Edward Chaszar : The Czechoslovak-Hungarian Border Dispute of 1938

140/76582-83

Telegram
Berlin, October 3, 1938
zu Pol. lV 6891

The result achieved at the historic conference of the four leading statesmen of Europe at Munich, which did full justice to the demands put forward in the German memorandum, betokens an outstanding success for the policy of the Fuhrer in general, as well as in the Sudeten-German question in particular. For the first time in history it has been possible to arrive by peaceful means at a frontier revision in the spirit of the peoples, right to self-determination.

(German Documents, IV 18-19.)

Fears expressed in the press of various countries of southeastern Europe that the outcome of Munich represents an act of dictation and simply means the first step toward further German territorial demands in southeastern Europe are completely groundless.

The Munich agreements amount to nothing more than the carrying into effect of the measures for the cession of Sudeten-German territory already conceded in principle by Czechoslovakia.

If, as in this case, the four leading Great Powers of Europe find themselves in complete agreement upon a European question, that can surely not just be overlooked in the future by the other European powers. But neither by the German Government, nor by the other powers concerned, as far as is known, are any plans or designs entertained of pursuing a joint policy of intervention.

(...)

Prague, October 3, 1938, 9.0 p.m.
Your telegram No. 408

During conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs today I spoke to him on lines indicated. He explained that it was very difficult politically and even constitutionally to promise in advance in writing to cede Czechoslovakian territory. Verbally, however, he had made it quite clear to Hungarian Minister that such was definite and early intention of Czechoslovak Government and he thought Hungarian Government were satisfied.

Dr. Kroftamade a somewhat pathetic appeal not to be forced to settle so important a matter absolutely immediately when he and the Government and their officials were already overwhelmed and worked to death with (Sudeten)2 and Polish questions. He had suggested to Hungarian Minister that joint Commission should be set up in eight or ten days and it would be extremely difficult to find the Czechoslovak representatives for it before October 15. He would be grateful if His Majesty's Govemment would use their influence in this sense at Budapest. Dr. Kroftas verbal assurances are confirmed by a semi-official review of the position in Press today which ends by saying that in the circumstances explained Czechoslovak Government could not reject Hungarian claims for treatment similar to that of Germany and Poland.

(1.British Docunnents, 111. 81-82.
2.The text is here uncertain.)

Additional reason for a few days delay is that discussion on mutual relations generally are proceding with Slovak representatives whose participation is desirable in negotiations with Hungary.

Repeated to Budapest, Paris, Rome and Berlin.

140/75681

Telegram

No . 556 of October 4 Prague, October 4, 1938

11:05 p.m.

Received October 5

3:30 a.m.

According to reports here, independence movement in Slovakia is gaining ground steadily. Far-reaching autonomy is now demanded by political circles in Slovakia formerly loyal to Prague. A tendency is evident toward declaration of complete independence. According to press reports Cernak, the newly appointed Slovak Minister, today handed his resignation to the President and told journalists that conditions in Slovakia were steadily deteriorating. Slovakia was being overrun by the Czechs.

Prague Government is endeavoring to reach agreement with Slovakia as soon as possible and at any price. Deputy Foreign Minister today spoke to me optimistically about probable outcome of negotiations at present in progress between Government and Slovak parties.

Hungarian Minister here stated that Budapest would regard voluntary union of Slovakia, including Carpatho-Ukraine,2 with Hungary as the most practical solution of the Slovak question. In his personal view Slovakia could be given territorial autonomy (Territorial Autonomie.) Carpatho-Ukraine on the other hand, in view of the large Hungarian element of the population, could only be granted national autonomy (National Autonomie.) This would also be in accordance with Poland's wishes, as Warsaw feared a strengthening of Ukrainian nationalism as a result of territorial autonomy.

Polish Legation in Prague is more inclined to the idea on an independent Slovak State which would leave open the possibility of a protectorate under Poland or Hungary.

(1 German Documents, IV. 32.
2 Ruthenia.)

140/76588

No. 564 of October 5 Prague, October 5, 1938

9:00 p.m.

Received October 6

1:00 p.m.

With reference to my telegram No. 555 of October 4.2

(1) Hungarian Minister today handed a note to the New Foreign Minister in which surprise is expressed that the answer to the Hungarian note3 of October 3, promised for October 4, had not yet been received. In today's note the Hungarian Government demands an answer from Czechoslovakia and further makes an energetic protest against treatment and persecution of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia whereby good Czechoslovak-Hungarian relations would be endangered and prejudiced for the future. By the very nature of things Hungary and Czechoslovakia are at present in a state of excitement and, being aware of the Munich decisions, await their application with extreme anxiety. These conditions make it imperative that the necessary awards should be implemented immediately.

(2) The head of the European section of the Foreign Ministry told a member of the Legation that point 1 of the immediate measures demanded by Hungary (cf. telegram no. 545 of October 3) had already been fulfilled by the Czechoslovak Government and that this had been confirmed by note. Point 2 could not be carried out at once as the interpretation of Hungarian nationality could not be established forthwith. The Hungarian Legation itself was not clear about the type of measures demanded in point 3. There can be no discussion on point 4 (symbolic cession of territory) while Hungarian detachments which penetrated at Rimavska Sobota are still on Czechoslovak soil. The reconstruction of the Government had rendered impossible a complete answer to the Hungarian note within the time requested. The Czechoslovak Government envisaged October 15 as the date for the opening of negotiations and hoped that Germany would exert a moderating influence on the Hungarian Government.

(1 German Documents, IV. 36-37.
2 Reporting to Berlin that the "Czechoslovak Government for its part wished to reach direct agreement with Hungary as soon as possible. For technical and personal reasons, however, it was not possible to negotiate simultaneously with Germany, Poland, and Hungary. The Czechoslovak Government would therefore propose to Budapest that the start of the negotiations be postponed for a few days."
3 Reproduced here as No. 41)

760F.62 1838

Report by the U.S. Military Attache in Germany (Smith)

No. 16,169 October 5, 1938

. . . There is today a mental conflict between Hitlers wishes [to retain Italy's friendship while winning France and England's] and Germany's national interest [an understanding with England at all costs.]

This conflict is apparent on October 5th, not only in the Mediterranean, but more particularly and immediately in the Hungarian-Czechish question. This latter question is on the surface one thing and under the surface quite another. If the surface aspect were the true one, the Hungarian problem would be settled tomorrow and the areas of Czechoslovakia which contain a Hungarian majority would be handed over to Hungary immediately. Actually the issue at stake is not the Hungarian districts of Slovakia, but Slovakia as a whole. The Hungarian Government wants the whole of Slovakia and Czechish Ruthenia, but never says so openly. Hungary's secret demand for Slovakia is championed by Mussolini and backed silently by Poland.

England and France want Slovakia to remain with Prague, largely out of a sense of shame for their desertion of her cause in the Sudeten issue. What the Slovaks want is not clear, so confused is the strength, grouping and platforms of the various political parties in Slovakia. Probably the majority of Slovaks would like to remain with Prague, but with a much larger degree of autonomy than has been theirs up to the present. Nevertheless there are potent elements in Slovakia who want an autonomous Slovakia within a Hungarian framework.

What does Hitlerwant? This is the present mystery of the German foreign policy. It is noticeable that Hitlers support of the Hungarians has been much less vociferous and much more reserved than Mussolini's, though if the issue were purely the Hungarian minority area passing to Hungary, Hitlerwould undoubtedly be in the first line fighting alongside Mussolini. Why isn't he doing so? Why does there appear to be a real difference of viewpoint between Hitlerand Mussolini on the Hungarian question? The answer is believed to be Slovakia. Hitlermust wish that Slovakia remain with Prague for military-political reasons, if for no other. Also to hand over Pressburg and the rest of Slovakia to Budapest would violate National Socialist tenets, "Men of the same race belong in the same state."

It is a military, political and economic disadvantage for Germany to have Slovakia pass to Hungary and for the following reasons:

(1 U.S. Foreign Relations 1938. 1. 716-720.)

Poland and Hungary obtain thereby common frontiers. Italy's position in Central Europe becomes thereby also immensely strong, for Hungary's acquisition of Slovakia brings into being automatically the grouping Italy-Yugoslavia-Hungary-Poland. This grouping is a far more serious military barrier to Germany's Danubian expansion than Czechoslovakia ever was.

If on the other hand Slovakia remains with Prague, Berlin can dominate both and incidentally keep a protective shield of her own between Warsaw and Budapest.

That Hitlerwould prefer to keep the Czechs and Slovaks together appears certain. On the other hand it seems doubtful if he can do so, for, for him to oppose openly Rome, Warsaw, and Budapest together at the present juncture, is out of the question.

It is a curious fact that five days after the meeting of Munich, Hitlerfinds himself in accord with France and England on the livest European issue and opposed to his allies, Poland, Hungary, and ltaly. This is not to say that Hitlerwill not yield to Mussolini, if he has to do so. Only that he will seek to conceal his opposition behind France and possibly urge Prague to grant at once autonomy to Slovakia as a means of warding off a worse fate. Hitlers diplomatic position at the moment is not an enviable one. He will require all of his diplomatic skill to avoid the many pitfalls which today confront him and hold to Italy while winning England and France.

There are two further sidelights of the European crisis which deserve the closest attention today and tomorrow.

1st. Poland has enormously strengthened its political-military position in Central Europe by the acquisition of the Olsa-Teschen area. This area looks small on the map, and to the uninformed the Teschen dispute seems to have been thought to be a minor matter of minorities. Actually Teschen is to Central Europe what the Panama Canal is to the Americas .

Teschen has rich coal and important steel industry. These by themselves make Teschen a rich prize. Still more important, however, is it that Teschen is the communication center of all Eastern Europe. Through the town and over the Jablunka Pass to the south runs the great north-south artery of Central Europe from Budapest to Prague and Breslau. Through it also run the lines from Vienna to Warsaw and the line from Prague to Slovakia and Ruthenia.

Poland now sits squarely across the main east-west line of inner communication of Czechoslovakia. Only minor unimportant routes over Pressburg and the mountains connecting Prague with her eastern provinces

remain in her possession. Poland is now in a position where she can speak aggressively on Danubian matters and influence definitely the fate of Slovakia.

2nd. The second sidelight in the crisis worthy of close attention is the inner political struggle in progress behind the scenes in Hungary, the portent and probable outcome of which is not clearly apparent in Berlin at this time.

It is believed that the Hungarian National Socialists are seeking to secure power, that large elements of the Army support them, and that the feeling is strong in Hungary that Horthy and Imredy have been too weak and unaggressive in the crisis of the past weeks; and that now through weakness, Hungary runs the risk of losing the Hungarian districts of Czechoslovakia. It is furthermore understood in Berlin that the Hungarian Nazis, unlike the Horthy-lmredy regime, do not want Slovakia. This viewpoint of the Hungarian Nazis suggests that Hitlerwould welcome a Hungarian revolution. Such an outcome would undoubtedly obviate a clash with Mussolini.

Edward Chaszar : The Czechoslovak-Hungarian Border Dispute of 1938