Edward Chaszar : The Czechoslovak-Hungarian Border Dispute of 1938

Warsaw, October 6, 1938, 4:45 p.m.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Polish Government would undoubtedly like to secure a common frontier with Hungary. Responsible members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs favour attainment of this by grant of autonomy to Ruthenia under Hungarian suzerainty. They point out that there is a 20 per cent Hungarian minority there and that if Hungarian districts are detached including essential railways therein, the rest of Ruthenia cannot exist. Semi-official "Gazeta Polska" today states that in any case Czechoslovakia never had any proper historical or economic claim to Ruthenia which was a bridge-head for Czecho-Soviet cooperation. For centuries Poland and Hungary had a common frontier. The problem of Ruthenia's restitution to Hungary was a Polish problem and involved Poland's military security. Attitude now adopted by Czechoslovak Government towards Ruthenia would be of cardinal importance and would prove whether Prague intended to accept Poland's outstretched hand of friendship.

2. According to offlcial Polish telegraph agency all parties in Ruthenia except Communists are agreed in demanding a plebiscite to decide future of territory.

British Documents, III 111-112.

3. I hear that the question of the future of Ruthenia is causing excitement in the Ukrainian districts of Poland.

4. The question of Slovakia's future status has become more acute since my interview with the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs on October 3 (see my telegram No. 75 Saving).

An evidently inspired article in the "Gazeta Polska" today says that the movement for independence is growing in Slovakia and that Poland would view with great satisfaction "any improvement in the national existence of the Slovaks." According to official Polish telegraph agency report from Bratislava this morning political circles there are pleased that "both Poland and Hungary adopted a favourable attitude to the Slovak independence and are ready to give guarantees to an independent Slovak State."

The Polish and Hungarian Governments are evidently in very close co-operation. The Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs' Chef de Cabinet flew here yesterday and is to see M. Becktoday.

I understand that my Rumanian colleague saw M. Beck having been instructed by his Government to make representations regarding the Polish attitude towards future of Ruthenia.

M. Becktold him that the Polish Government favoured the return of Ruthenia to Hungary.

He further said that it was expected that the Slovaks would declare their independence today and indicated that such a small Slav State would have to maintain closest relations with her northern neighbour.

Repeated to Prague, Paris, Berlin, Rome, Bucharest and Budapest.

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 6, 1938
9:30 p.m.
Your telegram No. 861

The Hungarian Minister saw Sir A. Cadogan on October 3 and asked that His Majesty's Government would use their friendly influence in Prague in order to promote the success of the negotiations regarding the Hungarian claim which had, he said, already been initiated.

Sir A. Cadogan did not promise that we should take this action, but I nevertheless think it would be useful if you were to inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the instructions sent to Sir G. Knoxin my telegram2 No. 96 and were on the strength of these to urge upon the Minister for

(1 British Documents, 111. 113-114.
2 Reproduced here as No. 21.)

Foreign Affairs if you see no objection the importance of initiating conversations with the Hungarian Government without delay and of bringing them to a conclusion as soon as possible.

Rumanian Minister, who is much alarmed at Polish and Hungarian activities regarding Slovakia and Ruthenia, suggests that the continual pressure of these two countries will force the Czechs, now that they are deserted by the Western Powers, to turn more and more to Germany in the hope that latter will in her own interest oppose further cession of territory by Czechoslovakia. Do you support this view or have you any reason to expect that, as a result of Dr. Benes resignation or for other reasons, we may now expect a reorientation of Czechoslovak foreign policy?

Repeated to Budapest, Paris, Warsaw, Bucharest, Berlin and Rome.

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 6, 1938
10.00 p.m.
Prague telegrams Nos. 861(2) and 867.

Similar appeal was made October 4 by Czechoslovak Minister here in memorandum of which following are chief points:

(1) Czechoslovak Government fully appreciate urgent need for "stable and working arrangement" with Hungary involving transfer of territory, but think it imperative that this should not be done under pressure from Hungary.

(2) They do not intend to procrastinate, but preoccupation with German and Polish claims makes it technically impossible for them to settle at once with Hungary.

(3) Great Britain, France and ltaly should induce Hungary to negotiate peacefully: otherwise armed conflict might ensue, involving Rumania and Yugoslavia as well. These Powers should employ same tactics at Budapest as they employed at Prague in regard to German demands.

(4) Czechoslovak Government could open diplomatic negotiations with Hungarian Government in ten days or fortnight (from October 4) and diplomatic discussions even sooner but only if there is no ultimatum.

(5) Czechoslovak Government assure His Majesty's Government that their desire for agreement is "sincere and unflinching." They authorise His Majesty's Government to inform the Hungarian Government of this assurance.

(1 British Documents, 111. 115-116.
2 Reproduced here as No 15.)

Please bring points (1), (2), (4) and (5) above to the knowledge of the Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs and, after expressing appreciation of the manner in which the Hungarians have hitherto put forward their claims against Czechoslovakia, express to him the hope that they will in future refrain from making demands in such a manner or of such a nature as to prejudice the prospects of that peaceful agreement which the Czechoslovak Government have announced their anxiety to reach. You should then communicate to Minister for Foreign Affairs the text of Sir T. Inskips statement about the British guarantee.l You might add an expression of hope that the Hungarian press will do nothing to aggravate situation (see Bucharest telegram No. 233 to Foreign Office).

You should then mention that the Hungarian Minister on October 3 asked us to use our influence at Prague to induce the Czechoslovak Government to enter into negotiations and to conclude an agreement with the Hungarians with the least possible delay and should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of the instructions sent to Mr. Newtonin my telegram No. 438.2

I understand that your French colleague will be receiving instructions to make similar representations in this sense.

Repeated to Warsaw, Prague, Paris, Berlin, Bucharest and Rome.

1 The reference is to Sir T. Inskips statement in the House of Commons on October 4 in answer to a question whether the British guarantee to Czechoslovakia was already in operation. Sir T. Inskip Minister for the Coordination of Defence, said that the formal treaty of guarantee had not yet been drawn up, and that therefore technically the guarantee could not be said to be in force. He added: "His Majesty's Government, however, feel under a moral obligation to Czechoslovakia to treat the guarantee as being now in force. In the event, therefore, of an act of unprovoked aggression against Czechoslovakia, His Majesty's Government would certainly feel bound to take all steps in their power to see that the integrity of Czechoslovakia is preserved." Parl. Deb., 5th Ser., H. of C., Vol. 339, cols. 295-308.

2 Reproduced here as Document 20. 383/210819

Secret Berlin, October 6, 1938
Pol. I.M. 3855 g.
No. 0168/38 geh. Ausl. Ic. 2 Ang.
Reference: No. 0168/geh. usl. Ic. of Oct. 5, 1938

Subject: Establishment of a common fronffer between Poland and Hungary

(1 German Documents, IV. 40.)

The creation of a compact bloc of succession states on Germany's eastern frontier, with lines of communication to southeast Europe, will not be to our interest. Accordingly, a statement to that effect was addressed to the Foreign Ministry by the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht on October 5, 1938, saying "that for military reasons a common Hungarian-Polish frontier was undesirable."

It is assumed that in the future the "Czech and Slovak" Rump State will of necessity depend to a considerable extent on Germany. The conditions for this are now present, especially as in Czechoslovakia strong feeling prevails against Britain and France, by whom she feels betrayed. Moreover a strong tendency is developing toward dissolving the relationship of the Czechs to the U.S.S.R. at the earliest possible moment.

Consequently, it is in our military interest that Slovakia should not be separated from the Czechoslovak union but should remain with Czechoslovakia under strong German influence.

By order of the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht.

Edward Chaszar : The Czechoslovak-Hungarian Border Dispute of 1938