920, mutilated the territory of the millenial Hungarian kingdom, and destroyed the ideal geographic and economic unity of the Carpathian basin. The political and military strength of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy disappeared from the European balance of power. Other nations, first Nazi Germany and later Soviet Russia, filled the political vacuum left on the ruins of the Dual Monarchy. Hungary was forced to accept the clauses of the dictated peace treaty. The pleniponten- tiaries of the victors were not willing to examine the ethnic composition of the Magyar land. They made their decisions on the declarations and falsified statistics of Benes concerning the ethnographic, historic, geographic and economic formation of Hungary. Benes had quick answers to the questions arising from the debates of the Boundaries Commission. According to Benes, Slovakia was part of a Czecho-Slovak state long ago, but at the beginning of the tenth century the Magyars conquered that political structure. According to Benes the historic frontiers of Slovakia extended from the Carpathian mountains to the Danube river and

--in his opinion--it was necessary to take into account the common language, identical religious conditions--although the Slovaks were never Hussites--and moral affinity between the Czechs and the Slovaks.(28) Not a single word was true in this statement. It would take too much time to trace step by step through the boundary dispute. It has been discussed in many works and it would only be repetitious. The aim of the peace makers was in this case to satisfy the insatiable appetite of the Czechs and to create a great Czecho- Germano-Hungaro-Polono-Rutheno-Slovakia. A careful, precise, minutious, serious study of the ethnographic map of Upper Hungary was not important at all. The result of this unbelievably inimical attitude of the allied representatives toward the Magyars ended in the dismemberment of Hungary which country lost 71.5% of its territory and 63.6% of its population.(29) The treaty left 92,666 km2 of the 325,411 km2, and 7,606,971 of the total population of 20,886,487.

The extreme tragedy of Hungary can be illustrated in comparison with other smaller losses of land and population after different wars. In 1871 France lost to Germany 2.6% of her territory or 4,509.4 km2, and 4.1% of her population or 1,579,219 persons.(30) Alsace and part of Lorraine did not constitute an integral part of historic France. Strassburg was occupied from the Germano-Roman empire by the forces of Louis XIV in peacetime, yet after the French defeat in 1871 many protests were filed against the harshness of the peace treaty which gave back to Germany parts of her earlier losses. After World War I Germany lost 13% of her territory and 9.5% of her population. The enclosed maps show the losses of Hungary to the successor states (Figures 1-5). In the support of their case the Czechs always referred to the historic borders of the mediaeval kingdom of Bohemia as natural boundaries. The Bohmer Wald, Erzgebirge, Riesengebirge, Sumava and the Sudeten Mountains surrounded Bohemia from three parts. The kingdom of Hungary could be compared with Britain, Spain or Italy as concerns the natural borders. The thousand-year old natural borders of the land of the Hungarian crown, the Carpathian mountains,surrounded Hungary in a semi circular direction from north-west to

north and to south- east. The natural borders of the Save and Danube rivers in the south were never questioned before the end of World War I.

The geopolitical and economic unity of Hungary was disregarded by the peace conference in Paris. It was unnatural to divide the lowlands from the highlands in the same basin. The rivers are the natural highways from the Hungarian Plains to the watershed of the Carpathian mountains. The mineral wealth of the mountainous regions and the agricultural lowlands ideally complement each other, resulting in a self-sufficient economic unity. Railways and roads were built mostly following the natural communication pathways and there were only two transversal railways in Northern Hungary. As a consequence of the Trianon treaty, the natural conditions were no longer in harmony with the political map of this

part of Central Europe, including the successor states. The absurd border between the CSR and Hungary wanted to satisfy the Czech access to the Danube river and, by internationalizing it, in its entirety to the Black Sea. It could have been arranged by a commercial agreement. The former capital of the Hungarian kingdom, Pressburg for this reason was handed over to the new state; it was not justified on ethnic grounds. According to the 1910 census, the last before World War I, the county (comitat) of Pozsony, Pressburg, including its capital city had: 146,763 Hungarians, 39,488 Germans and 18,282 Slovaks.3l The Boundary Commission was not interested in this. They listened rather to Benes who asserted that previously the border of "Slovakia" had been the Danube river. The Czechs needed the Danube river as a frontier for strategic reasons. The Boundary Commission also found reaso- nable the Czech claim to the purely Hungarian Csallokoz (Gross Schutt), 180,000 hectares between the two branches of the Danube river, with 108,000 Magyars, 3,030 Germans and 1,170 Slovaks.(32) Furthermore, the Czechs demanded a section of the railway line between Pressburg and the Ipoly river north of the Danube. East of Pressburg, the new border divided purely Magyar regions, cutting off indigenous inhabitants from their own nation in Hungary, transgressing rivers, roads, railways, railway junctions, agricultural land and mines, paralyzing communities and separating landowners from their property on the two sides of the borderline. The Commission believed Benes that the brook Rondva at Satoraljaujhely was a navigable river, and it could be, therefore, an ideal dividing line between the two states for strategic reasons. The 800 km long border with Hungary did not give a defensible frontier to the Prague government. The terrain northward grew narrower towards the mountains which impeded the transversal--west-east --movement of troops in case of war. This territorial gain was still not sufficient for Masaryk and Benes. They wanted to incorporate even Ruthenia. Before 1918 it was part of historic Hungary. The Carpathian mountains formed a natural border between Poland and Hungary; they descend gradually towards the great Hungarian Plains. The roads and railways follow a natural route, the valleys of the rivers. The large cities were founded at the meeting points of the lowlands and the foothills. The communication pathways connect- ed Poland and Hungary through the mountain passes. The Ruthenians, descendents of the Ukranians, reached the Carpathian mountains in the thirteenth century and were settled by Louis the Great, the first Angevine king of Hungary. Relations between the Ruthenians and Hungarians were excellent during their common history. They were called "gens fidelissima" by the Magyar leaders because of their unquestionable loyalty to their chosen homeland. The Pan-Slavic propaganda, masterminded by Russian expansio- nism, tried to drive a wedge between these two friendly nations by using a small fraction of the Ruthenians in the service of the government of Petrograd. In 1918 the Hungarian Parliament

passed a law on the autonomy of the Ruthenians for those four counties (comitats) where the Ruthenians had an absolute majority. At the beginning of March 1919, general secret elections were held and a government was elected for the Ruthenian region. On 21 March the short-lived Hungarian Soviet republic was proclaimed, and the danger it represented was the pretext for Benes' demand to incorporate Ruthenia into the CSR, and to prevent the spread of Communism from Russia through Hungary. On 8 May, 1919, Benes told the peace makers that Ruthenia desired to form an autonomous state within the CSR. In the USA Masaryk and Zatkovic signed a pact for this purpose. There were several Ruthenian councils formed in those days with different loyalties.(33) In Paris Ruthenia was transferred to the CSR. The autonomy for Ruthenia was forgotten by Masaryk and Benes. The Ruthenians were governed by Czech civil servants who did not speak their language and still constituted 72% of the public employees.

The Czechs did not need Ruthenia for strategic nor for economic reasons. It becomes obvious by a glance at the map that the narrow strip of land in the eastern end of Czechoslovakia simply could not have been defensible from Bohemia. Economically, the region is connected with the Great Hungarian Plains, and the two areas ideally complement each other with their products. There were no political reasons for the annexation of Ruthenia by Prague since the Czechs and the Ruthenians never had any previous historical ties, and their association in the same state never worked in an acceptable way for either group. The political union of Ruthenia with Bohemia hindered the economic and commercial development of the Ruthenians, caused for them an economic stagnation and depression. The possession of Ruthenia made the CSR from a mili- tary point of view more vulnerable and more difficult to defend against external attacks.

In 1910, the four counties which later formed Ruthenia had the following population: Ruthenes: 44.89%, Magyars: 33.4%, others: 21.8%. In the cities, the Magyar and German population represented 90.4%, the Ruthenian 4.1% and the other nationalities 5.5%.(34) The number of Ruthenians living in the CSR in 1921 totalled 459,364.(35)

The newly created successor states promoted French hegemony in Central Europe. There is a difference, however, between these political units and the Dual Monarchy. The Austro-Hungarian monarchy became a multilingual state through long historical development. Different nations and nationalities--eleven of them --lived there together for centuries. Contrary to this peaceful development, the Czechs forced to leave in 1919-1921 from their homes 56,000 Magyars according to their own statistics; but the Hungarian statistics exhibited 106,841 refugees.(36) In 1910 there were 7,468 Czechs in Upper Hungary, in 1921 the number of Czechs in Slovakia rose to 71,733, and in 1930 to 120,926.(37) The Czechs were able to hold the newly acquired foreign territories only with foreign support. Benes, in 1919, betrayed the real Czech interests to the

French and later in 1945, to the Russians. He and Masaryk did not fulfill their promises to make a model democracy, an Eastern Switzerland, from the new state. They were vehemently opposed to a plebiscite because in that case they never could have had Czechoslovakia. The republic fell apart in twenty years because there were no equal democratic rights for all the citizens of the country. The peace treaty caused subsequent sufferings for millions. The ruining of the Danubian monarchy resulted in chaos and invited foreigh armed interventions in Central Europe.

The real fallacy was, that a real peace conference, at which the defeated would also have been present to demonstrate the limit of acceptable conditions, was never called together. In the extent of the territories taken from Hungary wrongs were perpetrated and gross injustices done.(38)

Footnotes

1. Glaser, Czecho-Slovkia: A Critical Nistory, p. 3.

2. Helmreich, E.C., West Europe: Sensitiue Allies, Culsent History,

October 1953, p. 213.

3. Kovag6, J., The Cities of the Hungarian Linguistic Territory in Slovakia,

p. 32.

4. Apponyi, A., et aL, Justice for Hungary, p. 51.

5. Problem Slowacki (The Slovak Problem), Gazeta Polska, 24 May, 1938.

6. Benes, V., Masarykovo dilo v Americe, p. 3.

7. Czako, E., La verite sur les deliberations preliminaires du traite de

Trianon, p. 50.

8. Vnuk, F., Slovakia's Six Eventful Months, Slovak Studies, Historica 2, Clevedland-Rome, Slovak Institute, 1964, p. 22

9. Lettrich, J., Modern Slovakia, p. 3.

10. Thomson, S.H., Czecho-Slovakia in European History, p. 291.

11. Macartney, C.A., Hungary and Her Successors, p. 215.

12. Gajanova, E., CSR a stredoevropska politika velmoci, 1918-1938. Praha, CAV, 1967, p. 16.

13. Foreign Relations, 1918, Suppl. I, p. 824-825.

14. Felvidekunk-Honvedsegunk, p. 5 (Trianonto1--Kassaig).

15. Csatar-Olvedi, A visszatert Felvidek adattara, p. 28.

16. Felvidetunk-Honvedsegunk, p. 28.

17. Balla, P., A felvideki magyarsag kulpolitikai tevekenysege, p. 22.

18. Benes, E., Svetova valka a naste revoluce, III, p. 500.

19. Gajanova, Op. cit., p. 31.

20. d'Olay, F., Les frontieres de la Hongrie demembree, p. 4.

21. Dobry, A., Kdo vladl v predmnichovske republice, p. 5.

22. Gajanova, Op. cit., pp. 30-31.

23. d'Olay, Op. cit., p. 5.

24. Szvatko, P., A visszatert magyarok, p. 30.

25. Milei-Smutny, Dokumentumok a Sziovak Tanacskoztarsasagrol, 1919, p. 38.

26. Ibid., p. 129.

27. Ibid., p. 114.

28. Czako, E., La verite sur les deliberations preliminaires du traite de Trianon, p. 27.

29. Ajtay, J., La paix en danger, p. 17.

30. Ibid., pp. 4-5.

31. Czako, E., Op. cit., p. 32.

32. Ibid. p. 47.

33. Tarjan-Falk, Hungarians, Slovaks and Ruthenians in the Danube

Valley, p. 20.

34. Seeds of Conflict I, p. 11

35. Kovacs, E., Szemben a tortenelemmel, p. 11.

36. Macartney, C.A., Op. cit., p. 158.

37. Ibid., p. 125.

38. Magyar, Zoltan, James T. Shotwell at the Paris Peace Conference, The Hungarian Quarterly, Vol. IV, No. 4, 1938, p. 764.

From Trianon to the First Vienna Arbitral Award