Edward Chaszar : The Czechoslovak-Hungarian Border Dispute of 1938

Strictly Confidential
(Excerpts)

(lLipski Pcpers. pp. 393-97, excerpts. Lipski was at Nuremberg with other members of the diplomatic corps to attend the annual convention of the National Socialist Party. This provided him with an opportunity for conversations with high German officials)

( . . . )

(4) Czechoslovakia. Goringdeclared that the Karlsbad points request, among other things, dissolution by Czechoslovakia of the pact with Russia. Goringdoes not believe in the possibility of an agreement with Czechoslovakia. If the Czech government were to make an agreement, it would do so with the intention of breaking it. Even if Benes were to accept its conditions, military elements would come out against it. From Gorings words it was clear that he is convinced that the necessity will arise to act by force. Goringshared the Ambassador's opinion that international armed conflict should be avoided. Goringthinks the problem should be placed on the League's agenda in order to define the aggressor. The Germans, though not members of the League, will be able to prove that they were not the aggressors. Before a decision is taken by the League, action in the field might already be finished. In Gorings opinion, France is simply looking for an honorable way out. England also is not willing to go to war and is exerting really strong pressure on Prague.

( . . . )

(6) Rumania. The Ambassador raised the question of the Havas Agency communiqui about the alleged Rumanian-Soviet agreement for Russian transit through Rumania. He pointed to the dimenti issued by Bucharest. Goringquestioned in detail the internal Rumanian situation, the King's role, his internal political plans, and, finally, the position of the new Rumanian envoy in Berlin, Djuvara.

(7) Russia. Goringstressed that in the future the real Russian attack against Germany could not be directed through Rumania or the Baltic states but only via Poland. Goringremarked that in case of a Polish-Russian conflict the Reich would come to Poland's assistance. A discussion followed about the situation in Russia and the strength of Russian armed forces.

(8) Hungary. Goringrevealed a number of confidential bits of information from his conversations with Horthy (the first point, not mentioned here, was told to the Ambassador for his information under a word-of-honor plea for secrecy). Goringdeclared quite openly to the Hungarian side that under no circumstances would Germany act as intermediary in matters of interest to Hungary and Poland. The Hungarian government should settle these matters directly with Warsaw. Goringacted in this way in order to deprive Budapest of any illusion in this respect. Goringalso pointed out to Horthy the necessity of granting broad autonomy to Slovakia. He did this in consequence of his last conversation with the Ambassador. Horthy was not too eloquent on this

point. Goringwas under the impression that, in spite of Hungarian statements that in case Czechoslovakia were attacked by another state no Hungarian government could maintain itself in power unless it decided to act, Hungary would probably go into action very late.

(9) Horthy allegedly told the Chancellor that it would take England ten years to forgive Hungary if it attacked Czechoslovakia today. Hitler upset by such a naive concept, replied that if this action took place in five years, when England would be armed to the teeth, it would be even less ready to forgive. Goringconfirmed that territorial matters between Hungary and Poland are of no concern to Germany. The Germans are not prepared to pull chestnuts out of the fire for the Hungarians.

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(3) Czechoslovakia. Ribbentrop: We strive for a solution by agreement. Benes, as yet, has not granted any adequate concession. Misgivings as to Benes', frankness. Remark that the Chancellor would never allow the provocation of May 21 to recur again. In such circumstances the Chancellor would definitely act by force, ignoring international repercussions, since then Germany's honor would be at stake.

Ribbentrop called attention to the anomaly of the signing of the FrancoCzech agreement at a moment when Germany was weak. The agreement was to serve the Czechs as an instrument to exert pressure on the Germans. In Ribbentrop's opinion, Great Britain would not budge on the Sudetenland case. France would encounter unyielding resistance with regard to armed intervention. Germany is now stronger than ever. The Ambassador declared it to be most important that the problem be solved locally to avoid international conflict. Ribbentrop replied that evidently no government would lightheartedly jump into an international brawl. Ribbentrop questioned our position on the Czechoslovak problem. The Ambassador replied that we are interested in a certain region. He stressed the necessity of autonomy for Slovakia. He pointed to the pro-Russian policy permanently pursued by Czechoslovakia, displayed in the geographical composition of the Czechoslovak state at the Peace Conference. ln the course of further deliberations on this issue, when the Hungarian question was raised the conversation had to be interrupted.

( . . . )

Herr Fuhrer and Chancellor of the Reich,

According to news reported mainly in the British press during the last few days there is an intention solving the Czechoslovak question in a way that the regions of Czechoslovakia inhabited by a German population would be separated with or without a plebiscite and transferred to the German Reich. In all other respects everything would remain as it is.

I believe it is unnecessary to point out that a settlement of this sort would fall short of a final solution of the Czech problem. This settlement could be imagined only in a way that all minorities settled in Czechoslovakian territory would be granted equal rights, i.e. that all nationalities of Czechoslovakia would be accorded the right to decide by way of a plebiscite on the sovereignty of the territories inhabited by them. Obviously, neither the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia, nor the Hungarian government could agree to a discrimination detrimental to our compatriots, and for this there is certainly full understanding on the part of the German government.

We are convinced that our opinion in this respect is in full harmony with that of the German Government, viz. that peace in Central Europe cannot be assured unless the Czechoslovak problem has been resolved definitively and radically.

ln view of the extreme urgency of the Czechoslovak question, I have considered it necessary to call the attention of Your Excellency to this circumstance in the firm hope that as a token of the warm and friendly relations between our countries, I may reckon with the ful1 support of Your Excellency in this grave hour.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the expression of my particular esteem.

(1 Horthy, Miklos, nagybanyai. The Confidential Papers of Admiral Horthy (Miklos Szinay and Laszlo Szucs, compilers). Budapest: Corvina Press. 1965, pp. 101-102. The compilers refer to this as "a letter on a joint action against Czechoslovakia," even though the text makes no reference to action planned. The date of the posting of the letter has been tentatively established as September 17, 1938.)

1863/423027-28

Berlin, September 28, 1938

(Pol. lV 6811)

Stoyadinovich expressed to Kanya his fear that, in the light of his information, the Hungarian Government had designs on the Slovak and Ruthenian areas besides the purely Hungarian areas. At the same time he stated that:

(1) if the Hungarian Government would give a satisfactory declaration regarding the security of Yugoslavia,

(2) if Hungary would state which areas of Slovakia we claim, he would be prepared, provided our claims did not extend to Slovak and Ruthenian areas, to attempt mediation in Prague, so that Prague should return to Hungary the Hungarian-inhabited areas.

From this it can be seen that Stoyadinovich would be ready to accept, or that he is reconciled to, the reassimilation of the Hungarian areas, but does not want a further strengthening of Hungary. He is apparently afraid that if the Ruthenes and Slovaks declared in favor of Hungary, and Hungary were thus strengthened, this might eventually become dangerous for Yugoslavia.

M. Kanya would be grateful if, in the interest of Hungary, Germany could, without mentioning the above information, but in the course of normal conversations, state in Belgrade that the Hungarian point of view, which aims at:

(a) the return of the Hungarian-inhabited areas,

(b) the practical realization of the right of self-determination for the Ruthenians and Slovaks, did not imply an aggressive attitude toward Yugoslavia, and that, in view of present-day circumstances, this would be the only correct solution.

(1 German Documents, 11. 992. The document bears the comment (in Weizsacker's handwriting): "Handed to me today by the Hungarian Minister," and instructions for the interested Missions to be circularized.)

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French Government have entered into the above agreement on the basis that they stand by the offer, contained in paragraph 6 of the Anglo-French proposals of the 19th September, relating to an international guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression.

When the question of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia has been settled, Germany and Italy for their part will give a guarantee to Czechoslovakia.

Munich, September 29, 1938.

(1International Legislation, VIII . 134.)

The Heads of the Governments of the four Powers declare that the problems of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia, if not settled within three months by agreement between the respective Governments, shall form the subject of another meeting of the Heads of the Governments of the four Powers here present.

Munich, September 29, 1938.

(lInternational Legislation, VIII 135.)

760C.60F/287 Washington, October 1, 1938.

EXCELLENCY: I was instructed by my Government in a message received October first at 12:30 a.m. to communicate immediately to the Government of the United States the contents of Poland's ultimatum which was handed to the Czechcoslovak Government shortly before midnight September thirtieth. My efforts to transmit the message during the night were unsuccessful.

Inasmuch as the Czechoslovak Government, according to later information, was forced to yield to the Polish demands, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the Czechoslovak Government considers the act of the Polish Government as a violation not only of the Briand-Kellogg Pact to which both States are signatories, but also of Paragraph 2 of the addenda to the agreement of the Four Powers reached at Munich on September 29th.

Accept. (etc.)

(1U.S. Foreign Relations 1938, I. 710.)

Berlin, October 1, 1938

zu Pol. lV 6621

Pol. IV68112

For Information.

According to information from Hungarian Minister here, the Yugoslav Prime Minister has informed Budapest that he would be willing to mediate in Prague about the cession to Hungary of areas of the former Czechoslovak State inhabited by Hungarians, if Hungary would issue a statement regarding security of Yugoslavia and would inform him what areas of Slovakia she claims. On the other hand, Yugoslavia would not agree to the cession to Hungary of strictly Slovak and Ruthenian territory, as this might be dangerous for Yugoslavia.

(1German Documents, IV. 8. Addressed to the interested Missions.

2 File numbers refer to documents reproduced supra as No. 6 and 9)

At the same time the Rumanian Government has also stated in Rome that it must reconsider its attitude in the event of Hungary's also putting forward claims to territory inhabited by a non-Hungarian population. For the rest, the Rumanian Minister in Rome has only emphasized that impulsive gestures on the part of Hungary cannot but render Rumania's international situation more difficult in view of her obligations arising out of the Little Entente.

The Hungarian Minister here has informed us that, apart from the re-integration of the region inhabited by Hungarians, Hungary in fact aims only at a realization of the right of self-determination of the Slovaks and Ruthenians, which has no kind of aggressive implication for Yugoslavia.

Hungarian Minister has today announced Hungarian demarche in Prague in near future with a view to requesting the Prague Government to agree to immediate negotiations in the spirit of the Munich decisions. In accordance with his wishes very far-reaching German diplomatic support has in principle been promised to him. It was added that we could naturally only support demands of which we had an exact knowledge and must reserve the right to decide in individual cases.

Please follow a similar line in your capital.

For information: Prague Legation has been asked to put itself in contact with the Hungarian Minister there and to report by telegram upon the precise wording of Hungarian demands.

Edward Chaszar : The Czechoslovak-Hungarian Border Dispute of 1938