From Trianon to the First Vienna Arbitral Award

The political transformation of Ruthenia also disrupted the tranquil atmosphere in the republic. The members of the Prague Parliament representing Ruthenia, the Russian Central Council and the Ukranian National Council, held a joint meeting on October 8 at Uzhorod (Ungvar) to formulate the political demands of Ruthenia in the presence of Governor Hrabar, and the Ruthenian Minister in the Prague government, Parkanyi. They decided to present a list of seven ministers to Prague, and request their appointments. After the confirmation of the new government for Ruthenia they wanted to take over the executive power of the province. Thereupon Hrabar announced his resignation, and Parkanyi became his successor appointed by the Prague government.(147) The internal subdivision of the republic resulted in three governments with 30 ministers: 18 in Prague, 5 in Pressburg and 7 in Uzhorod (Ungvvar). The number of ministers rapidly grew as the territory of the republic diminished.

Against this background, the direct negotiations started at Komarom, the city divided between the CSR and Hungary, After

procedural discussions, an agreement was reached in the handing over of two communities on the border to Hungary as a symbolic confirmation of the willingness for greater territorial concessions. Ipolysag (Sahy) in 24 hours counting from October 9 at 24:00 o'clock, and the railway station of Satoraljaujhely (Slovenske Nove Mesto) in 36 hours from the same date were occupied by Hungarian army units. The details were worked out by the military experts present. The next difficult point arose in the use of statistics. The Hungarian delegation based its demands on the 1910 census.(148) The CzechoSlovak delegation argued that newer statistical data would be more favourable to them. The Germans used the 1910 census, in the case of the Sudetenland, as the most recent reliable data. As pointed out in a previous chapter, the Czechoslovak censuses served the political purpose of denationalization. Territories had been taken away from Hungary by the order of the peace conference without such elaborate discussions based on statistics, and with experts from different fields present. Hungary made an offer for plebiscite not only for the Magyar regions but even for Slovak and Ruthenian districts, because Hungary was not afraid of the outcome of a plebiscite. Before further examination of the dispute, a quick glance at the justification of the use of the 1910 census results would clarify its importance. It should be noted that the ethnic settlements in the disputed area of 1938 corresponded to the points of contact between the Magyar and Slavic tribes in the 10th and 11th centuries. There are numerous works published on this question based on the findings of archeology, linguistics, folklore and written historical sources before the Czechs succeeded in the occupation of Upper Hungary in 1918. The Hungarian government did not seek historical justice by claiming territories which had been detached without a scrupulous examination of the composition of every little community and of the wish of the population. The false statements of Benes and the strong antipathy of Clemenceau were not supported by 6tatistics at the peace conference in 1919. The Hungarian proposals were founded on the location of the known and existing Hungarian settlements. The territory in question was taken away forcibly from Hungary in 1918 and without confirming the ethnic principles. The last census before the mutilation of Hungary took place in 1910. It was necessary to use the statistics of that census to enable the retum to the conditions of 1918. The first Hungarian census to distinguish between nationalities was taken in 1880.(149) "At the time of the establishing of the Hungarian rule, the ancestors of the present day Slovaks lived in loose tribal communities. There did not exist an established Slovak state. The conquering Hungarians, however, immediately established and organized a state which withstood the test of centuries. The Slovak tribes surrendered without resistance nor war, nor even a battle. No use of force against the Slovaks has been noted by history."(l50) The Turkish occupation (150 years), and the wars of liberation destroyed the Hungarian population and, to replace the vanishing Hungarian

element, Slovak settlers descended from the highlands to spread out later in all directions.(l5l) The former capital of Hungary, Pressburg, was established by German immigrants. In its population the Hungarian element never possessed a majority but neither did the Slovaks.(l52) Pressburg was promised to Hungary by Hitler in 1938 at the beginning of the Czechoslovak crisis but later the Germans favoured the Slovaks for political gains.(153) The distribution of the nationalities did not change from the 18th century according to reliable documents and various sources. According to Petrov, the unbiased Russian statistician, the Hungarian-Slovak ethnic dividing line remained unchanged throughout the last 130-150 years.(l54) This view was expressed ten years before the Czechoslovak crisis.

The new frontiers of the CSR, according to the Munich agreement, could not be guaranteed without taking into consideration the right of self-determination of the nationalities of the CSR. In 1918 there was no plebiscite either in Sudetenland or in Slovakia (Upper Hungary), because the population would have opted for Germany and for Hungary. After twenty years of constant degradation, the minorities of the CSR wanted to live as free citizens in the states of their nations. In case of plebiscites under international supervision only those persons were given the right to vote who lived there in 1918, the year of the Czechoslovak dispute, or their descendants. The imported colonists and officials could not have the right to vote; on the contrary, the expelled persons and their descendants would have been eligible. The outcome of the free votes cast under such conditions was evident for the government of Prague. A plebiscite, which was promised towards the end of World War I, was repeatedly requested by Hungary to enable the Hungarian minorities abroad to decide where they preferred to live. In October 1938, the Slovaks and Ruthenians opted for autonomy in the CSR. One must not forget that those decisions were taken when, in Slovakia and Ruthenia, a mobilized Czecho-Slovak army of 20 classes was ready to intervene on the order of Prague. For a period of four months, these two provinces remained parts of the CSR.

The Hungarian delegation in Komarom, on the basis of the 1910 census, asked for the transfer of 14,15Q km2 with a population of 1,090,000 with Magyar majority. The territory included the cities of Nyitra, Kassa in Slovakia; Ungvar and Munkacs in Ruthenia.(155) The area included 12 of 13 towns and 812 of 830 villages with Hungarian majority transfered to the CSR in 1918, representing 77.9% of Hungarians.(l56) The Czecho-Slovak delegation, instead of presenting counter-proposals, the following day tried to sidetrack the whole question of retrocession of the demanded belt of land. They talked of the economic, industrial and strategic importance of the area as well as the lines of communications and railway centres necessary for the CSR. These delaying tactics were unacceptable to the Hungarian representatives. The Czecho-Slovak delegation asked for postponement of the talks. The Slovaks at the Komarom

negotiations were influenced by Karmasin, editor of the German language newspaper Grenzbote in Pressburg. After the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany, he was the political leader, a small Fuhrer of the Carpatho-German Party in Slovakia. Karmasin was present at Komarom as an observer, but in fact as a Nazi spy. He obtained an audience for Durcansky and Mach, two ministers of the new autonomous Slovak government, with Seyss-Inquart, the Reich's governor in Vienna, under the disguise of economic talks for the not far away Slovak independence. The Nazi governor of Austria, with his connections in Berlin, made an appointment for the Slovak emissaries with Goring for the day following their arrival in Vienna. The Slovaks asked Goring for the support of the Reich's government against the Hungarian demands.(157) The Germans saw a golden opportunity to interfere with the furthering of their expansion in Slovakia. Durcansky, fresh in his position in the S1ovak cabinet and in the Czecho-Slovak delegation in Komarom, disclosed his real identity in the very first days of the existence of the Slovak autonomy. He was, together with other autonomist Slovaks, an implacable enemy of the Czechs, and yet, after the events at Zilina, they accepted the mandate to represent the new version of the Czecho-Slovak republic at an international conference. The Czechs themselves had no reason on any grounds to claim Hungarian territory, and they thought perhaps the Slovaks would like to have those territories for themselves which in 1918, with the aid of the protectors of Masaryk and Benes, had been given to Czechoslovakia. The Slovaks plotted against the Hungarians with the Nazis. They forgot one important detail. No matter who penetrated the Danubian basin, and tried to partition it, the Slovaks and Magyars would have to live there as neighbours after the departure of the conquerors, and would have to find the conditions of a peaceful and prosperous life.

The Hungarian delegation at Komarom learned of the visit of the Slovak ministers in Berlin; where a deal was made for the retention of purely Hungarian areas in Czecho-Slovakia. After the occupation of the Sudetenland by Germany, and Polish Silesia by Poland, the Czecho-Slovak occupation of Hungarian territory was impossible, but an obstruction was staged by the Czecho-Slovak delegation at Kamarom. They offered a wide-degree of self-government for the Magyars living in the new autonomous Slovak part of the CSR which was inconsistent with the earlier retrocession of Ipolysag and Satoraljaujhely to Hungary as a symbol of more territorial concessions. Then they offered a 90 km long part of the purely Hungarian Csallokoz (Velky Ostrov Zitny,, Grosschutt), an island between the two branches of the Danube river, between Pressburg and Komarom, an area of 1,840 km2 with a population of 105,000. They wanted to keep in the CSR several villages on the Csallokoz, in the vicinity of Pressburg. This did not satisfy the Hungarian delegation, and later it was modified to an area of 5,400 km2 with 350,000 inhabitants. These Czecho-Slovak proposals did not follow the

ethnic line but economic, strategic and transportation interests. The Slovaks were told that the basis of the border correction was the ethnic principle, the other aspects could be considered with mutual good-will. Since purely Hungarian districts would have remained in the post-Munich Czecho-Slovaco-Ruthenian republic, the Hungarian delagation, under instructions from Budapest, did not see reasons for staying longer in Komarom,(l58) and declared that it would ask the arbitration of the four Munich conference signatories. On October 22 a third proposal was made for the retrocession of 11,300 km2 with a population of 740,000 to Hungary.(159)

Several deputies of the United Hungarian Party from Slovakia and Ruthenia, among them Esterhazy and Jaross, stayed in Komarom during the negotiations and played important roles as gobetweens for the two delegations. Their presence proved essential, especially in decisive moments. Many emissaries and delegations visited Komarom from those villages which lay in the racially mixed regions. They were expecting a plebiscite, and were troubling the assistants of the negotiators with their questions concerning their future.(160) No one was able to give them answers for those vitally important inquiries. The mood of the population was disturbed by the bilingual, Slovak and Hungarian, pamphlets dispersed by air which denounced the retrocession of territory to Hungary.(16l) Before the interruption of the negotiations in Komarom, the Hungarian National Council in the CSR submitted a memorandum to Tiso and Bacinsky in the Czecho-Slovak delegation, and to Kanya in the Hungarian one, in which the representatives of the Hungarian National Council in Slovakia and Ruthenia demanded their representation in the negotiations. They argued that the subject of the discussions was the territorial sovereignty and the rights of the Hunagrian minority. This memorandum was signed by the following deputies from Slovakia and Ruthenia: Szilassy, Esterhazy, Jaross and Vozary.(l62) In the meantime, the retrocession of the two towns, Ipolysag and Satoraljaujhely, to Hungary took place with a solemn and enthusiastic reception of the Hungarian army and administration. The Magyars in the CSR had waited for twenty years for their return under Hungarian sovereignty.

On October 14 the Czech press recognized in the comments on the Komarom conference that the Slovaks and not the Czecho-Slovak central government conducted the discussions on behalf of the CSR. The press wrote that the Slovak counter-proposal implied the surrender of Grossschutt to Hungary, and the Hungarian counties south of the Slovak Ore Mountains.(163) The Italian consul in Pressburg had a conversation with the Vice-Premier of Slovakia, Durcansky, who returned from a trip in Germany. He was received by Goring who assured him that the Reich would not claim Pressburg as a gesture towards the Slovak nation. During the conversation Durcansky asked the consul to arrange a visit for Tiso and himself in Rome to clear the Slovak attitude towards Hungary. (164) The Slovak ministers

were not given the chance to travel to Rome for it would have taken too much time and caused unnecessary delay in the solution of the Hungarian claims. A few days later Prime Minister Tiso told the Italian consul in Pressburg that he found a favourably disposed attitude in Germany for the Slovak cause, and would like to have some understanding from Italy. He sent Sidor to Warsaw and Mach to Zagreb to seek sympathy for the government of Slovakia. (165) It was the view in the consular corps at Pressburg that in the presence of the Czech police and army, the Slovaks were not able to express their views freely. The idea of a Slovak state, detached from Bohemia, originated with Ribbentrop. The German Foreign Minister brought up this possibility to Tiso at the latter's visit to Munich on October 19, 1938.(166) From a Slovak autonomous government the Germans created in March 1939 a Slovak republic which immediately became a German satellite. Hitler in that month scared the Slovaks with a Hungarian occupation when in reality he wanted to occupy not only Bohemia and Moravia but also Slovakia to encircle Poland.

In those historic days the Hungarians in Slovakia formed national unity by the fusion of different political trends. The Social Democratic Party of Slovakia and its affiliated trade unions accepted a resolution on October 10 according to which the Hungarian socialist workers joined the Hungarian National Council. They wanted to take part in the work for the Hungarian national cause. The Slovaks already had declared their right to selfdetermination and the same right belonged to all the autochtonous people of Slovakia without any distinction regarding language, nationality or religion.(167) On October 14 the Hungarian National Council issued a proclamation toto the Magyar minority in the CSR asking it that after the break in the talks at Komarom, the Magyars should keep their poise and self-discipline. They reassured the Magyar ethnic group that in those troublesome days the Hungarian National Council worked for its rights.(168) There was a great need for this announcement because tempers were flaring at that time in Slovakia resulting in demonstrations. The Slovaks could express their feelings and joy over their autonomy but the Hungarians were attacked either by the Slovak mob or the gendarmerie not only for demonstrating in favour of their union with Hungary but even for entirely innocent expressions of their national feelings such as wearing the so-called Bocskai neckties. (Bocskai was the leader of an uprising against the Habsburg king of Hungary in 1604.) The Hungarian National Council had to intervene with the new autonomous Slovak government for the liberation of arrested Hungarians of various communities. The life of the Magyars in the CSR became extremely difficult because of the martial law in vigour in their region.(l69) The political leaders of the Hungarian minority formed a national council and issued the following proclamation:

Proclamation of the Hungarian National Council'70

Hungarians!

The negotiations between the Czecho-Slovak delegation and the Hungarian delegation were unsuccessful. (Here the censor erased ten lines.)

We call upon all Hungarian brothers and sisters to stand in closed ranks behind the Hungarian National Council faithfully as these serious times demand it, and to maintain their composure.

The Hungarian National Council works for the rights of the Hungarian ethnic group. It is our firm conviction that in the Carpathian basin it is possible to create peaceful conditions for a long period of time if every nation can live in its state and can develop its proper cultural, economic and national strengths. We wish this for the Slovak and Ruthenian nations, but we want to secure our rights independently of their fate.

God be with us in our subsequent work.

Komarom, October 14, 1938

The Hungarian National Council

Footnotes

1. PRO., FO., 341/21426, 133.

2. Ibid., 251.

3. Ibid., 371/22372.

4. Lidove Noviny, May 21, 1938.

5. Die Zeit, May 23, 1938.

6. Sb. zak. a nar.

7. Ibid.

8. PRO., FO., 341/21436, 276-277.

9. Foreign Relations of the U.S.A., 1938, I, 57.

10. PRO., FO., 341/21426, 194.

11. Ibid., 211.

12. Ibid., 222.

13. PMH, August 4, 1938.

14. Journal de Geneve, July 23, 1938.

15. PRO., FO., 800/306, 105-106.

16. PMH, August 5, 1938.

17. Op. cit., August 6, 1938.

18. Ceska Vyzva, August 6, 1938.

19. PRO., FO., 800/306, September 2, 1938.

20. PMH, August 6 and 10, 1938.

21. Op. cit., August 13, 1938.

22. PRO., FO., 800/306, 130.

23. PMH, August 27, 1938.

24. Daily Mail, August 18, 1938.

25. A muncheni egyezmeny... No. 275.

26. Ibid., No. 269.

27. Ibid., No. 288b.

28. Ceske Slovo, September 3, 1938.

29. Memoirs, Admiral Nicholas Horthy, 162-164.

30. A muncheni egyezmeny... No. 299.

31. Affari Esteri, No. 724/105

32. A muncheni egyezmeny... No. 297.

33. PRO., FO., 800/306, 141.

34. Ibid., 145.

35. Ibid., 108.

36. PRO., FO., 371/21564, 157.

37. Ibid., 208

38. Ibid., 213.

39 Ibid., 108.

40. PMH, August 26, 1938.

41. Op. cit., August 27, 1938.

42. Bruegel, J.W., Czechoslovakia Before Munich, 240.

43. PMH, September 1, 1938.

44. Prager Tagblatt, September 1, 1938.

45. PMH, September 2, 1938.

46. PMH, September 7, 1938.

47. Prager Presse, September 8, 1938 & PRO., FO., 800/3-4, 370.

48. PMH, September 7, 1938.

49. PRO., FO., 800/306, 110.

50. Ibid.

51. PMH, September 9, 1938.

52. Affari Esteri, No. 12332/P.

53. Op. cit., No. 2411/259.

54. PRO., FO., 341/21564.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid., 800/305. 57. Ibid., 459, 463.

58. Ibid., 364-376.

59. Affari Esteri, No. 232962.

60. PRO., FO., 800/306, 37.

61. Ibid., 341/21567, 154.

62. Ibid., 800/306, 58.

63. PMH., September 10, 1938.

64. A muncheni egyezmeny... No. 322.

65. PMH., September 9, 1938.

66. Ibid., September 11, 1938.

67. Slovak, September 11, 1938.

68. Ibid., September 16, 1938.

69. PMH., September 15, 1938.

70. PRO., FO., 800/304-9316, 78, 80.

71. Ibid., 341/21465, 147.

72. PMH., September 18, 1938.

73. PRO., FO., 341/21438, 186.

74. Ibid., 341/21482, 115.

75. Ibid., 240.

76. Affari Esteri, No. 14761/PR, September 17, 1938

77. Popolo d'Italia, September 15, 1938.

78. Gazeta Polska, April 23, 1938.

79. La Tribuna, September 19, 1938.

80. Ibid., September 22, 1938.

81. Ibid., September 25, 1938.

82. Ibid., September 26, 1938.

83. Ibid., September 27, 1938.

84. PMH., September 17, 1938.

85. PRO., FO., 371/21723, 30.

86. A muncheni egyezmeny... II, No. 308.

87. Ibid., No. 309.

88. Nieopublikowane dokumenty, EE/MG/no.52/tjn/191,

September 21, 1938, 33.

89. Ibid., AB/MR/no. 52/tjn/200, October 7, 1938, 451.

90. Ibid., No. 78, Nr. G.M.S. 2946, September 17, 1938.

91. Ibid., No. 83, Nr. G.M.S. 3071, September 22, 1938.

92. DGFP., D.V., 302.

93. Historicky Casopis, Op., cit., p. 603.

94. PRO., FO., 341/21747.

95. Horthy Miklos titkos iratai, No. 35.

96. Historicky Casopis, Op., cit., 603.

97. Nieopublikowane dokumenty, Nr. G.M.S. 2935, No. 118.

98. Ibid., 2950, No. 122.

99. Ibid., No. 133, 3088.

100. Ibid., No. 135, 3168.

101. Ibid., No. 128, 3168.

102. PMH., September 19, 1938.

103. A muncheni egyezmeny... No. 351.

104. Ibid., No. 358 and 362.

105. Ibid., No. 361.

106. Ibid., No. 370.

107. Ibid., No. 378, 379.

108. Ibid., No. 377.

109. PMH., September 23, 1938.

110. Ibid., September 24, 1938.

111. DGFP., D, II, 1016.

112. A muncheni egyezmeny... No. 395.

113. Uj Magyarsag, September 23, 1938.

114. Ibid., September 28, 1938.

115. Affari Esteri, 213684/C

116. Gazeta Polska, August 14, 1938.

117. ADAP., II, 671.

118. Gazeta Polska, September 28, 1938.

119. A muncheni egyezmeny... No. 448.

120. Ibid., No. 401.

121. Ibid., No. 425.

122. Affari Esteri, No. 4348/R., September 6, 1938.

123. Ibid., No. 17058/Pr/C., October 15, 1938.

124. PMH., October 21, 1938.

125. Culen, K., Op., cit., 558.

126. A muncheni egyezmeny... II, No. 432.

127. Ibid., No. 442.

128. Ibid., No. 403.

129. ADAP., IV, 26.

130. PMH., October 4, 1938.

131. Ciano's Diary, October 5, 1938.

132. Affari Esteri, No. 810/543.

133. Nieopublikowane dokumenty, p. 83-84, August 24, 1938.

134. Dokumenty z przededenia II wojny bwiatowej, Nr. 4-8, October 1, 1938.

135. PMH., October 5, 1938.

136. PRO., FO., 341/21588, 463-464.

137. PMH., October 7, 1938.

138. Gazeta Polska, October 24, 1938.

139. Affari Esteri, No. 2768/302.

140. PMH., October 16, 1938.

141. ChaszELr, E., Decision in Vienna, 45.

142. A muncheni egyezmeny... II, No. 477.

143. Ibid.

144. DGFP, Pol. IV, 7430.

145. Szinai, M.--L. Szucs, Horthy Miklos tiekos iratay, 180.

146. PMH., October 9, 1938.

147. Ibid., October 11, 1938.

148. A muncheni egyezmeny... II, No 487, 488, 489.

149. Kovago, J., Op., cit., 33.

150. Ibid., 32-33. 151. Ibid., 34.

152. Ibid., 36.

153. DGFP., Pol. V., 131.

154. Kovago, J., Op., cit., 38.

155. DBFP., III, Vol. 3, 152.

156. Chaszar, E., Op., cit., 39.

157. Hoensch, J., Op., cit., 136-137.

158. A muncheni egyezmeny... II, No..487, 493a.

159. 8 Orai Ujsag, November 13, 1938.

160. PMH., October 13, 1938.

161. Ibid.

162. Ibid., October 15, 1938.

163. Bohemia, October 14, 1938.

164. Affari Esteri, No. 5519, October 16, 1938.

165. Ibid., October 20, 1938.

166. Hoensch, J., Die Slowakei, 211.

167. PMH., October 15, 1938.

168. Ibid., October 18, 1938.

169. Ibid., October 20, 1938.

170. Ibid

From Trianon to the First Vienna Arbitral Award