From Trianon to the First Vienna Arbitral Award

In 1919, the peace conference devised an artificial state consisting of a conglomeration of nations under Czech rule. A majority of the people, 54%, had to live in Czechoslovakia against their will. Monstrous damage was done to the Hungarian nation by an unjustified separation of the coherent Hungarian population and their land from the mother country by putting them as a frontier minority under foreign rule. The restoration of control by peaceful means over the former integral parts of Hungary was the aim of the subsequent governments in Budapest. The Allied and Associated Powers, the victors in 1918, tried to perpetuate the status quo after World War I, and "to avoid later difficulties" they put the guarantee of the rights of national minorities under the protection of the Council of the League of Nations in Geneva. The treaty signed on 1O September, 1919 at Saint-Germain-en-Laye between the Allied and Associated Powers and Czechoslovakia provided for the protection of national minorities. It was never honoured by the Czechs. Before the peace arrangements in Paris, Benes stated in one of his numerous memoirs that the model of the Czecho-Slovak constitution would be the Swiss federal constitution and the new state would be a sort of Eastern Switzerland. (l) When in power, Benes did not apply the Swiss constitution to the specific Czech conditions.(2,3) In agreement with the clauses of the treaty of Saint-Germain, Czechoslovakia had to recognize to all former German, Austrian and Hungarian nationals and/or their descendants the right of domicile which they had on the day of the ratification of the treaty, 16 July, 1920, on the territory which became or would be part of the CSR based on the treaties already signed or in preparation.(4} There is contradiction between the stipulation of the treaty of Saint-Germain and Article 62 of the Treaty of Trianon of 4 June, 1920, which dictated the peace conditions to Hungary. The treaty of Trianon obliged Czechoslovakia to recognize for her citizens only those Hungarian nationals and their descendants who had the right

of domicile on the territory which the CSR received from Hungary prior to 1 January, 1920. The right of domicile was one of the necessary conditions for the acquisition of Czechoslovak citizen- ship. The granting of citizenship to those persons who received the right of domicile in communities only after that date, depended on the judgment of the government of Prague. The terms of the treaty of Saint-Germain concerning the guarantees of the minority rights could only be changed with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. The Czechs had no right to change the minority rights unilaterally. With this action the Czechs wanted to deprive tens of thousands of persons of Hungarian origin of their citizenship and to treat them as aliens. They became foreigners on the land of their forefathers due to the intruders possessing foreign military and diplomatic aid. The Czechs also interpreted, in a restrictive way, the prevalent Hungarian laws. The Hungarian laws automatically recognized the right of domicile to a person who resided for four years without interruption in a community and contributed to the community taxes at least once during those four years. The Czech interpretation of the Hungarian laws required four years of uninterrupted sojourn in a community and payment of municipal taxes for the entire four-year period. In Hungary admission as a legal resident in a community became automatic or tacit after four years of residence, by descendance, or by marriage. It was not necessary to apply formally for the right of domicile or to receive a document to prove it. An application for Czechoslovak citizenship was processed only in that case if the applicant or his/her predecessor had received the right of domicile prior to 31 December, 1906 (when the CSR did not exist yet), and it was proved by the minutes of the meeting of a municipality. Applications for Czechoslovak citizenship had to be mailed until 31 December, 1921. Late applications were not accepted. A Czech arbitrary decision further rendered more difficult the admission of the former resident Hungarian population to the citizenship of the new state by a decision of the Supreme Administrative Court of the CSR, issued on 6 October, 1923. This didnotrecognize the tacit right of domicile. If a person wanted to acquire a document proving that right, he or she had to apply for it in a community.(5) This was an erroneous interpretation of the Hungarian law No. XXII/1886. This court decision invalidated, a posteriori, acquired rights.(6) The Hungarian law was not withdrawn or replaced by a new statute for Slovakia and Ruthenia in the new CSR. Over twenty-six thousand people became stateless by losing citizenship in their native land. This number augmented by 1930 to 91,832 in Slovakia and Ruthenia.(7) Such degradation was a deliberate, malevolent step by the Czechoslovak internal administration. In the possession of this judicial weapon, the Ministry of interior and its police force could harass anyone they wanted to brand as an alien. An investigation of the right of domicile status of selected groups followed this court decision. Hungarians from all social classes, poor and rich,

pensioners, widows, orphans, teachers, physicians, lawyers, workers, industrialists all alike were victims of harassment and deprivation of their rights. Many of them lost their livelihood or had to liquidate their assets and were forced to cross the border to Hungary as stateless persons. Their number was added to the already expelled 100,000 persons since 1918.

In the treaty of Saint-Germain, Czechoslovakia also accepted other legal obligations towards her minorities. Sections 1 and 2 of Chapter I, and section 10 of Chapter II of this treaty were incorporated word for word into the Czechoslovak constitution.(8) Law 122/1920 of the language rights takes into consideration the appropriate chapters of the peace treaty. The official language of the state according to this was the "Czechoslovak" language. It must be noted that such a language never existed nor does it exist today, just as a Belgian, Canadian, or Swiss language does not exist. Such a fabricated language was the legal and official language of an invented nation. Law 122/1920 established guidelines for the language rights in the CSR. In practice it meant that in Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia and Ruthenia the Czech language and in Slovakia the Czech and Slovak languages belonged to the official language category. The language law regulated the language rights of the minorities in the courts of law, administrative offices of the state and judicial districts. The use of the language of a national minority was permitted if according to the latest census at least 20% of the population belonged to other than the "Czechoslovak" language category, and the sphere of a judicial district was limited to that territory. Submissions in such districts had to be accepted and decrees issued not only in "Czechoslovak" but also in the language of the recognized minority. Legal entities were obliged to use "Czechoslovak" in their oral or written submissions. The law also regulated the language of instruction in the public education sector. In towns and districts Czechoslovak citizens other than Czech or Slovak speaking, if in considerable proportion, received instruction in their own language and managed their own cultural and charitable orgavnizations. In spite of Law 122/1920 several million citizens of the CSR, did not enjoy the most fundamental linguistic rights although the government of Prague was obliged by an international treaty to grant legal equality to all citizens. The government decree, No. 17 of 3 February, 1926, interpreted the application of the language law by using different derivates for the limitation or the extinction of minority rights in the republic. The minorities had to live in constant personal insecurity. The acceptance and declaration of granting equal rights did not mean the fulfillment of the obligations by Czechoslovak authorities.(9) One method for the quick diminution of the number of minorities in their counties was the falsification of the results of the census. In Slovakia and Ruthenia the enumerators completed the question naires, and there was no control over or legal recourse against their activities. A comparison of the 1910 Hungarian and the 1921 and

1930 Czechoslovak statistics shows a rapid official decrease of the Hungarian population of the republic.l0

The Czechoslovak Land Reform

The appointed"not elected"revolutionary National Assembly passed Bill No. 251/1919 (13) which set up the Land Office to implement land reform, or rather, the limitation of possession of land acreage by one landowner. The Czechoslovak land reform was in reality the confiscation of land from their owners without adequate compensation. It was politically motivated without social or economic purpose. A great part of the land in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia was owned by Germans, and in Slovakia and Ruthenia by Magyars. The Czech revolutionary National Assembly passed laws and took away with the semblance of legality the land from the German and Hungarian landlords, and distributed it among Czech, Moravian and Slovak colonists in German and Hungarian districts. It was a political handout for those who were willing to support the policy of the new masters governing in Prague. The government seized the land through the Land Office, it was recorded in the Registry Office, and the Land Office disposed of such land. The land

could be distributed, rented or forced farming could be introduced on it. Such seized land was kept in limbo, in uncertainty, because the former owner could not cultivate it properly with the necessary investments for profitable farming.

The Land Office paid an average of 2,100 Kc (Czechoslovak crowns) per hectare when the average price was 10,500 Kc. The land purchaser had to pay to the state 4,000 Kc per hectare. The loss of the Magyar landowners was 3,500 million Kc.(l4) The government made a net profit of 12 million Kc on 2.5 million hectares of land.(15) In Slovakia from the total land area of 10,713,533 cadastral yokes (1 cadastral yoke = 1.412 acres) of which 5,003,196 cadastral yokes were arable, the state seized 2,865,735.10 yokes = 26.7% of the total land. The arable land was 19.1%, or 956,213.03 yokes. The state returned to selected owners a total of 588,862.03 yokes of which 293,099.08 yokes were arable. During this operation the Hungarian population suffered serious losses: 1,836,137.05 or 80.7% of the total land, of which 528,743.12 or 79.8% was arable land. The losses of other nations were as follows: Germans: 4.5% arable land, Slovaks: 1.6% arable land.(l6) (See Appendix No. 3). Compensation for the seized land was regulated by order-in-council No. 329/1920 and No. 53/1921.(17) The Land Office paid the 1913 and 1915 prices not in the old Austrian crowns but in the new Czechoslovak currency. Payments were made in non-transferable bonds bearing 3% interest with an amortization period of one-hundred years. 18 The aim of the land reform was the weakening of the economic power of the Germans and Hungarians in order to force them to forfeit their land in the frontier zones to the faithful political followers of the reactionary government of Prague disguised as democratic rulers. In Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia 72% of the estates were left in the po6session of the owners; whereas in Slovakia and Ruthenia" formerly Upper Hungary"this percentage was only 28%. The land reform, which confiscated the arable land over 150 hectares or over 160 hectares in case of co-ownership, or non-arable land over 250 hectares, broke the homogenous Hungarian language territory in Slovakia by settling on the expropriated land Czechs, Moravians and Slovaks. These outposts of the Slavic element in Hungarian regions received all kinds of financial support, including long-term loans for the purchase of land, buildings and instruments, to ensure their successful farming. This forced transfer of property deprived about 50,000 Hungarian agricultural workers of their livelihood because they had to leave their homes located on the confiscated land.(l9)

Another device for the distribution of land to government supporters was the creation of residual estates. Selected persons could receive land above the permitted level from the Land Office. This way, land could be obtained up to 1,000 cadastral yokes or 1,412 acres. Altogether 581 colonies were created in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, and 2,276 in Slovakia and Ruthenia.(20) It was characteristic of the operation of the Land Office that it never had to

explain its manipulations, and for budgetary purposes it did not belong to any ministry during its 15-year existence, although it had to manage property worth billions of Kc. Its dealings were never controlled by the usual way of a parliamentary democracy. The land confiscation by the Czech "liberators" was a form of denationalization and economic destruction of the chauvinistic program of the government under democratic fasade. Full compensation for the confiscated land was never provided to the landowners

Capital Levy

A new tax, called capital levy, was enacted by the revolutionary National Assembly at the beginning of the existence of the Czechoslovak republic. This tax had to be paid on the property owned on 1 March, 1919. This tax was raised on movable and immovable property up to 30% of the value of one's possessions. The motive for the introduction of this tax was the accumulation of income, called war fortune. It had to be paid even if the property was not acquired during the war. Similarly to the seized land by the Land Office, this tax was recorded in the Registry Office; conse- quently, the property owners lived in complete uncertainty as to their title deed, and did not dispose of their property freely. This was a very high additional tax required by the new Czech rulers. The final sum of this tax was never determined during the twenty-year existence of the CSR, and it left irreparable damages. This extra tax became even higher when it was collected. Due to the depreciation of the Czechoslovak currency, the retroactively levied capital levy tax reached three times its initial sum when it had to be paid.(21) If one adds to this sum the income, property and school taxes demanded at once for six years retroactively, it is clear that they were well beyond the means of the taxpayers, and consequently ruined many of them financially leading them into desperation. On 29 March, 1938 the House of Deputies in Prague discussed an amendment to the Land Reform Act and Capital Levy Act (of 1919). Two years prior to this amendment, Bill129/1936, was supposed to regulate the problems connected with these laws but they were not solved until the projected date of 1938. The government introduced an amendment again in 1938 which deferred the fina] actions connected with these two laws for another two years.(22) In practice, it meant that these problems were never solved because the republic collapsed in the same year leaving behind the burdens created by the appointed zevolutionary lawmakers.

Reimbursements of War Loans

During World War I loans were offered by the citizens to help the war efforts of the Austro-Hungarian govermnent in the form of interest-bearing bonds and/or mortgages. The Czechoslovak government

had also to assume the debts, not only acquire the assets of Austria-Hungary. The exchange rate offered for the war loans caused another grievance to the population of Slovakia and Ruthenia. After passing Bill 216 on 30 September, 1924, there was a short time allowed for the redemption of these government obligations. In the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, taxes were allowed to be paid with war loan bonds.(23) The taxation offices in Czechoslovakia collected taxes for the years 1916-1918 when the republic did not yet exist. In the CSR, claims for these war loans were limited to 25,000 Kc ($1 = 30 Kc), and they could be filed in the district taxation offices. The rigid application of regulations, the control, the revisions, the tardiness in connection with the redemption of the war loans caused hardships to lenders. Interest on the loans was not paid by the Czechoslovak authorities, and the mortgages could not be discharged without the approval of the Registry Offices. If the taxation officers wanted to delay the repayment of the loans or to release the mortgages, they checked and rechecked the eligibility of claimants or used several other delaying tactics. In some districts war loans were redeemed for higher rates than in others. The Czechoslovak crown (Kc) was taken at parity with the pre-war Austro-Hungarian gold crown when in reality the ratio was ten Kc to one gold crown. The Czechs were not the losers in this operation since they did not support the Austro-Hungarian government with their contributions during the war years.

The Fate of the Hungarian Banks in Slovakia and Ruthenia

The Hungarian owned banks, loan associations and credit unions suffered great financial damage due to the change of borders and the banking regulations of the new rulers. Some deficit occurred when many debtors of these financial institutions had to evacuate the new state and many credit claims could not be collected from beyond the frontiers. These losses forced many lenders out of business. The unfair treatment of the Prague government dwindled the branches of the Hungarian banks. The banking regulations permitted the increase of the original capital investment only to Czech and Slovak banks. The banking law No. 239/1924 (24) sup- ported the Czech and Slovak banks from the state treasury to help them to offset financial losses caused by political changes. This aid was given through discretionary power as well as by permits for establishing new branches. The government extended preferential treatment to selected Czech and Slovak banks but not according to the needs of economy. Politics governed this monetary policy in order to weaken the Hungarian banks to the detriment of the economy of the Magyar populated areas of the republic. The Prague government reached its objective: many banks owned by Hungarians had to close their doors for business. During the first ten years of the CSR the number of Hungarian banks was reduced from

126 to 15 in Slovakia and to 5 in Ruthenia. (25) This procedure of constant pauperization of the population of Slovakia and Ruthenia was augmented by requiring paper money to be validated by govern- ment issued stamps. This was a method for controlling the circula- tion. With this procedure the money lost 55% of its value in Slovakia and 90% in Ruthenia. (26) Another study puts the shrinking of the Hun- garian financial institutions in the CSR from 177 to 37, their local branches from 52 to 27, their agencies from 29 to 7, their capital from 61.5 million gold reserves to 20.7 million, their reserves from 30.5 million to 12.2 million Kc.(27)

The Czechoslovak Taxation Policy

The taxation policy of the government was a political weapon hidden behind various sets of regulations valid for the Czech lands and for the former Hungarian lands. In practice they manifested themselves in arbitrary changes of figures on the income tax return forms completed by the taxpayers. Appeals against decisions had no delaying effects on enforced tax collections and led to the auctioning of properties and caused numerous bankruptcies among defenceless taxpayers. The general public was certainly not responsible for the slow work of the taxation officers or for the levying of taxes retroactively for six years together with retroactive interest charges. Arrears in tax payments had some side effects, too. Applications for passports were sent to the district taxation offices for verification of tax payment. Persons found to be in arrears could not receive passports unless a substantial collateral deposit in securities was made.

There were inequalities in tax rates(.2)8 Income tax on wages in Slovakia and Ruthenia was 10%, in Bohemia and in Moravia 2%. The Hungarian population of the republic was very much incon- venienced by this taxation policy. Flying commissions of the internal revenue offices terrorized the over-taxed Hungarian minority. Power of taxation in Slovakia was significantly curtailed with the de-industrialization of the province. The Czechs progres- sively destroyed the competitive industry built during the Hunga- rian sovereignty, and until 1934 they closed down 215 factories in Slovakia.(29) The taxation power of this province was weakened by this economic policy

Pensioners

At the time of change in state sovereignty the retired persons suffered much as a result of the political events. The Czech authorities interrupted or completely withdrew the payments of pensions waiting for the outcome of citizenship applications or special investigations. This group found itself in the most grave financial situation. When the state wanted to escape from its obligations towards those of its subjects who for a lifetime had

worked honestly as public servants, they were condemned together with their widows or orphans to a poverty stricken life of misery. In many cases the right to pension was not recognized. Some persons were forced into early retirement and received an income equal to the minimum required for bare survival when in fact rising consumer prices would have justified a more humane treatment.

Magyar Cultural Life

According to the international obligations undertaken by signing the peace treaties, the Czechoslovak government had the moral responsibility to grant equal rights to the national minorities. These principles were incorporated in the Czechoslovak legislation (30) but were not enforced: statistics speak for themselves. The systematic reduction of the schools of Magyar language instruction in the CSR is proof of the cultural maltreatment of the Magyar minority. On the territory of Upper Hungary, the post-war Slovakia, in 1918 there were 3,298 Magyar elementary schools. In 1921-22 this number was reduced to 727. The Czechs had one high school for every 48,000 inhabitants, the Hungarians in the CSR one high school for every 137,000 inhabitants.(31) The planned destruction of the Magyar elementary schools had a direct consequence on the number of the Magyar high schools since only those students were allowed to continue their studies in Magyar high schools who completed their elementary training in the same language. In 1918, sixty Hunga- rian high schools functioned in the territory which the peace treaty had detached to the CSR. Under Czech and Slovak administrations this number was redueed to eight. Cities with an absolute Hun- garian majority did not get high schools in the language of the majority. Law No. 189/1919 prescribed the establishment of schools in such communities where at least forty children could be found in a language group. This law was not enforced to satisfy the needs of the Hungarian school-aged children. Cultural oppression mani- fested itself through the entire educational system, not only at elementary level. The tendency of curtailing Hungarian instruction was continued in the classical, commercial, agricultural and vocational high schools. New schools were not opened even if the Hungarian parents asked for them.(32) Instruction at university level in Magyar language did not exist in the CSR. The University of Prague and the University of Pressburg employed a part-time lecturer, the same person, for giving lectures on topics of the Hungarian literature. Studies completed and diplomas received at universities in Hungary were not recognized in the CSR. University studies in Hungary were discouraged and were even regarded as a hostile act. The acquisition of passports for such purpose encoun- tered enormous difficulties, and the receiving of Czechoslovak currency for studies in Hungary was simply impossible due to exchange regulations. There were no scholarships available for Hungarian students in the CSR which was supposedly their state, and they had to be loyal citizens of the new republic.

In 1929 President Masaryk donated 1 million Kc for the foundation of a Hungarian scientific, literary and artistic association. It was put under the direction of Hungarian speaking individuals loyal to the CSR, many of whom escaped to safety in the CSR after the collapse of the Hungarian Soviet republic. The Czech democracy protected them and used their services to divide the solid opposition of the patriotic Hungarians. Hungarian Theatres in the CSR

Theatres play a great role in the cultural development of every nation and have an important function in the maintenance of the national spirit. It is therefore understandable that in many countries monarchs lavishly supported the national theatres by their donations. The Czechoslovak Republic also supported the theatres through the state budget with a sum of 20,660,000 Kc (1930) but the existing two Hungarian theatre companies received only 100,000 Kc of that sum instead of the minimal pro rated share of 1,770,000 Kc they were entitled to.(33)

The Hungarian theatre companies had to share on a territorial basis the buildings and stages of the Slovak companies. For Hungarian performances the buildings were obtained before or after the peak season. This added to the hardships of those companies which had to maintain themselves with the help of patrons and supporting benevolent associations in the towns of Slovakia and Ruthenia. Permission to function had to be obtained from the counties. Invitation of actors and actresses from Hungary was permitted only on exceptional occasions and with great diffi- culties. Under these circumstances no one could speak of equal support of the theatres of the Hungarian minority from the state budget

The Hungarian Press in the CSR

Article 113 of the Czechoslovak constitution declared freedom of the press. The Czech authorities, however, exerted constant pressure on the newspapers, journals and other publications of the Magyar opposition parties as well as on other non-Czechophile publications through censorship. This operation was covered by the Defence of the Republic Act No. 50/1923.(34) Printed material was silenced if it contained views defending the minority rights or the speeches of the Hungarian deputies in the Prague Parliament critical of the government's policy towards minorities. The introduction of censorship was a flagrant violation of the constitution worked out by the Czech Revolutionary National Council. In the fourth year of the new republic even this method of control was abandoned and substituted with confiscations of publications critical of the minority or language policy of the Prague government. The severity of this measure can be understood from

the frequency of the blank pages of the reprinted second editions of newspapers after the confiscation of the first editions. For instance, between 1 January and 1 October 1927, 1525 printings of newspa- pers were confiscated in Magyar, German and Slovak languages in Czechoslovakia. If the entrepreneurs did not want to face heavy financial losses and readership declines, the newspapers had to be reprinted but with blank spaces. In 1933 and 1934 the Pragai Magyar Hirlap (Prague Hungarian News), the official paper of the Hungarian opposition party, was suppressed for three months by the state censorship.(35) When the Magyar newspapers reported various abuses committed against Hungarians, the publication of those papers was simply suppressed for months.(36)

The Czechoslovak government wanted to counteract the activity of the Magyar language newspapers loyal to their nation, and started to subsidize newspapers in Magyar language in the service of the state. These Czechophile papers were managed and manned by such Hungarian speaking reporters and journalists who sought asylum in the CSR after the collapse of the Hungarian Soviet republic in 1919.

The importation of publications in any form from Hungary was banned. Only three or four selected newspapers were allowed a place on the newsstands in Slovakia and Ruthenia; otherwise, the Hungarian press was tightly excluded from the reach of the Magyar population in the CSR

Churches

The dismemberment of Hungary disrupted the work and administration of churches because several Roman Catholic and Greek Catholic dioceses were entirely or partially lost, and the Calvinist and Lutheran districts suffered damages for the same reason. These disruptions were worsened by the expulsion of Magyar bishops, parish priests and pastors from the occupied territory by the Czechs. Three Roman and two Greek Catholic bishops, as well as many priests and ministers were expelled from Slovakia and Ruthenia. When the autochthonous Hungarian population passed into the minority status, it was deprived of its religious leaders. The ecclesiastical institutions remained the focal point of the Magyar population in the defence of the language, culture and tradition of their ancestors. The Prague government in its anti-Hungarian harassment turned against the Calvinist ministers who helped preserve the true Magyar national feeling in their congregations. Their persecution appeared in the usual form. If the government disliked the activity of a priest or minister, it withheld the congrue guaranteed for them by law. Appeals against such administrative decisions remained unanswered for decades so the involved persons could not take their case to court. These grievances were presented to the League of Nations in Geneva by the Hungarian deputies in the Prague Parliament when legal

redress could not be obtained in the CSR.(37) For self-protection, the Hungarian minority had to form social, philanthropic and charitable organizations and help the underprivileged members of its group, many of whom fell into a degraded status in the CSR. Political Parties Until 1918 the natural political centre for Hungarians was Budapest. After 1918, the northern frontier at the nearest point was only 40 km from the capital. The Trianon treaty debarred a large segment of the Hungarian population from contact with its own race. The new minority suddenly had to build up its own political organizations in the CSR. The ideal solution would have been the formation of only one political party in Slovakia and Ruthenia for the protection of Hungarian interests. The Czech authorities did not give their approval for such a party.(38) In 1920 the Hungarian leaders were not allowed -to form a single party, therefore, there were two parties, the Hungarian Christian Social and the National Small- holders Party, both in opposition to the government in Prague.

Government circles tried to divide the Hungarian voters and organize them into different sections of the Czech or Slovak political parties in order to rule them more easily. The primary concern of the national minorities in the CSR was the preservation of their natural rights, and not the integrity of the improvised state. Their loyalty depended on the respect for the use of their own language, granting of citizenship, establishment of schools for their children and consideration of their property rights by the new rulers. The Magyars, faithful to their national heritage, never wanted to acquiesce in the Czech occupation of Upper Hungary. In the parliamentary elections, held on 18 April, 1920, the Christian Democrats sent four deputies, and the Smallholders one deputy to the Prague Parliament (39) from Slovakia for the defence of the interests of the Hungarian minority. In 1920 there were no elections in Ruthenia.

The two parties in opposition saw the necessity of harmonious work and coordination of their strategy. With this realization they set up a common central bureau for the Hungarian Parliamentary Club initially with headquarters at Losonc (Lucenec) in Slovakia. It was later transferred to Prague. The two Magyar parties in opposition defended the vital interests of their constituents and in 1935 the number of deputies in Prague was augmented to nine and of senators to six. The Hungarian leftist parties were represented by three deputies.

It must be noted that electoral constituencies were unjustly created. In the most exclusive Czech constituency of Prague, 19,469 votes were necessary for the election of one deputy. In the Slovak constituencies of T. Sv. Martin 21,000 votes, in T. Sv. Mikulas 19,000 votes elected one deputy. In the Hungarian constituencies of Ersekujvar/Nove Zamky/31,000 and in Kassa/Kosice/33,000

voters elected one deputy.(40) The increasing encroachment of the government in the political rights of the Magyar population forced the political leaders of the two parties to form only one Hungarian opposition party for a more effective flght within the limits of the democratic institutions. On April 21, 1936 the representatives of the Hungarian Christian Socialist Party and the Hungarian National Party, at their congress held in Ersekujvar /NovE Zamky/, declared the fusion of their parties in the United Hungarlan Party.(4l) With a renewed and younger leadership the united Hungarian opposition led the twenty-year desperate struggle against the Czechoslovak government to a successful conclusion. It was achieved by the unification of the larger part of the territory settled by Magyars in the CSR with Hungary by peaceful revision of the border in 1938.

Footnotes

1. Young, E., Czechoslovakia, Keystone of Peace and Democracy, pp. 346-347.

2. Glaser, Op. cit., p. 39.

3. Schmid-Egger, B., Der Volkerbund und die Sudetendeutschen Minderheitspeti- tionen der Jahre 1920-1926, p. 6.

4. Traite entre les Principales Puissances Alliees et la Tcheco-Slovaquie si- gne a Saint-Germain-en-Laye, le ]0 septembre 1919, Sbirka zakonu a narizeni Statu Ceskoslovenskeho, 21 Dec. 1921, p. 234.

5. Borsody, I., Magyarok Csehszlovakiaban, p. 71.

6. La Question de la nationalite sur la base de l'indigenat de la minorite hongroise en Tchecoslovaquie, Memoire a la Societe des Nations, p. 10.

7. Olvedi, J., A magyar kisebbseg Csehszlovakiaban, p. 280.

8. Sb. zak. a nar., 1920.

9. Macartney, Op. cit., p. 156.

10. Narodnostni vyvoj Ceskoslovenske republiky, pp. 61-62, 88-89. 43***

11. Winkler, W., Der Wert der tschechishen Nationalitatenstatistik, p. 9.

12. Macartney, Op. cit., p. 156.

13. Sb. zfik. a nar.

14. Macartney, Op. cit., p. 172.

15. Public Record Office /PRO/, FO. 307, pp. 4-5.

16. Tarjfin-Falk, Op. cit., p. 39.

17. A Csehszlovakiai Magyar Nepszbvetsegi Liga Memoranduma a Nepszovet- seghez p. 39.

18. Sb. zak. a nar., 1921.

19. Moravek, A., Hungarians in Czechoslovakia, p. 709.

20. Tarjan, O., The Ways of Czechoslovakia and its Magyar Minority, p. 56.

21. Grosschmid, G., Kisebbsegi sors, p. 328.

22. Pragai Magyar Hirlap/PMH/, 30 March, 1938.

23. A Csehszlovakiai Magyar Nepszovetsegi Liga ..., p. 15.

24. Sb. zak. a nar., 1925.

25. Tarjan-Falk, Op. cit., p. 37.

26. Borsody, Op. cit., p. 60.

27. Macartney, Op. cit., p. 177.

28. A Csehszlovakiai Magyar Netpszovetsegi Liga..., p. 15.

29. Jehlicska, F., Le probleme slovaque, p. 1.

30. Sb. zak. a nar., 189/1919.

31. Szvatk6, P., Op. cit., p. 187.

32. Grosschmid, Op. cit., p. 38.

33. Ibid., p. 249.

34. Sb. zak. a nar., 1924.

35. d'Olay, F., La presse hongroise dans les ettats successeurs, p. 6.

36. Balla, Op. cit., p. 18.

37. Metmoire a la Societe des Nations, 1935, p. 27.

38. Borsody, Op. cit., p. 63.

39. Statisticka prirucka Rep. Ceskoslovenske, III, p. 280.

40. de Valous, G., Le sort des minorites en Tchecoslovaquie, p. 279.

41. Purgat, J., Od Trianonu po Kosice, p. 97.**

From Trianon to the First Vienna Arbitral Award