From Trianon to the First Vienna Arbitral Award

The parliamentary elections of 1935 and the strengthening of the opposition gave a serious signal to the government of Prague to formulate new policy towards the national minorities. Although it was very dangerous from the standpoint of individual liberty to criticize the Czechs and their institutions as they were protected by laws, nevertheless, it was the duty of the Hungarian opposition parties to defend bravely, in spite of the envisaged heavy punishments, the interests and rights of the Hungarian population. President Benes was forced to speak on internal political questions during his travels in the country.

On September 11, 1936, Benes invited the Chairman of the United Hungarian Party, count Esterhazy, to his summer residence in Slovakia, and expressed his views on the general European political situation. Later he switched over to the internal problems of the CSR, and mentioned that a coalition government was the only possible way of goveming the country. He offered to consider the participa- tion of the United Hungarian Party in the government of Prague to prevent the persecution of the Hungarian minority in the CSR if there were a revolution or some other internal political changes in Hungary. In such a case, repercussions would be taken inevitably against the Magyars in the CSR. It was a hidden menace by the President of the republic. Benes was thinking of a ministry without portfolio with a certain budget of which the Hungarian minister would dispose freely. The minister would be able to develop the approved Hungarian cultural institutions with that fund. The Hungarian minister, furthermore, would have free access to the President, and could formulate demands. Benes was thinking of Esterhazy himself as a minister without portfolio. He was a courageous advocate ofthe Hungarian cause, and was not disturbed by the fact that there were many legal procedures pending against him. Those were originated by the Czechoslovak autorities. Benes

admitted that he knew of the errors which had been committed against the Magyars by the Prague government, and that they should be rectified. He checked a list presented by Esterhazy to the President's secretary a few days earlier. Benes added that he was against the revision of the borderline in favour of Hungary. Esterhazy, avoiding the question of borders--it was dangerous because of the Defence of the Republic Act--told Benes that the Hungarians did not want to serve the interests of the* ethnic group in the framework of a Czechoslovak coalition government. The Magyars were not looking for opportunism. Such persons were not regarded as Hungarians who escaped to the CSR after the defeat of the first Hungarian Soviet republic and who for financial compen- sation served the interests of the Prague government. Esterhazy further explained to Benes the policy of denationalization pursued by the government and its agencies. The Hungarian deputy did not believe that Hungary was nearing a revolution, and if the Magyar minority were persecuted in the CSR because of internal events in Hungary it would be the duty of the Hungarian minority leaders to take the case to international forums. The Magyars in the CSR did not accept the offer of a cabinet post in the Prague government and did not remain silent. Their economic, cultural and linguistic grievances did not find a favourable hearing or remedy. The competent Czechoslovak authorities had to show their benevolence and understanding before anything could happen concerning the proposals of the President. Benes asked Esterhazy not to disclose to the press that the meeting between them took place.(50)

It was not the first meeting of Esterhazy with Benes. Towards the end of 1935 the ill-health of the President demanded the election of his successor. Masaryk wanted to see Benes in that high position, and negotiations were initiated with the representatives of political parties. Among the first deputies it was count Esterhazy to whom Benes explained the wish of Masaryk as well as the importance of the Hungarian votes for himself. He admitted that many injustices were committed against the Hungarian minority, but he was willing to remove them in exchange for Hungarian support. Esterhazy could not give any firm commitments alone, and recommended the invitation of Jaross, another Hungarian minority leader. Several days later a Hungarian delegation went to Hradsin, the castle of Prague. Benes promised them everything they asked for but the delegation wanted a written confirmation of his statements. Benes hesitated to commit himself in writing. Finally it was agreed upon that the reception of the Hungarian demands would be confirmed by Benes. Of those demands only one point was fulfilled, a donation of Kc 100,000.00 ($30,300.) on one occasion to the Hungarian Mensa Academica in Pressburg. The Hungarian minority leaders were tricked by the future president of the republic who broke his word after his election.(5l) Two months later a new nationality policy was promised by the Prague government, and the deliberations were based on the cooperation of the activist parties

Meanwhile there were changes even in the activist camp. In 1937 the German activists forwarded a common list of demands to the Hodza government which was then working on a new nationality policy which did not provide enough concessions to the minorities. Benes himself wanted to take a more active part in the management of the state affairs. He himself went to Belgrade in April to the Little Entente conference, the first time since he became President and had to abandon the foreign affairs portfolio. He thought his pre- sence was needed to gain international support for the CSR in the in- ternal difficulties. The Prague government decided to start negotia- tions with the minorities, and a new nationality policy was unveiled on 12 November, 1937 and Hodza began his deliberations with the Sudeten German party on 16 November.

The Question of Minorities: an Internal and External Problem of Czechoslovakia

President Benes and Prime Minister Hodza were vehemently against any kind of substantial concessions or autonomy for the territories inhabited by Germans, Slovaks, Hungarians, Ruthe- nians or Poles, and even more so against the revision of the borders in the regions of the national minorities. Both of them held their offices since the end of 1935, the year in which the parliamentary elections strengthened the opposition. The cause of the nationalities gained momentum through internal and external actions, reaching its climax in 1938. Twenty years earlier, when Benes negotiated the southern borderlines of the future CSR in Paris with the aid of the French, Hodza tried to do the same with the Hungarians in Budapest. In 1938 the political constellation was different, and the same methods could not be applied again for the deliberate misrepresentation of facts. By the irony of fate, it was the role of these two men to negotiate in 1938, under pressure from their allies, new borders with Germany, Poland and Hungary in albeit altered conditions. In 1918 the degradation of Germany and Hungary was a triumph for Benes, Hodza and their associates; twenty years later the humiliation of the CSR, the overthrow of its President and the dismissal of its Prime Minister was a failure of both men and the political concepts they represented. Their democracy was a disguised dictatorship for the non-Czech part of the population.

It missed the essential elements of a democratic system: equality before the law and respect for the human dignity of national minorities. The minorities reciprocated to the Czechoslovak government appropriately when the opportunity arose. In self- defence it was their duty to end the perpetration of injustices committed against them by the users of political power in Prague. The Czech politicians were so confident in the inviolability of their power base, protected by treaties of alliances, a modern well-armed army, strategically located line of fortifications, a gendarmery, a police force and laws for the defence of the republic, that every

susceptible move or deed by the opposition to the democracy of the Czechs could be nipped in the bud. This ultra self-confidence or political blindness of the Czech leaders resulted in delaying tactics and intransigence which ultimately produced outside intervention and resulted in the reduction of the territory of the republic in favour of Germany, Poland and Hungary, and a forcible granting of autonomy to the Slovaks and Ruthenians. All of these steps came too late, and were insufficient to save the artificial borders from disappearing.

Signs of danger for the continued maintenance of the Czech domination appeared after the May 1935 parliamentary elections the results of which clearly indicated an increased dissatisfaction of a large segment of the population with the government. During the following years, Benes toured the country delivering speeches while Hodza introduced a new nationality policy in 1936. It was not called a minority policy; perhaps it suggested a new outlook of the old problem. This innovation did not signify a benevolent attitude to the badly neglected and mismanaged question. It was just a new appearance of an agitated confusion camouflaging an unwanted policy imposed on the government by events at home and abroad. Neither Benes nor Hodza were sincere in the extension of full citizenship on every subject of the republic and introduction of truly democratic system of government. They were compelled to pretend before the general public that a democratic transformation was taking place which would save the government by getting around the thorny and acute problem without changing anything in the old practice.

The diplomatic activity and international interest in the Czecholovak question which culminated in 1938 is recounted in a plethora of literature. Hundreds of books and articles have been published on this subject as well as on the Sudeten German portion of the problem. The status of the Hungarian minority in the republic and the demands of this national minority has until now received less publicity. The Magyars exerted less pressure on Prague than the German minority.

During the pre-Munich years and during the 34 days between the Munich agreement and the Vienna arbitration, the Hungarian government and the Hungarian minority in the CSR behaved more correctly towards the Czechoslovak government than the other nationalities of the republic. The six coalition parties of the Prague government had to negotiate with the leaders of the minorities, first of all, with the strongest group of the Sudeten Germans. Prague had to come out with some concessions, some plans as they called them, to pacify the nationalities and to try to give a chance for the captive minorities to lead a bearable life. The Czechs made a great mistake by waiting so long with the solution of the minorities question. It was getting late for finding a satisfactory answer. Germany became a military power, and the right for military equality for Hungary was recognized by the signatories of the Protocols of Rome

Hungary was willing to discuss economic matters with the Prague government on condition that her equality in rearmaments and the question of the Hungarian minority was settled. At the end of April 1936 a Polish government delegation visited Budapest. There the Czechoslovak difficulties were discussed, and the Poles did not indicate any territorial claims at that time from the CSR. They rather expressed their interest in the coordination of their policy with Hungary concerning Ruthenia.(52) For one thousand years, there was a common and peaceful border between Hungary and Poland, and the Poles longed for a safe southern border. They were encountered in east and west by their centuries old enemies. During the next two years the Poles displayed vigorous diplomatic activity for the re-establishment of the former common Polish-Hungarian border in the Carpathians.

The Sudeten Germans sought to establish contacts with the Hungarian minority leaders in the CSR and desired to gain encouragement for them from Budapest.(53) They planned to send emissaries to the Hungarian government already in 1936 but the visit was delayed for two years.(54) They thought that the Hungarian minority in the CSR was not aggress*e enough and perhaps they needed emboldening from Hungary for the common cause. The Czechoslovak government in its uncomfortable political situation hardened the traditional oppressive measures against the minori- ties, and tried to involve even the Little Entente by asking for the transformation of the existing alliance into a regional treaty which would invoke the casus foederis if any of the contracting parties should be attacked from any direction(.5)5 Rumania and Yugoslavia did not want to cover the Czech internal problems nor commit themselves for the armed defence of the CSR. Th etwo Little Entente partners of the CSR first in the economic sphere, later on the political front, moved closer to the axis powers, and consequently their negotiations with Hungary concerned the treatment of their Hungarian minorities and they were conducted on a different basis against a different backdrop than that found in Prague. Meanwhile Mussolini had openly endorsed the Hungarian revisionist aims in his speech in Milan on 1 November, 1936.

The Czech treatment of the minorities started receiving interna- tional attention, and it was impossible to hide it by inaction. Prague first used the policy of intimidation which had been employed on countless occasions in the past. The national minorities in the frontier zones lived in constant insecurity and threat due to the Defence of the Republic Act which was used against them very frequently. Even their cultural life was hindered by Prague. In April 1936 a planned Sudeten German cultural week by the Henlein Party at Aussig (Usti nad Labem) had been prohibited by the government, and the direction of the party was informed that its official daily, Die Zeit, and its weekly magazine, Rundschau, could be interdicted because of their frequent confiscations by the censors. After such an

overture, the possessors of power, Benes and Hodia, at the end of the month invited the representatives of the Sudeten German Party to discuss the future political attitude of the party.(56) It was a naive approach from these two senior experienced politicians to think that the Sudeten Germans would confide them their future plans and tactics. In Benes' view, the minority problem did not exist any longer in the CSR, the minorities had more rights than they were entitled to, and nothing should be changed. Benes, in his powerful position, did not want to hear of the legitimate grievances of the minorities and of their rectification by legislation. Under those conditions, the two parties were too far from each other and a common ground for serious negotiations did not exist. At home, the subdued nationalities incessantly demanded their rights secured for them in the peace treaty. However, the movement of the national minorities was supported abroad by the press and by members of several parliaments in various countries in Western Europe. These unforeseen occurences of foreign support forced the Czech leadership to alter its old strategy in internal policy. A satisfactory conciliation and compromise with the national minorities was a pressing problem, but in spite of the gravity of the situation, Hodza was talking only of cultural concessions, more language rights, and perhaps the usage of the names of localities in the language of the minority on the inscriptions of post offices and railway stations. These proposals were ridiculous when it was very well known by the government that the minorities had more serious demands: adjust- ments in making up the economic losses since 1918, equal budget for schools, sharing the public employment, and the public works, and administrative autonomy for the regions inhabited by the nationalities. The strengthening of the opposition in the 1935 elections was not a sufficient sign for a needed policy change in Prague. The stubborn standpoint of the government embittered the situation to such a degree that two years later, after the Austrian Anschluss, the rearmanent of Germany and Hungary and because of the cooperation between Italy and Germany, the concessions demanded in 1936 by the minorities did not satisfy them in 1938 when the balance of power tilted against the CSR. In 1936 the Prague government rather negotiated the eventual concessions destined for the minorities with the activist politicians who re- presented only a small fraction of the ethnic groups. This proves that Prague did not want to negotiate in good faith and did not want to consider long overdue demands. On 18 February 1937, Hodza signed an agreement with three German activist ministers without portfolio in his own government (Appendix 5). It was presented to the press and foreign correspondents as a great accomplishment for the internal peace of the state.(57) The activist politicians were satisfied with little, insignificant concessions but these would not stop further impoverishment and misery in the Sudetenland or in the regions of Southern Slovakia where the Magyar minority lived in a similar situation. The official press release was replete with

promises for the future material well-being of the Sudeten German population by giving them a greater share in public works, investments, social care, state employment, government subven- tions for cultural purposes and the use of German in their contacts with the state authorities. After eighteen years in power, the Czechs finally started thinking of granting some rights and promoting better living conditions but only to the largest minority group, and even that only under external pressures. The Henlein Party, indeed was very soon ready with the repudiation of the plan prepared by the government and its activist German ministers. Henlein in his speech in Aussig (Usti nad Labem) enumerated the demands of his party on behalf of the Sudeten German population. He wanted to officially transform Czechoslovakia, corresponding to reality, into a nationality state. His main points were as follows: autonomy which was not in contrast with the unity of the state; recognition of a national group as a corporate unit for securing its free development within the borders of the state; administration for the autonomous territory for the safeguards of minority rights and reparations for the damages done to the Sudeten Germans since 1918.(58) In addition, the program of the Sudeten German Party included the introduction of laws in the Parliament for the protection of nationalities, and, in case of their rejection by the Czechs and their allies, secure foreign support. A strong Sudeten German union around one party was the reaction to the Czech imperialistic nationalism which denied democracy to the minorities who were fighting for their national existence. Hodia responded to the move of Henlein, and asked for a one year period to work out the details of an agreement.

Time was almost running out for the Czech counter-propositions. After 12 March 1938, Bohemia was militarily in the grips of Hitler from three sides. His will to unify the Germans with the Reich added militancy and boldness to the Sudeten dynamism. Every peaceful agreement was made impossible by the Czech opposition to moderate demands. The Czechs were thinking of accepting or provoking foreign intervention on their behalf, perhaps by the repetition of the brilliant performance of Benes abroad during World War I with influencepeddling and falsification of well-known facts. Czech illusions were placed in the hope of solidarity with France and Russia, but not creating acceptable conditions for the citizens of the state. On 18 February 1937, the government signed a document with the Sudeten German activists for the application of the principle of proportionality which promised them a certain degree of state employment (Appendix 5).(59) Hodia did not negotiate with the opposition parties. The first step was not followed up by legislation, and therefore it could not have beneficial results for the internal political settlement. It was not continued even by any administrative measures or the part of the government. In reality nothing was changed in the life of the minorities and their old grievances did not get redress. The government was unwilling to allow the introduction of any reforms, and the activists themselves

saw a stand-off. They themselves were convinced of the futility of their cooperation concerning the solution of the minority question. Eight months after the February agreement, Jaksch, deputy of the German Social Democratic Party, an ardent supporter of the government, made the following declaration in the Prague Parliament: "The German policy of understanding has in many fields failed to find practical recognition of its vital necessities. It would do no service to the cause to deny that even the most loyal adherents to the policy of understanding in the Gerrnan camp are dissatisfied with the pace at which the February agreement is being put into effect. The consequences of the failure of the honest efforts embodied in the agreement can be averted no longer by words, but only by facts. From this point of view I am compelled to describe the national-political side of the account as unsatisfactory."(60) Hodza was using various tactics but was unable to secure in the constitution even minimal rights for the nationalities. These citizens of the republic in their desperate situation had to turn for support to their blood relatives across the state boundaries, although every contact with them was extremely dangerous for their personal security considering the strict dispositions of the Defence of the Republic Act. The great threat to the individual freedom in the CSR made the internal problems explosive.

The Magyar minority lived under the same civic restrictions as the other nationalities. The authorities arrested and sentenced hundreds of Hungarians for wearing the Hungarian tricolor, singing the Hungarian national anthem or listening to it on the radio if it was heard and reported to the police, for participation in balls in Hungary and noticed in the CSR, for living in university residences in Hungary, for singing innocent military songs, for taking Levente (Cadet) cigarettes ornated with the tricolor across the Czechoslovak border from Hungary.(61) If the newspapers wrote about the complaints of the minorities, they were confiscated by the censors before their appearance on the news-stands. Complaints could not be aired; even the printed words menaced the existence of the state. This policy of intimidation created only brave fighters and many martyrs on the minority front.

Yet, there were some Czech voices in the Prague Parliament which did not approve the permanent obstruction of the minority question by the government and the President. Beran, the Chairman of the Czech Agrarian Party and chief opponent of Benes, who tried to thwart the election of Benes to the presidency, wrote an article in the newspaper Venkov(Countryside) in its New Years' Day issue, recommending the consideration of political realities and include the Sudeten German and Slovak Populist parties in the government by offering them portfolios.(62) This possibility of cooperation with the opposition for saving the republic was hinted to the President before Germany's annexation of Austria, a fatal incident not only for the independence of Austria but also for that of the CSR. The article of Beran produced a sensation among the Czechoslovak

politicians. They were not accustomed to such declarations. For them in the year of the twentieth anniversary of the foundation of the republic it was not desirable to accept all parties into the government, which disapproved the existence of the state. In Benes' view more parties in the government would make governing more difficult. In Beran's view, even if more parties in the go- vernment made the task of governing more difficult, they lent proof to the strength of the government. In his opinion the relations with the minorities needed regulations. It was necessary to proceed in the direction which was expressed in the government's decision on February 18 of the previous year. There had to be an honest and worthy compromise with the Sudeten Germans. More than one- quarter million German voters gave confidence to the Sudeten German Party, and the necessary conclusions had to be drawn from it. They should recognize the CSR and not keep dreaming over the borders. In communities and institutions where they form the majority, the leadership must be given to them with proportional representation to the Czech population. Similarly, they should share in the government of the country. Every German should not be regarded as a traitor because he belongs to the same party. It cannot be regarded as a heroic act if the Vice-Speaker of the Chamber of Representatives does not give a ticket to the gallery of the Chamber to the Chairman of that party which has received the largest number of votes at the elections. This is not the road towards an agreement. The policy makers have to proceed with dignity and responsibility. All the members of the minorities know that in time of danger the whole Czechoslovak nation which suffered for centuries wants to conclude a compromise with the citizens belonging to other nationalities. His wish is that the year of the jubilee might bring a tight cooperation with those nationalitites with whom until now there were many misunderstandings." (63)

The declaration of Beran carried much weight because in the same issue the Venkov published an interview with Henlein, who among other things, said the following: Let us remember the time of the origin of the state. The feeling of satisfaction filled every Czech and Slovak, but the Germans think back with

depression and mourning to the year 1918. It is not the year of victory but the year of the German defeat, as it has always been emphasized from the Czech side. Howevers if we cast a glance at the past twenty years, one can see that in the Czech camp the minds start to clear up. Here are not only satisfied people but also dissatisfied Germans, Slovaks, Hungarians and Poles. If the twentieth year of the republic could produce such a feeling that this state is our state, then we could have a celebration which corresponds to the reality. We wish to all na- tions of the republic but first of all to the Czechs that they should dispose of such wisdom and self-criticism that they might have a successful year in 1938. In that year the ideological and power constellation is different from that of 1918. The Czech nation is older than this-state, and its historic tradition lays an obligation on

the Czech people. He would like to see that the Czechs think back to the Austrian times when they were in a similar situation as the Sudeten Germans in 1938. They have to understand the mood of the Sudeten Germans. The Czechs have the power to make offers for a better understanding.(64) Beran wanted to influence the internal and international relations with his article, and Henlein wanted to prepare the Czech public opinion for the next phase of the confrontation in the minority policy with the government.

The New Year began with a concentrated attack on the govern- ment of Prague not only by the Sudeten Germans but also by the Slovak and Ruthenian autonomists as well as by the Magyar and Polish minorities. The Sudeten Germans took over the leadership of the opposition, and prepared the formation of the minority front against Prague. A delegation of the Sudeten German Party went to the parish of Hlinka in Rosenberg (Ruzomberok, Rozsahegy) on 8 February, 1938 to discuss the cooperation between the two parties, and to establish a liaison for harmonizing the basic principles of a common policy.(65) From Rosenberg, Kunzel and Frank, deputies of the Sudeten German Party, went to Budapest for an informal meeting with Pataky, Secretary of State of the Nationality Affairs in the Hungarian Prime Minister's Office, on the necessity for collaboration between the United Hungarian Party in the CSR and the Sudeten German Party. They informed Pataky of their negotiations with the Slovaks, and the planned common Slovak-German- Magyar demonstrations in Pressburg on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Pittsburgh agreement. They also were received by Prime Minister Daranyi, and Foreign Minister Kanya. Both of them assured the Sudeten deputies of their complete accord with the policy to be followed in the Czechoslovak question. At the expressed wish of Janos of Esterhazy and Andor Jaross, leaders of the Hun- garian minority in the CSR, they also met the former Prime Mi- nister, Bethlen, who already, in 1918 and 1919, tried to realize a cooperation between the Sudeten Germans and the Magyar minority.(66) The Slovak autonomists set out in 1938 with the motto: Attack in the New Year on Prague because Prague does not want to agree on anything.(67) Benes had a meeting with Tiso of the Slovak Populist Party on 15 March but he did not want to hear of a Slovak administration of Slovakia, nor did he recognize the Pittsburgh agreement, and recommended that Slovaks become Czechoslovaks.68 Under those auspices there could not he found a common basis for further negotiations between the Czechs and Slovaks under the leadership of Benes.

The small (81,737) Polish minority in the CSR also felt oppressed and wanted to live with their own race in Poland. The government in Warsaw in the early months of 1938 dealt with the Czech question. In Poland there was an interest not only in the fate of the Polish population in the CSR but also in the realization of a common frontier between Poland and Hungary. If Slovakia and Ruthenia were detached from Prague they should have been prevented from

falling under German domination.(69) Warsaw was pressing on international forums for a common border with Hungary on the old border lines in the Carpathian mountains with the renewal of the safe historical border between the two friendly states. This could have been achieved easily had Hungary granted autonomy to the Slovaks and Ruthenians, where they belonged before 1918. A segment in the Slovak Populist Party, led by Sidor, preferred Polish orientation. He was the emissary on the part of the Slovaks to negotiate an agreement with the Poles. Poland did not want to occupy Slovakia, the former Hungarian territory, and conducted long discussions with Budapest on the potential cooperation for a common border. The key to this question, due to later developments, was in the hands of the National Socialist government of Germany. The Poles tried to persuade several European chancelleries of the desirability of the re-establishment of the old border between Poland and Hungary to form a barrier against the German expansion eastward. These anti-German plans reached Berlin. The common Polish-Hungarian border was realized only in March 1939, after the Hungarian annexation of Ruthenia, with German consent. The north-south concept of the Polish and Hungarian foreign policy was not new. For centuries the north-south line of the Poles, Hungarians and Serbs proved to be a successful barrier against the invaders from the east and south. This political orientation was changed under the reign of Sigismund of Luxembourg, King of Hungary and Bohemia and emperor of the Holy Roman Empire (1387-1437) because of his involvements in the Czech, German, Italian and Church affairs which turned his attention to Western Europe from the burning problems in Eastern Europe. Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, presented the idea of a third Europe for consideration, a bloc from the Baltic to the Aegean and Adriatic Seas for safeguard- ing the independence of the small nations in that immediate area. It had an anti-German and anti-Russian edge. The political vacuum remaining after the destruction of Austria-Hungary had to be filled with the people living in that region and not by foreign invaders. This was felt instinctively by the Polish and Hungarian statesmen. The Polish government was scrutinizing the developments in the CSR, and Beck in his speech on 12 January, 1938 before the Polish Foreign Affairs Committee said that any decision made by the CSR in favour of her minorities, if not applied to the Polish minority, would be regarded by Poland as an unfriendly act.(70) The Prague government reacted to this open manisfestation of support for the Polish minority, and the Czechoslovak ambassador in Warsaw told Beck on 4 May that the Polish minority would enjoy the conces- sions granted to any other minority.(7l)

In February 1938, Horthy, Kanya and Csaky made an official visit to Warsaw coordinating their plans on the minority question in the CSR.(72) In March the Polish government gave its accord to the cooperation of the Polish political parties in the CSR with the United Hungarian Party. The Czechs made an unsuccessful

attempt to divide the govemments of Poland and Hungary by treating their minorities differently. Esterhazy was consulted in Budapest on the Slovak affairs and had talks with the Slovak Populist Party concerning the future of Slovakia. There were constant high level negotiations on political and military questions between Poland and Hungary. The Poles were very much concerned with the standing of Hungarian-Slovak relations. They knew that there had been some contacts between them through the mediation of the United Hungarian Party in the CSR, and that Hungary had offered autonomy for Slovakia in case of the change of the CSR borders. The Poles regarded the future status of Slovakia and Ruthenia as members of Hungary, and in April 1938, according to instructions given to the Hungarian ambassador, Hitler did not claim Pressburg nor other parts of Slovakia.(73) Tiso, leader of the Slovak Populist Party, had a chance to talk to the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Kanya, on the occasion of the Eucharistic Congress in Budapest at the end of May, but there are no details available of this meeting.(74) The Slovaks had more confidence for negotiations in the Hunga- rians living in the CSR than in those in Hungary, and had certain reservations concerning an autonomous Slovakia within Hungary. This was the explanation extended to Esterhazy on his visit to the Polish Foreign Office in the course of preparations made for the case of the liquidation of the CSR in June.(75) From the Polish and Hunga- nan point of view the concern was understandable facing

the menace of placing the whole of Czechoslovakia under German control. In such an eventuality, the fate of Poland and Hungary, they thought, would be similar to that of the CSR after the Austrian Anschluss. A secure border was vitally important for both countries. For this reason so much time and effort was spent in Warsaw and Budapest on Polish-Hungarian diplomatic contacts and on the nationality problem of the CSR.

Footnotes

1. Kramer, Juraj, Slovenske autonomisticke hnutie, Csl.Csopis Historicky, IX, 1961, 346.

2. Hoensch, Jorg, Die Grundlagen des Programms der Slowakischen Volkspartei, 320.

3. Dvortchak, Victor, Aide-memoire sur la Question Slovaque, 6.

4. Ibid., 11

5. Jehlicka, Frangois, Le probleme slovaque, 10.

6. Dvortchak, Op. cit., 7.

7. Hoensch, Op. cit., 334.

8. Mlynarik, Jan, Slovenska narodna rada a vcelovanie Slovenska do cesko- slovenskeho statu, 1918-1919, Csl. Cas. Hist., VI, 1968, 513.

9. Jandera, A. A., Kapitoly z dejin predmnichovske republiky, Praha, Orbis, 1953. 201-202.

10. Jehlicka, Op. cit., 11.

11. Macartney, Op. cit., 145.

12. Miksche, Op. cit., 32.

13. Burian, Peter, Chanzen und Grenzen des sudetendeutschen

Aktivizmus, 135.

14. Chmelar, Joseph, Le probleme allemand en Tchecoslovaquie, Prague, Orbis, 1936, 45.

15. Hoensch, Jorg, Der ungarische Revisionismus und die Zerschlagung der Tschechoslowakei, 19.

16. Ibid., 93.

17. Nittner, Ernest, Dokumente zur sudetendeutschen Frage, 90.

18. Ibid., 98

19. Chmelar, Op. cit., 125.

20. Nittner, Op. cit., 125.

21. Ibid., 124.

22. Public Record Office (PRO), FO. 371/21738, 205.

23. Macartney, Op. cit., 179.

24. Ibid., 180.

25. Miksche, Op. cit., 32.

26. Ibid., 36.

27. Nittner, Op. cit., 126.

28. Burian, Op. cit., 147.

29. Duff, Grant, Europe and the Czechs, 153.

30. Nittner, Op. cit., 128.

31. Cesar, Joroslav--Bohumil Cerny, Politika nemeckych burzoaznich stran v Ceskoslovensku v letech 1918-1938, Praha CAV, II, 1962, 314.

32. Ibid., 315.

33. Private interview with Dr. Walter Brand, formerly of the Sudeten German Party,on 5 July, 1972 at Waldkraiburg in Bavaria.

34. Schramm, Gottfried, Cesi a Nemci v CSR, Dejiny a Soucasnost, 8,

1968, 15.

35. Letak, Miroslav, V osidlech zrady, Praha, Svobodne Slovo, 1965, 226.

36. Cesar--Cerny, Op. cit., 317.

37. George, Pierre, Le probleme allemand en Tchecoslovaquie, 1919-1946, 53.

38. nsar--Cerny, Op. cit., 391.

39. Ibid., 392.

40. Ibid., 393.

41. Vnuk, F., Munich and the Soviet Union, Journ.of Cent.Eur.Aff.,

XXI, Oct. 1961, 293

42. PRO, FO. 371/21723, 3 June, 938.

43. Ibid., 341/21726

44. Jakabffy, E., A szudetanemetek, Magyar Kisebbseg, 1936, 298-299.

45. Nittner, Op. cit., 148.

46. Ibid., 154.

47. Pragai Magyar Hirlap (PMH), 10 January, 1938.

48. Pesti Hirlap, 25 June, 1937.

49. Lidove Noviny, 27 May, 1937.

50. Adam, Magda, A muncheni egyezmeny letrejotte es Magyarorszag kulpolitikaja, 1936-1938, II, No. 32.

51. Culen, Konstantin, Po Svatoplukovi druha nasa hlava, (Zivot Dr. Josefa Tisu), Middletown, Jednota, 1947, 169-170.

52. Ceskoslovenska otazka v diplomatickych spisoch Horthyovskeko Madarska, Hist. Cas., XIV, 1966, 626.

53. A muncheni egyezmeny..., No. 11.

54. Ibid., No. 14.

55. Ibid., No. 40.

56. Ibid., No. 14.

57. Szvatko, Pal, A csehszlovak-szudetanemet kiegyezes kiserlete, Magyar Szemle, XXX, May 1937, 71.

58. Ibid., 73-74.

59. Munchen eine offene Frage, Munchen, Ackermann, Heft 12, 1938, 10.

60. Survey of Intemational Affairs, 1937, 457.

61. Balla, P., Op. cit., 25.

62. Venkov, 1 January, 1938.

63. PMH, 2 January, 1938.

64. Ibid.

65. D.G.F.P., Series D, II, 124-125.

66. Ibid., 135.

67. Ibid., 190.

68. Culen, Op. cit., 193-194.

69. Cienciela, Poland and the Eastern Powers, 56.

70. Ibid., 60. 71. Ibid., 72.

72. A muncheni egyezmeny... No. 135.

73. Ibid., No. 152.

74. Tilkovszky, Lorant, A revizio es nemzetisEgpolitika Magyarorszdgon, 22.

75. A m.uncheni egyezme'ny... No. 250.

From Trianon to the First Vienna Arbitral Award