Edward Chaszar : The Czechoslovak-Hungarian Border Dispute of 1938

383/210762-68

Berlin, October 7,1938

I submit a memorandum for the Fuhrer on the Slovak and Carpatho-Ukraine question.
To the Foreign Minister.

Woermann (Enclosure)

ln view of the negotiations due to begin in the next few days between Hungary and Czechoslovakia, it is necessary to define our policy on the Slovak and Carpatho-Ukraine question.

Slovak Question

Four possibilities in theory:

1. lndependent Slovakia
2. Slovak autonomy within the Czechoslovak State

(1 German Documents, IV. 46-49.)

3. Autonomous Slovakia oriented toward Hungary, which might develop from alliance into incorporation
4. Autonomous Slovakia oriented toward Poland.

Ref. 1) The question of the economic viability of a completely independent Slovakia is doubtful but could be answered in the affirmative if Germany provided support. Very rich in timber; part of the Czechoslovak armament industry lies in Slovak territory (Waag and Gran Valley). Geologically not yet fully explored, old inactive mining area, of which a part is again being worked. Possibilities for the future in this region. At all events favorable conditions for intensifying economic union with Germany. Common frontier will be set up.

An independent Slovakia would be weak constitutionally and would therefore best further the German need for penetration and settlement in the east. Point of least resistance in the east.

Ref. 2) Since the resolutions passed at Sillein on October 6 by all the Slovak parties and the subsequent agreement with the Czech Government, an autonomous Slovak Government has now been formed in conjunction with Czechia (Tschechei). According to reports so far received the State presidency, foreign policy, and finance are to be common to both, while Slovakia is to have an independent military organization. The relationship would be similar to that between the old Austria and Hungary. We could tolerate that solution for the present. It even presents certain advantages compared with an independent Slovakia. This presupposes that the future Czecho-Slovakia will have a strong leaning toward Germany in political and economic matters, and evidence of a readiness for this is now apparent. A complete separation between Czechia and Slovakia would always be possible later. The complete structure of Czecho-Slovakia be stronger than two independent structures. If we exercise decisive influence on Prague, Hungary's and Poland's chances of making Slovakia a permanent bone of contention would be lessened.

From the point of view of foreign policy the solution of a Slovakia united with Czechia is the easiest of achievement. After the Slovak leaders have declared in favor of this solution it could be recognized by us under the slogan of "self determination."

The decision lies therefore between solutions 1 and 2, while solution 1, i.e. an independent Slovakia, would still remain open for the future if the Czecho-Slovak solution is decided on for the present.

Ref. 3) Hungary is striving for some form of union of an autonomous Slovakia with Hungary. Germany has no interest in this solution. Slovaks themselves strongly reject any form of union with Hungary.

Ref. 4) Our interest in an autonomous Slovakia oriented toward Poland is even less than in one oriented toward Hungary. By her acqui

sition of the Teschen district Poland has already considerably increased her power in this area. The addition of Slovakia to the Polish economic sphere might put considerable difficulties in the way of German economic aspirations toward the southeast

An independent Carpatho-Ukrainian State without support from outside at present is hardly viable. The advantage of this solution, however, would be that a nucleus for a greater Ukraine in the future would be created here. The many million Ukrainians in Poland, the Soviet Union, and Rumania would be given a motherland and thus become national minorities.

In any case autonomy for the Carpatho-Ukraine under the slogan of self-determination should be demanded, and on this there are hardly any differences of opinion. Orientation of the autonomous Ukraine to Hungary is to be definitely rejected. This solution is desired by Hungary as well as Poland. A common Polish-Hungarian frontier would thereby be created, which would facilitate the formation of an anti-German bloc. From a military point of view the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht is also opposed to this common Polish-Hungarian frontier.

While rejecting the Hungarian solution and assuming that an independent Carpatho-Ukraine is not viable, the remaining solution would be an autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine oriented to Slovakia or Czechoslovakia. This is the most natural solution for the present. It leaves other possibilities open for a later date, and it can also be achieved under the slogan "self-determination." Regarding the demarcation of the Carpatho-Ukraine from Slovakia there are questions of detail which have still to be examined.

With the exception of Pressburg, there are no German-language enclaves in the area, immediate cession of which is claimed by Hungary. Most important groups: Proben and Kremnitz language enclave with about 50,000 Germans, Upper and Lower Zips about 40,000, less important new settlements in the Ukrainian area north of Munkatsch about 15,000 Germans. There should be no transfer of population from these language enclaves, as they are of value as a nucleus for further development in the east. Transfer from the Kremnitz area is possible for some of those who already are coming to Germany for seasonal work.

Summary

1. For Slovakia: Alternatives independent Slovakia or Czechoslovak solution. Both presuppose orientation toward Germany. For the outside world, a slogan of "right of self-determination" which leaves open the possibility of a plebiscite in Slovakia.

2. For Carpatho-Ukraine: Alternatives support for an independent but scarcely viable Carpatho-Ukraine and orientation toward Slovakia or Czechoslovakia. For the outside world the slogan also to be "right of self-determination" with the possibility of a plebiscite when the time comes.

3. From this results a rejection of the Hungarian or Polish solution for Slovakia as well as for Carpatho-Ukraine. In rejecting the demands of both those powers we would have a good slogan in the phrase "selfdetermination." For the outside world no anti-Hungarian or anti-Polish slogans are to be issued.

4. Steps can be taken to influence leading persons in Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine in favor of our solution. Preparations for this are already on foot.

lt is not in my official capacity as the Regent of Hungary that I am writing this letter to you, but as Admiral Horthy, a simple Hungarian, who Ioves his country above all. Three years ago I had the pleasure of meeting your brother, Sir Austin, as my guest here. He showed great interest in all the questions concerning my country - the wrongs and injustices done to her. Sir Austin understood that Hungary's claims are just and fair, and told me when I asked him to give me his advice: "Keep quiet now, I promise you, when the right moment comes, England will help you."The past years prove that I carried out loyally his advice I kept quiet and waited for the right moment to come!

But I think I am justified in saying: the right moment has come. Therefore I am now appealing to you - the man who has shown so much generosity, wisdom, and courage, asking you to accept as your legacy, your late brother's promise to me to help us, and do all in your own and your great country's power to assist and help us in this eventful hour.

I pledge my word that you will never have to regret it, and assure you of the undying gratitude of the entire Hungarian nation.

1 Horthy, Confidential Papers, pp 104-105.

1648/391407-10

Telephone Message
Godesberg, October 12, 1938
4:45 p.m.

For the State Secretary.

In his conversation with the Foreign Minister at Godesberg on October 11, the Fuhrer made the following decisions:

( . . . )

IX

As for the question of Pressburg, complete reserve is at first to be exercised in principle, and all questions connected with this problem are to be subjected to the most careful examination. Should the Hungarians approach us with demands for Pressburg, the following statement is to be made to them:

(a) In principle Germany sympathizes with Hungarian demands on Czechoslovakia .

(b) The Fuhrer has repeatedly said that Germany can only draw the sword for German interests.

(c) The Fuhrer invited the Hungarian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to visit him at Obersalzberg and there advised them both to press their cause somewhat more energetically. In the critical days which followed, the Hungarians did nothing and this explains their present difficult diplomatic situation.

(d) If any points of difference remain, a plebiscite under international control must take place.

IX

For the personal information of the State Secretary.

Should Hungary mobilize, it is not our intention to hamper the Hungarians or even advise them to use moderation.

1 German Documents, IV. 54-56.

140/75826

The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry1

Telegram
No.129 of October 13. Budapest, October 13,1938-10:56 p.m.
Received October 14-3:20 a.m.

With reference to telephone message today to Under State Secretary Woermann.

Prime Minister informed me that his predecessor, Daranyi had been instructed to clear away certain misunderstandings which appeared to have arisen between Germany and Hungary and to clarify the views of both parties.

The attitude of the German press toward the creation of a common frontier between Poland and Hungary in Carpatho-Ukraine had caused astonishment here. The idea suggested in the French press of Hungarian participation in any formation of a Polish-Rumanian bloc against Germany was absurd as the Carpathians form a natural barrier only against the east. With the reincorporation of Carpatho-Ukraine, Hungary would prolong the Rumanian front against Bolshevism and form a strong bulwark against it on the Carpathian passes.

The events of recent months caused the Hungarian Government to feel itself bound more firmly than ever to the Berlin-Rome Axis and it was prepared to affirm this on paper. The question of the Pressburg bridgehead is not to be raised by Daranyi

1 German Documents IV. 66.

140/75801

The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry1

Telegram
Urgent Budapest, October 13,1938-10:56 p.m.
No.132 of October 13 Received October 14-1:40 a.m.

Prime Minister informed me that if the Czechoslovaks, whose counterproposal of this morning was completely unsatisfactory, did not change their attitude, the Hungarian Government would order mobiliza

tion within 24 hours, presumably without making its intermediate demand announced in yesterday's telegraphic report.2 This would result in the doubling of the present strength of the army. This measure did not mean war but was necessary because Czech demobilization had not yet taken place. Hungary was ready to march if we gave our consent. Unrest in the Hungarian area of Czechoslovakia was constantly increasing.

The Foreign Minister's Chief de Cabinet has just stated that negotiations in Komarom had been broken off. The Hungarian Government will appeal to the four Great Powers and inform them of the course of the negotiations.

1 German Documents IV. 67.

2 The telegram reported that the Hungarians intended first to demand that the Czechs demobilize on their trontier by a certain date; in the absence of a favorable reply, they would themselves mobilize.

October 13, 1938

The resolution passed in the four-power conference in Munich on September 29th decreed that if the problem of Polish and Hungarian minorities could not be settled by an agreement of the governments interested within three months, this would devolve upon another conference of the chiefs of the governments present in Munich. Obviously the conference had in mind a solution by which the territories inhabited by Poles and Hungarians would be handed over to Poland and Hungary, respectively. This was the underlying principle of the negotiations to be started between the two countries.

No sooner was Hungary advised of the resolutions than its government immediately applied to the Czechoslovak government proposing to take up negotiations without delay, and on October 3rd, forwarded a note suggesting that the negotiations be opened on October 6th. Simultaneously, a few appropriate demands were put forward to guarantee that negotiations would be continued in earnest. In response to this action the Czechoslovak government in principle replied in the affirmative, yet actually it used delaying tactics, until finally on October 9th the negotiations were opened.

Before negotiations started, the Czechoslovak govemment on several occasions had expressed to the Hungarian representative, and then also publicly, through broadcasts, the press, etc., that they do not want

national minorities to remain within their frontiers in the course of the reconstruction of their country, but would be prepared to cede these minorities and the territories inhabited by them.

This meant that there was agreement on principle between the great powers, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. This agreement in principle could be construed in no other way than the territories inhabited by a Magyar majority would be ceded to Hungary. At determining these territories, obviously the start would have to be made from the further principle, which had been applied to the Sudeten country, that the conditions of twenty years before, i.e. the data of the latest census before that date could be accepted as a basis. This thesis holds to an even greater extent as regards the Hungarians, the question involving a territory which before was part of Hungary, yet, as has been explicitly shown by the Munich resolutions, was detached from her wrongfully by denying the Wilsonian principles. Obviously, at the settlement the changes that have occurred in the composition of the population, being based on unlawfulness and injustice, cannot be taken into consideration, and consequently the conditions before the commitment of unlawfulness and injustice have to be reverted to.

Despite this, in the opening negotiations on October 9th, the Czechoslovak government adopted an attitude on the ceding of these territories, which cannot be justified, and which shows that the Czechoslovak government want to evade the assertion of the principle of cessation of territories, and betrays their intention to hold dominion over foreign nationalities against the latter's will.

The Czechoslovak government rely for this point of view exclusively on considerations of power, and in order to assert these considerations do not carry out the demobilization of the army as decided nominally, but using this mobilized army want to exert pressure on Hungary which has not mobilized.

The Hungarian government have done their utmost to carry through the settlement laid down in the Munich agreement by the most peaceful means, by way of negotiations continued in a friendly spirit. However the Hungarian government feel compelled to state that neither the spirit in which negotiations have been opened, not the Czechoslovak proposals put forward during the negotiations, nor the circumstance of maintaining the army in a mobilized state with the hope of influencing the progress of the negotiations are attitudes to be tolerated any longer without strong objections. Furthermore there is every indication that these attitudes are purposeful evasions of rightful Hungarian claims.

For this very reason the Hungarian government have decided to interrupt the negotiations, and without delay inform the four parties to the Munich agreement of the actual state of negotiations, (and in order

to ensure further negotiations being continued on an equal footing decree the general mobilization of the army.)2

1 Horthy, Confidential Papers, pp. 105-107.

2 The last passage in this typed draft, signed by Horthy, was crossed out by him in pencil. There was no general mobilization, instead, on October 17th, five age groups were called to arms. There is no proof that the declaration was ever published, and it fell on the Minister of Foreign Affairs to inform the interested powers. (See below, Hungarian communication to Berlin, London, Paris, Rome and Warsaw, October 14, 1938.)

October 13, 1938

Your Excellency:

The negotiations with the Czechoslovak Republic had to be interrupted tonight. The counter-proposals of the Czechoslovak government were wholly unacceptable, inasmuch as these proposals included only a fraction of the territory inhabited by a Hungarian majority, and in addition, apart from the town of Komarom situated on the Danube, not a single one of the many Hungarian towns was included in them. These proposals were put forward after negotiations had been protracted for several days, and in addition accompanied by menacing statements over the radio which for our part we could not accept without a reply. Besides, our co-nationals living in the occupied territory are harassed, their foodstuffs and cattle are taken from them with force. For this reason I should like to inform Your Excellency without delay that in all likelihood I shal1 be forced to decree the mobilization of the army the more so since Czechoslovakia is still in a mobilized state.

Simultaneously, I would request Your Excellency to grant us an opportunity for a thorough and urgent discussion to make clear certain questions which are partly independent of it. I should be very grateful if Your Excellency had time to receive if possible tomorrow the former Prime Minister Daranyi who carries my instructions as representative of the government. He is ready to leave by airplane immediately . . .

1 Horthy, Confidential Papers, pp. 107-108. A similar letter was sent to Mussolini, and subsequently Count Csakywas dispatched to Rome for an "urgent discussion."

Ainsi que nous avons eu l'honneur de declarer a plusieurs reprises, nous sommes venus ici animis des meilleures intentions et dans la plus sinchre espoir qu'il nous sera possible d'arriver rapidement a un accord qui donnera des bases solides aux relations entre nos Etats.

A notre plus vif regret, cet espoir ne s'est pas rialise.

Je ne voudrais pas, a cette occasion, me referer a nouveau a certains symptomes defavorables, car nous l'avons fait plusieurs fois au cours des negociations.

Je dois cependant constater et souligner que la contre-proposition tchecoslovaque concernant les nouvelles frontieres qui nous a ete remise ce matin est tellement differente de notre conception et que concernant les bases du nouveau reglement les theses representees par les deux Delegations sont separees d'un abime sur lequel, selon notre conviction, il est impossible de jeter un pont par les presentes negociations.

Pour ces motifs, le Gouvernement Royal de Hongrie a decede de considerer ces negociations, en ce qui le concerne, comme terminees et de demander le reglement urgent de ses revendications territoriales vis-a-vis la Tchecoslovaquie, des quatre grandes puissances signataires du Protocole de Munich.

1 Adam, A muncheni egyezmeny. . ., p. 772. The declaration was read by Foreign Minister Kanya in Hungarian, and handed to the Czechoslovak delegation in French.

Edward Chaszar : The Czechoslovak-Hungarian Border Dispute of 1938