Henry Bogdan: From Warsaw To Sofia

November 4, 1956, 9:00 PM

"The events of November 4 have brought about the total eclipse of

reactionary forces in Hungary. The government of Imre Nagy, which

opened the door to the counter-revolution, has crumbled and no longer

exists.... The socialist forces of the Hungarian people, in conjunction

with the Soviet troops called in to defend them, are dedicated to the tasks

undertaken by the revolutionary worker and peasant government.... "

Source: Horay, Pierre. La Revolte de la Hongrie, Paris, 1957. Excerpts

from speeches broadcast on Hungarian radio in October-November,

1956.

The Hungarian revolution of 1956, when compared to events taking place at the same time in Poland, clearly demonstrated the extent of Moscow's tolerance. For Moscow, it was out of the question for any socialist country to leave the "system," regardless of the opinion of a majority of that country's inhabitants. A few reforms in the satellite countries might be acceptable, but for any member of the Warsaw Pact to renounce its alliances and take a neutral stance was absolutely intolerable.

Moscow viewed the uprising in Hungary as a security problem, a problem even more unnerving in light of the fact that France and Great Britain had chosen to launch the Suez expedition against Nassar's Egypt -- then an ally of the USSR -- at precisely the same time. The Soviets were under the impression that the events were related and part of some strategy. The Hungarian revolution, however, had been brewing for several years and was spontaneous -- provoked by a regime which had imposed itself upon the people and had brought them nothing but misery and servitude.

The repression following the Hungarian revolution was harsh. Thousands were arrested and sentenced to long prison terms or captured by the Soviets and deported to Siberia; hundreds more were sentenced to death after quick military trials. The principal defendants, including Nagy and Maleter, were condemned to death after a secret trial and were executed June 17, 1958. According to the former chief of police in Budapest, Kopacsy, who witnessed the events, the Soviets required that Kadar attend the executions of the men he had once collaborated with. If Kopacsy's testimony is true, it proves that the Soviets wanted to issue a serious warning to the new Hungarian leaders, alerting them to the dangers of attempting similar experiments.

The crisis in Poland and Hungary in 1956 seemed to leave their countries in quite different circumstances. In Poland, destalinization appeared to have succeeded without bloodshed. Gomulka, with the blessings of Cardinal Wyszynski, had kept the socialist regime intact by allowing a few

concessions, such as agricultural decollectivization and greater religious freedoms. Gomulka had actually reinforced ties with the USSR, signing an agreement on a visit to Moscow in November, 1956, in which he sanctioned continuing Soviet military presence in his country in exchange for economic favors. But in 1957, with the strong support of the Polish people who saw in him a successful negotiator with ideas for improvement, Gomulka was able to limit the effects of the concessions made. Nevertheless, he was unable to solve his country's economic problems; the problems which had been at the root of the crisis in Poznan in June, 1956, were no different from those which faced Poland in 1960.

In Hungary, despite the apparent failure of the revolution in 1956, the new leaders quickly realized that nothing could remain as it had been before the uprising -- something they had to keep in mind while revising their political strategy. The Soviets made the first wave of repression more harsh than the Hungarian authorities desired, but it was followed by a period of relative détente. Ten years after the events of 1956, Janos Kadar's Hungary had become the envy of the other Eastern European countries with its relatively high standard of living and relative liberty.

In 1956, Gomulka and Kadar played decisive roles in their respective countries: Gomulka was then the most popular man in Poland, and Kadar, by contrast, the man most disgraced in Hungary. Ten years later, the tables had been turned. Gomulka had become the hard-liners' champion within the socialist world, deeply disappointing his people, while Kadar, using a successful economic development policy and downplaying heavy ideology, had won over many of those who had opposed him. Gomulka was driven from power by the 1970 workers' revolt in the Baltic ports, but Kadar remained the uncontested leader of his country until 1988.

FROM CRISIS TO CRISIS: EASTERN EUROPE

FROM 1956 TO 1968

The events in Poland and Hungary in 1956 prompted changes in all the Eastern European countries; the leaders tried, either collectively or individually, to take measures which would prevent the recurrence of such crises.

New Directions in Eastern Bloc and Soviet Policy

The events in Poland and Hungary forced the USSR and its allies to redefine their relationship to one another. The military intervention in Hungary clearly demonstrated that no Warsaw Pact country was free to leave the socialist bloc or to organize its foreign relations as it pleased. The USSR

obviously meant to maintain the protective glacis constructed along its western borders, and concentrated on keeping it intact. Revitalizing the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (the CMEA or COMECON) created in 1949 was another move to promote cohesion within the socialist bloc. Until the mid-1950s, COMECON existed to develop trade relations between the member states and with the USSR. Beginning in 1955, its prevailing goal was to coordinate the economic plans of each country and institute specialization according to each country's potential. In June, 1962, the countries adopted the fundamental principles of the International Socialist Division of Labor, according to which, in theory, each country would receive a monopoly or at least a major share of the market in the production of some specific item -- for both domestic consumption and export to partner countries. Only the USSR, with its variety of resources and its relatively advanced level of economic development, was exempt from the specialization rule. The true objective of these measures, however was to increase economic interdependence among the various states. In order to avoid payment problems with COMECON, a bank for international economic cooperation was created. Based in Moscow, it began operation on January 1, 1966. At the same time, cooperation between socialist countries was extended to domains other than trade, such as transportation, technological exchange, joint construction of pipelines and nuclear power stations. The objective remained constant: to weld the various members of the socialist community closer together.

The Soviet leaders, under Khrushchev initially and then under Leonid Brezhnev after October, 1964, were beginning to embark on a policy of détente with the West about this time. The policy led to a development of trade between the Western countries and the Communist world and also border openings to foreign visitors. These new economic and political orientations were to have significant consequences within the socialist world.

A Note of Discord: Albania

From the beginning, Albania showed the least enthusiasm of all the popular democracies for the new direction set by Moscow after the crises of 1956. Enver Hoxha and the Albanian leadership approved of the Soviet military intervention in Budapest without reservation, but simultaneously renewed their attacks on Yugoslavia. They accused the Yugoslavs of having encouraged Imre Nagy's liberalization policies. Later, Hoxha let it be known that he thought the Khrushchev report and the new orientations of the 20^th Congress were responsible for provoking the counter-revolutionary movements in Poland and especially in Hungary. Hoxha repeated his charges to Khrushchev himself on a visit to Moscow in April, 1957. Nevertheless, Hoxha continued on apparently friendly terms with Moscow even though he

held firm to hard-line policies at home. Hoxha never missed an opportunity to mention the positive role Stalin had played in the history of socialism until finally, in the year 1960, relations between Moscow and Tirana began to show signs of strain. The Albanians increased their attacks on the "Yugoslav revisionists" and thus indirectly attacked their real target, Khrushchev. Invoking their national independence, Albania became more reticent in accepting Moscow's philosophy on the international division of labor, and outright refused to condemn the stance taken by Beijing in the ideological conflict pitting the Chinese against the Soviets. In fact, the Albanian head of state, Haxhi Kieshi, took advantage of his official visit to Beijing in June, 1960, to publicly endorse Mao Tse-tung's philosophy. Meanwhile, Enver Hoxha was conducting a purge of the Albanian Workers' party, expelling all pro-Soviet members from the central committee. The Moscow-Beijing conflict thus echoed in the Balkans. The Soviets recalled their technicians from China, and refused to send Albania a promised shipment of grain. Both sides were preparing for a break, which finally took place in Moscow in November, 1960, at the Party Congress. Enver Hoxha attacked Khrushchev's revisionist positions, condemned the policy of rapprochement with Yugoslavia, and publicly praised Stalin and the Chinese leadership. The Albanian delegation left Moscow before the conference was over. Until 1978, Albania was the spokesman of Chinese communism in Eastern Europe. Chinese technicians moved into Albania to help develop the country's natural resources and economy. With the support of the Chinese, Albania did not fear intervention by any of the Warsaw Pact countries.

The Evolution of Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia normalized relations with the other socialist countries of Eastern Europe in 1955. The Soviet intervention in Hungary clouded these relations somewhat, particularly since Tito's position throughout the affair was ambiguous, but neither the Yugoslavs nor the Soviets were in a position to make an issue of it. The USSR had its problems with China, and Tito had his hands full in Yugoslavia with internal tensions. Milovan Djilas, the one-time Partisan and Communist party leader, had intervened again in protest of the rapprochement policy with the USSR. He was arrested for his criticism and sentenced to another term in prison. Yugoslavia was struggling with economic problems essentially brought on by hesitating between a policy of complete decentralization and the centralized socialism advocated by Rankovitch. In addition, continuing regional disparities between the more developed western republics like Croatia and Slovenia and the underdeve- loped eastern regions like Macedonia and Kosovo revived traditional tensions between the Croat and Slovene faction and the Serbs. Liberal policies prevailed in the political sphere beginning in 1965-1966 -- although a

contentious academic, Professor Mihajlov, was arrested after publishing a book in the West in which he harshly criticized the USSR. Political liberalization was confirmed by the June 1966 dismissal of the all-powerful secret police chief, Rankovitch, who had been the spokesman of pan-Serbian nationalism in the government. Rankovitch was accused of conspiracy and of abusing power, but was never prosecuted. In connection with the Rankovitch affair, the secret police force, the UDBA, was purged and decentralized. Another component of liberalization was expanding the powers of local assemblies and democratizing their operation; they became more vocal, and less unanimous in their voting. The same kind of détente began to appear in the strained relations between the church and the regime. On June 25, 1966, Father Casaroli, acting for the Holy See, signed an agreement with the president of the Commission on Cults, Moratcha, reestablishing full freedom of religion and an open communication between the Yugoslav church and Rome. The agreement was the prelude to Yugoslavia's resumption of diplomatic relations with the Vatican.

"Kadarism" in Hungary

Despite the shadow of its origins, the Kadar government managed to reconcile a relatively liberal policy with the existence of a popular democracy. This development was the personal work of Janos Kadar, the first secretary of the Socialist Workers, party beginning in 1956, and leader of the government from 1956 to 1958, and from 1961 to 1964. In his first term, Kadar primarily worked to reassure the USSR and the other socialist countries of Hungary's allegiance by tightening political and military ties through the Warsaw Pact and by taking full advantage of the economic cooperation offered by COMECON. Domestically, Kadar attempted to justify Soviet intervention in a May 9, 1957, report to parliament; "the counter-revolution tried to bring down the legitimate government of the Hungarian People's Republic, as well as its social order... in order to install in its place the most reactionary of bourgeois dictatorships, the fascist dictatorship." On the other hand, Kadar also recognized that "the mistakes made by Rakosi and his group played an important role in the events of 1956," (from a report to the Socialist Worker Party Congress, November 30, 1959).

From 1959 on, the Hungarian government embarked on a policy of considerable liberalization. A partial amnesty released political prisoners, and a new political slogan replaced an old one by reversing it. Rather than the Stalinist, "Those who are not with us are against us," it now read, "Those who are not against us are with us." In keeping with this motto, former government officials dismissed in 1949 were reinstated. Border

restrictions were progressively lifted in both directions, and in 1964, 200,000 Hungarian tourists were allowed to travel in the West.

A similar flexibility was adopted in relations with the Catholic church. While the state kept control of ecclesiastical appointments, an agreement was finally reached on September 15, 1964: the Holy See was allowed to fill a certain number of vacant episcopal seats. The case of Cardinal Mindszenty, in refuge in the American embassy, was not settled until 1971 when Pope Paul VI asked the prelate to leave the country and thereby go into exile. The nomination of a new primate, Cardinal Lekai, seemed to put an end to the

friction between Budapest and Rome.

The economic policies of the Kadar government were also distinguished by a desire for efficiency and pragmatism. Economic reform was in full force after July 1, 1968, giving business wide freedoms and introducing a veritable free-market economy. The priority of developing heavy industry had been abandoned after 1953, and was now replaced by a focus on modernization and the development of trade between all countries. A result of this policy -- already obvious in the late 1960s -- was a relatively high living standard, particularly in comparison with neighboring socialist countries. Ten years after the failure of the revolution of 1956, Kadar's Hungary was already a happy exception within the socialist camp.

The "Neo-Stalinists"

Bulgarian and Rumanian leaders took advantage of the events of 1956 to end the limited destalinization policy that they had begun. In Bulgaria, Todor Zhivkov continued to benefit from the concentration of power. He held the office of secretary general of the Communist party from 1956 on, and in 1962, added to it the office of prime minister. Under Zhivkov, Bulgaria aligned its policies rigorously with the USSR's. With its strategic position between Rumania and Yugoslavia, it became the Soviet Union's most faithful and zealous ally in the Balkans. In Rumania, the period after 1956 was also marked by a return to rampant Stalinism. The first victims were the Hungarians in Transylvania; they had welcomed the events in Budapest and were thus considered suspect once again, losing the few concessions they had gained in 1950. But the Hungarian minority was not the only group brought to a heel. Out of fear of potential agitation, the whole population was placed under close surveillance by the militia and the secret police. Communist party power, incarnated by Gheorgiu-Dej until his death in 1965, passed on to First Secretary Nicolae Ceausescu who has remained as head of state since December, 1967. Ceausescu, Rumania's "best loved son,,, cleverly built up an international image to garner affection from the West of an open-minded leader who occasionally defied Moscow; he objected to the small role Rumania was assigned in COMECON, increased Rumania's agreements of

economic cooperation with Western countries, and took advantage of the Moscow-Beijing rivalry to play both sides against each other. In reality, Ceausescu combined this show of nationalism with repressive Stalinism and nepotism.

In Poland, Gomulka was returned to power with the support of the liberals and the church, and with the enthusiastic approval of the people. Much to their dismay, however, he began to restrict the progression Kadar was following in Hungary. His demeanor toward the church was indicative of his change in political orientation. Officially, the agreements of 1957 granting the church special status were maintained, but beginning in 1958-1959, local problems increased. The state made it difficult for parents to enroll their children in catechism, and at other times denied authorization for free construction of new churches, even when all expenses were to be paid by followers. In each case, Cardinal Wyszynski intervened and won, but only after long and painful negotiations. The church/state conflict reached its height in 1965-1966 when the Polish bishops began communi- cating with their colleagues in East Germany, hoping to reconcile the two peoples. The Polish government interpreted these actions as treason against Poland. Cardinals Wyszynski and Wojtyla responded by publicly denouncing the harassment endured by church followers.

Hopes for the economic improvement which Gomulka had promised were quickly shattered. While salaries did rise more than 35 percent between 1956 and 1959, inflation soon reduced gains to zero. Purchasing power for all workers remained very low and, as in the past, the unions continued to play the rnediating role between the political powers and labor. Low productivity and high net cost of industrial products slowed exports even to the COMECON countries, while imports of equipment increased. The result was growing foreign trade deficit and high foreign debt both to the USSR and to Western countries. Beginning in 1962, accelerating inflation accentuated the latent dissatisfaction among the workers. Only the peasants had benefited from the Gomulka regime; they left the collective farms in great numbers and managed to raise their incomes with higher productivity. But elsewhere economic problems, periodic shortages of basic goods, and the disillusionment brought on by false hopes, all contributed to the low morale of the workers which surfaced in alcoholism, violence, vandalism and corruption. To ward off outbreaks of public discontent, Gomulka began to harden his policies in 1959, and to tighten censorship. He accused certain intellectuals of being too receptive to Western influences, and dismissed the likes of the Minister of Education, Brankowski, who were considered too liberal. Gomulka himself was becoming more and more authoritarian. A group of Party leaders formed around him, made up of General Spychalski, General Mozzar, the minister of the interior, Edward Ochab, his predecessor

as head of the Party, and former socialists Jozef Cyrankiewicz, the prime minister, and Adam Rapacki, minister of foreign affairs. The members of this group shared traits in common: the firm desire to maintain alliances with the socialist bloc, a suspicion of Western countries -- particularly West Germany -- a preference for strict order and a hostility towards intellectuals. They stood by the USSR in 1968, determinedly criticizing the Czechoslovak experiment with liberalization. Gomulka's personal prestige was slowly affected by this change in political direction, and his unpopularity grew because of his rule's personal character.

In East Germany, Walter Ulbricht's neo-Stalinist policies continued unfalteringly. Sealing off East Berlin from West Berlin by the Wall in August, 1961, ended the flow of discontented emigrants . But the East German leaders nevertheless attempted to avert potential discontent by improving the standard of living. Because of a high level of industrial development and massive exports, East Germany began to experience a high growth rate in the 1960s. Its role in COMECON was similar to West Germany's role in the European Economic Community (the EEC). Consumer goods were produced to satisfy the needs of a population whose standard of living by 1968 was already the highest in Eastern Europe. The economic success of the socialist government thus compensated for the conservatism of its leaders.

In Czechoslovakia, where there had been no destalinization per se, the situation was somewhat different. The Czechoslovak Communist party had been one of the first to condemn the events in Hungary and Imre Nagy's policies, and to applaud the intervention by Soviet tanks. The crisis caused the regime to harden its stance; Novotny and his conservative following were not going to take any risks in their own country. They implemented a system that served as a model for discipline in the socialist bloc. In 1960, the new constitution ratified the stricter policy, and Czechoslovakia went beyond the stage of a popular democracy to become a socialist republic.

It was only in 1962 that Novotny took some steps toward amnesty and announced the creation of a commission to review political trials of the 1950s. The commission began its work in early 1963 and examined 480 cases. The rehabilitation of Slansky on August 21, 1963, was the first of its kind, although it was posthumous and only partial because he remained expelled from the Party. Others, like Clementis in 1964 (posthumously), then Gustav Husak, Arthur London and Eugene Loebl, were reinstated completely. All of the bishops arrested in 1950 were released in the summer of 1963, but they were not awarded the right to rehabilitation. They remained under surveillance and were not allowed to resume their duties. Archbishop Beran of Prague, who had been imprisoned in March, 1951 , was released in October, 1963, but confined to his residence. He was finally allowed to leave

the country for Rome in February, 1965. It was also during the years 1963-1964 that the country began to allow visits by Western tourists, giving the impression that a thaw had indeed come to Czechoslovakia. Censorship became less stringent, and people began to feel the changes.

The first releases of prisoners and the rehabilitations provoked contradictions within the Party. While liberal elements were demanding explanations, the conservatives grouped around Novotny, re-elected to the presidency in 1964, and Prime Minister Jozef Lenart, to attempt to retard the already slow process of liberalization. The situation developed rapidly despite their efforts because of a number of accumulating unsolved problems. The greatest of these was the catastrophic state of the Czechoslovak economy. Collectivization was completed in 1959-1960, but a combination of passive resistance by the peasants and climatic uncertainties brought on serious supply shortages in the cities. In industry, the massive weight of the bureaucracy held back production, while COMECON's international division of labor policy caused disorganization within certain branches of industry by eliminating certain products. Economists like Otak Sik and Eugene Loebl recommended administrative reform and greater decentralization of business in order to revive the economy. After long debates within the Party, Novotny accepted their suggestions in 1967. About the same time, The Slovak Communists under Dubcek and Husak asked for justice for their countrymen, and that Czechoslovakia become a federated state. Intellectuals led by the Slovak novelist Ladislav Mnacko demanded the truth about the major trials with greater boldness and criticized the rehabilitations as expedient methods for government officials to clear their consciences. Czechoslovakia seemed ripe for crisis in 1967; though a bastion of Stalinism, the country had many similarities to Poland and Hungary in 1956.

The Prague Spring in 1968

To better understand the events that took place in Czechoslovakia in 1967-1968, the international context at the time should be considered. These were the years of student demonstrations in Western Europe, particularly in Italy, West Germany and France, which culminated in the May, 1968 riots. In China at the time, the cultural revolution was at its height. The authorities in Moscow and in most Eastern European capitals looked with great suspicion upon the anarchistic demonstrations and took steps to avoid any repetition of the furor in their own countries. The Six-Day War of 1967 between Israel and the Arab countries caused further East-West tension, since the USSR and all the socialist countries except Rumania formally condemned Israel's action and denounced American imperialism for its collusion with Zionism.

Henry Bogdan: From Warsaw To Sofia