Henry Bogdan: From Warsaw To Sofia

In a central committee meeting on October 30, Novotny demanded more severe sanctions against the intellectuals, but was opposed by Czech liberals and by Slovaks led by Alexander Dubcek, the first secretary of the Slovak Communist party. The clash between Dubcek and Novotny was a conflict between a liberal and a conservative, but also a product of the ongoing rivalry between the Czech and Slovak factions within the Party. The next day, October 31, students from the Prague Technical College demonstrated for better living conditions, but were brutally beaten by the police under orders from the government; their protests began to take on an increasingly political character. The liberal current in the Party only served to make Novotny all the more unpopular. He took measures to avoid further confrontations on advice from Brezhnev, who visited Prague on December 8, 1967. Brezhnev had no desire to see Czechoslovakia, strategically located in central Europe, weakened by internal strife.

The central committee meeting of December 19 to 21 was distinguished by a new confrontation between Novotny and the hard liners, and the coalition of Czech liberals and Slovaks led by Dubcek. No concrete decisions were reached during the three-day melee of free debate. Taking advantage of a lull during the end-of-the-year festivities, Novotny planned a military coup with the support of General Sejna who served under Miroslav Mamula, the head of the Communist apparatus in the ministry of defense and the popular militia. The plot failed because General Vaclav Prchlik heard of the plan and warned Dubcek. By the time the central committee met again in early January, 1968, Novotny's position was seriously shaken. The committee reached a compromise after much debate; Novotny remained president, but resigned as head of the Party. During the night of January 4, Dubcek was chosen to be first secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist party, marking the first time a Slovak became the political leader of the country. The coalition of Slovaks and liberal Czechs had overcome the conservatives, electing not only a Slovak, but a member of a new generation.

Changes were quick in coming. On March 5, Dubcek announced that

censorship would be suspended. Political discussions, which up to then had taken place in private or in small circles of friends, could now be taken up in newspaper columns, on the radio and on television. Political debate raged openly, with full participation of the public -- constituting a hitherto unheard of situation in the country. The church took advantage of the new climate to demand the religious freedom guaranteed by the constitution but never observed or enforced. On March 12, the episcopate, at the request of seminary students and followers, removed Father Plohjar from his office in a Communist cover organization known as the Peace Movement of the Catholic Clergy, the "peace priests." This puppet movement was dissolved and reorganized under a new name in order to continue its activities. Delegates from religious orders which had been dissolved in 1950 began asking the ministry of culture for justice for past persecution and for permission to resume their work. Bishop Frantisek Tomasek of Prague, speaking for the episcopate, demanded the total rehabilitation of condemned priests, particularly that of Archbishop Beran in exile in Rome. The bishops already released were authorized to return to their dioceses, but the case of Archbishop Beran remained in suspense.

Dubcek and his associates took advantage of their newly won freedom to find rapid solutions to the numerous problems facing the country. In March, Dubcek promised the Slovaks that a special statute would put them on equal footing with the Czechs in the framework of a federal state. President Novotny's resignation on March 21 and the ensuing exodus of "Novotnyites" opened the doors for the liberals at all levels of government. On the 30^th of that month, the National Assembly chose General Svoboda to succeed him as president by an overwhelming majority, 282 out of 288 votes. A new state leadership composed of men well disposed to the new orientation of the Party was formed under the Czech liberal, Oldrich Cernik, with new ministers Jiri Hajek in foreign affairs, General Dzur in the defense ministry and Ota Sik in charge of economic reform. On April 18, the National Assembly chose another liberal, Josef Smrkovsky, as its president. The central committee ratified the new "action program," subtitled The Chechoslovak Road to Socialism, on April 4 and 5, providing for: "a wide alliance of progressive forces in the cities and countryside headed by the worker class, and the unity of the Czech and Slovak nations. " They recalled that "the Party is founded, and will continue to be founded, on the working class," and that "the goal of the Party is not to become a universal administrator of society. . .or to impede all social life with its directives.... The policy of the Party should never lead non-Communists to believe that they have been deprived of their rights and their freedom by the Party...." During March and April of 1968, a period known as the "Prague Spring, " socialism had indeed taken on a human face. It is interesting to note that the instigators of the Prague Spring were

men who had pledged unconditional loyalty to the Party and to Moscow throughout their careers. These "liberals" had all played decisive roles during the Prague coup of 1948 bringing the Communists to power, and had held responsible positions throughout the Stalinist era. Josef Smrkovsky, who was made the likeable hero of the Prague Spring by the Western press, was the same man who had mobilized the workers' militia to support the ultra-Stalinist Gottwald in February 1948, thus assuring the success of the coup. Oidrich Cernik had climbed the ladder of cursus honorum from a good apparatchik during the Stalinist era, first as party secretary, then as secretary of the central committee, minister of planning, council vice-president in the Lenart cabinet, and finally as a member of the presidium under Novotny. In 1948, General Svoboda had given Gottwald the unconditional support of the army, an army he had also purged of non-Communist elements; though he was removed from power in the early 1950s, Svoboda still led the comfortable life of a retired high official during the time of the purges. Dubcek himself was the product of a Communist upbringing. His family had lived in the USSR from 1925 to 1938, and he had become active in the clandestine Communist party in Czechoslovakia from 1939 on, then participated in the Slovak insurrection of August, 1944, and went on to a brilliant career within the Party. He was a member of the central committee of the Slovak party in 1951 at the same time that Husak, Clementis and other Slovak Communist leaders were being persecuted; Dubcek, however, was sent to the political academy in Moscow from 1955 to 1958 because of his zealous devotion to the Party. He returned in the midst of the Novotny era and continued up the Party ladder until he became first secretary of the Slovak party in 1963.

As their backgrounds indicate, those responsible for the Prague Spring were far from liberal. Why then did they attempt to take the Czechoslovak party in such a new direction? Undoubtedly they acted more out of a desire to salvage a system to which they were deeply attached than to end the abuses of that system. But they were walking a fine line. In giving their pledge of goodwill to the intellectuals and to a public hungry for freedom, Dubcek and his colleagues were risking the displeasure of the leaders in the USSR and the other socialist states. On April 13, Pravda commented on the events in Czechoslovakia, denouncing the "anti-Socialist elements indulging in attacks against the Party." Czechoslovakia's neighbors were anxious as well. In Dresden at the end of March, Walter Ulbricht warned the Czechoslovak leaders of the risks they were undertaking and Gomulka in Poland ventured the same opinion. In Hungary, however, Kadar seemed to look approvingly on the Dubcek experiment, noticing its similarities to the policies he himself had applied to Hungary since the early 1960s.

The Prague Spring was becoming more and more of a concern to the

entire socialist camp. By the end of August, diverse movements were created or reappeared within the country, taking advantage of lifted restrictions and hoping to obtain still greater freedoms. The Sokols, banned since 1930, were reorganized and portraits of Masaryk and Benes began to reappear everywhere. Former political prisoners organized associations to demand justice for themselves and punishment for those officials responsible for their imprisonment. Former political party members, Socialist and Populists, began to ask for a voice in the administration of public affairs. The church was anxious to reform the youth movements, and began publishing church newsletters.

On June 27, liberal intellectuals who had originated the revival tried to accelerate the process of liberalization by publishing a statement written by Vaculik called 2,000 Words. This manifesto pointed out the differences between true liberals and those who, like Dubcek, were running the government and the Party, and also harshly criticized the Communist party's misuses of power since 1948. It denounced the threats leveled against the revitalization efforts within the country, declaring "Let us establish committees to defend freedom of expression, let us have marshals to maintain order at our meetings and support the security organs when they prosecute genuine criminal activity.... Let us stand firm in the face of threats from the outside and not initiate conflict." Moscow reacted sharply, and the Czechoslovakia party leadership itself realized it had unleashed a tide it could not control. Attempting to curb the movement, Dubcek increased his warnings to the people. He told the workers' militia on June 13, that the Party was "committed to fighting the anti-Communist phenomenon and all the excesses which were endangering the process of democratization. " When the 2, 000 Words manifesto was published, the authors were sharply criticized by Communist party leaders. Smrkovsky spoke of "political romanticism" in the Rude Pravo, and Jiri Hajek denounced the text as liable to furnish supporters of the hardline with arguments. Dubcek and the new leadership meant to follow a median course; they had no intention of returning to political pluralism or of questioning the Party's authority to decide on the future direction of the country. An extraordinary Congress had been called for the following September in order to define major future policy.

Dubcek quickly encountered increasingly hostile reactions from other socialist countries. Moscow and the "brother countries" were extremely uneasy with the good-natured anarchy which was growing in Czechoslovakia and which threatened to spread to other Eastern European countries, carried by the thousands of Czechoslovak tourists traveling through them. An ill-timed statement by the minister of foreign affairs, Hajek, approving economic cooperation with Western countries while continuing close ties with COMECON countries, was interpreted in Moscow as the beginning of a shift

in foreign policy. On May 3, as Dubcek, Cernik and Smrkovsky traveled to Moscow to explain their policy to the Soviets. The Polish press violently attacked the Prague leadership, accusing them of wanting to collaborate with West Germany. The East German press minced no words on the subject of Dubcek's policy either. The Soviets were more reserved; they did not seem to have lost hope of retrieving Dubcek peacefully, or if necessary through intimidation. On May 17, the head of the Soviet government, Aleksei Kosygin, accompanied by the commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact armies, Marshal Andrei Gretchko, paid a brief visit to Karlovy-Vary -- officially for the therapeutic value of the warm waters. Dubcek met with him there. The Soviet leaders warned him once again of the risks he was undertaking in allowing the policy adopted in March to continue. During the interview, they agreed that Warsaw Pact military maneuvers would be held in the near future in Czechoslovak territory. These maneuvers, in which Soviet, Czechoslovak, East German, Hungarian and Polish troops participated, began on May 30. The soldiers were to leave at the end of June, but it was not until mid-July that the last Soviet units left the country. This prolonged foreign military presence coinciding with intense diplomatic activity between Moscow and the Eastern European capitals should have prompted leaders in Prague to take certain precautions. Instead, they adopted an attitude of complacent optimism, blaming agents provocateurs for the growing unrest of the population. Once again, how could this strange behavior be explained? Did Dubcek truly believe that nothing was happening? Or had he decided to let the Soviets act, and if so, why?

In early July, 1968, the Soviets decided not to allow the Czechoslovak Communist party to continue on its new path. Brezhnev began to gather his allies together into a common front. He could count on the Poles, the Germans and the Bulgarians, but the Hungarians were less dependable. During Kadar's visit to Moscow in early July, Brezhnev clearly spelled out his position, "The USSR cannot be and will never be indifferent to the fate of socialist structures in the other countries, as well as to the common cause of socialism and communism in the world." Kadar was forced into line with Moscow's position, completing the "coalition of five." Rumania still refused to condemn the Dubcek experiment. On July 14, the Communist leaders of the five countries met in Warsaw to "examine the upsurge in aggressive imperialist activity that is undermining the socialist regime in certain countries through diversionary tactics, and is weakening the ties of ideology and cooperation which unite the socialist states. " They addressed a letter to Czechoslovak party leaders in which they announced their acute concerns: "We cannot allow foreign powers to lead your country from the path of socialism and to put Czechoslovakia in danger of being separated from the socialist community. This is a problem relevant to all communist and

The polemic intensified in mid-July. While the Hungarian press was still relatively moderate in tone, the Soviet, East German and Polish newspapers were particularly inflammatory. There was news of a cache of arms discovered in Czechoslovakia; West German tourists, who had flocked to Prague when visas were granted liberally, were accused of coming to assist the "counter-revolutionaries" as a fifth column. Although confronted with these increasingly direct attacks, Dubcek continued his attitude of naive insouciance, even going so far as to state on July 28 that there was absolutely no cause for alarm. However, that same evening, an impressive Soviet delegation led by Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny and Suslov arrived at the small Czechoslovak-Slovak border station of Cierna-nad-Tisou to meet Dubcek and a large Czechoslovak delegation. The conversations that took place between July 29 and August I , turned to confrontation; the "amiable

and broad exchange of opinion" mentioned in the final communiqué led to another meeting between "the five" and the leaders of the Czechoslovak Communist party in Bratislava on August 3^rd. Once again, socialist unity was stressed: "the maintenance, consolidation and defense of what has been attained at the price of heroic efforts and self-denial of the people, is the common international duty of each of the socialist countries." The final communiqué of the Bratislava meeting emphasized the priorities of concerted action for European security and peace, and a strengthening of the Warsaw Pact. The crisis seemed to abate and the risk of military intervention diminished, to the great relief of a population that was less optimistic than its leadership.

Dubcek's unawareness of the situation, whether feigned or real, brought the matter up again. Tito and Ceausescu both met with him in Prague, the first from August 9 to 11, and the second on the 15^th. Both men received triumphant welcomes, which was too much for the Soviets. The Prague-Bucharest-Belgrade rapprochement looked too much like the beginning of a new Little Entente to them, and their reaction was quick.

During the night of August 10, armed forces of the Warsaw Pact entered Czechoslovakia from all sides; Soviet airplanes landed at the airport in Prague, deplaning units of shock troops that immediately took control of the capital, occupying public buildings and the central committee headquarters. There, the Soviets took Dubcek, Cernik and Smrkovsky prisoner and sent them immediately to the USSR, while President Svoboda was isolated in his Hradschin palace. The absence of basic precautions had greatly facilitated the Soviets' task. Dubcek drew up an appeal to the central comrnittee as soon as he learned of the Soviet intervention, protesting "this act contrary to the fundamental principles of relations between socialist countries . " Both Dubcek and General Svoboda appealed to the population to remain calm.

On the morning of August 21, 1968, the entire country was occupied by Warsaw Pact forces. The Czechoslovak army remained passive throughout, and the population limited itself to a few demonstrations and instances of rock throwing -- nothing like the demonstrations in Budapest twelve years earlier. The next day, Communist militants held a secret meeting in a factory on the outskirts of Prague, naming a new central committee and a new presidium, while retaining Dubcek in all of his offices. The new leadership called a one-hour strike for the following day in what would be the only concrete demonstration of resistance.

President Svoboda hoped to diffuse the crisis by going to Moscow on August 23; he was accompanied by General Dzur and Gustav Husak, who had kept his distance from Dubcek in the final days. Svoboda was recieved as a head of state, but he refused to negotiate until Dubcek and his colleagues were released. The Soviets conceded. In exchange, the full Czechoslovak

leadership headed by Svoboda and Dubcek signed the Moscow Accords on August 26, which "normalized" the situation. The leaders from Prague had totally capitulated: they admitted that the presence of Soviet troops was justified because of the threats to socialism in Czechoslovakia, threats Dubcek himself admitted he had underestimated.

The Prague Spring ended with a permanent Soviet military presence in Czechoslovakia. A treaty signed on October 16 spelled out the status of the Soviet armed forces, stating that most of the 500,000 men who had participated in the invasion would be withdrawn, but that several Soviet divisions would remain indefinitely. The "liberals" of the Prague Spring were the first to assist in the "normalization" procedures, to the great disappointment of those citizens who had placed their trust in them. Dubcek remained head of the Party until April, 1969, when he was replaced by another Slovak, Gustav Husak. Dubcek was then expelled from the Party in June, 1970. Josef Smrkovsky was relieved of his duties as president of the National Assembly when the new constitution took effect on January 1 , 1969, and despite his display of self-criticism, was also expelled from the Party in 1970. General Svoboda continued as president of the Republic, and remained head of state until his death in 1975. Hundreds of intellectuals and thousands of private citizens traveling outside the country at the time of the Soviet invasion chose not to return. Dubcek's so-called "friends," Tito and Ceausescu, had raised a few objections initially but then they too accepted the normalization.

The only true beneficiaries of the Prague Spring were the Slovaks and the Soviet Union. The Slovak intellectuals and the leaders of the Slovak Communist party had played an important role in instigating the mechanics of change, and as a result, finally saw the transformation of Czechoslovakia into a true federation of Czech and Slovak states. The events of 1968 granted the Soviets the opportunity to station their troops in Czechoslovakia in the quadrilateral area of Bohemia that juts far into West German territory. Dubcek had done them a favor in providing a pretext for intervention; ultimately, he did not fare badly himself. Imre Nagy had not been so fortunate.

At the end of the 1960s, despite the crises of 1956 and 1968, the Eastern Europe countries remained socialist states in which the Communist party retained exclusive control over the government; all foreign policies -- except for Albania's and to a lesser degree, Yugoslavia's -- were faithfully aligned with Moscow's. Through COMECON the Eastern European nations formed an integrated and powerful economic bloc; nevertheless, they all remained dependent on the USSR for raw materials, for their energy supply and also for their export market -- though they tried to expand their trade relations with the industrialized capitalist countries and with the Third World.

Economic integration never succeeded in erasing the inequalities in levels of economic development within the bloc. Some countries such as East Germany and Hungary were able to raise their living standards because of their advanced technology or the flexibility of their organization. Others, like Poland and Czechoslovakia, despite their abundant natural resources, urere not able to overcome the economic problems confronting them, primarily because of their weighty bureaucracies and low agricultural and industrial productivity. Agricultural countries like Bulgaria, Rumania and Yugoslavia met with varying degrees of success. Bulgaria and Rumania did fairly well, but only at the expense of the living standard of their populations. Yugoslavia, however, was plagued with a hesitant economic policy and inefficient administration despite its associate membership in both COMECON and the EEC, and its status as the only Eastern European country to possess a convertible currency. Although partially hidden by the emigration of part of its work force to Western Europe, Yugoslavia's problems with inflation and unemployment were serious.

The crises of 1956 and 1968, differences in foreign and domestic policy, differences in the levels of economic development and in standards of living, all contributed to changing the image of a homogenous Eastern bloc that prevailed in the early 1950s. The 1968 crisis and the invasion by the Warsaw Pact troops caused an involuntary resurgence of a certain nationalism that had its hour of glory between the two world wars. National diversities which had lain dormant slowly reappeared. The entry of East German troops to Bohemia evoked memories on both sides of historical antagonisms between Czechs and Germans, and in southern Slovakia, the Hungarian minority enthusiastically welcomed the Hungarian troops taking part in the Warsaw Pact invasion on August 21, 1968. The Slovaks took advantage of the situation to demand the autonomy they had been waiting for since 1919. And everywhere, through the events of 1956 and 1968, the "church of silence" demonstrated that its following remained as strong as always, despite official atheism and persecution. A continuity of tradition was exposed by the crises of 1956 through 1968; these upheavals took place only in East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia -- all countries with cultural traditions closest to those of the West, and with the most developed national consciousness .

Henry Bogdan: From Warsaw To Sofia