Edward Chaszar : The Czechoslovak-Hungarian Border Dispute of 1938

Telegram
Immediate Budapest, October 14, 19385:25 a.m.
No. 133 of October 14 Received October 149:15 a.m.

Count Csakyinformed me at 3 a.m. that the Council of Ministers had just passed a resolution to call up five more classes by individual orders but to refrain from making a public announcement of this partial mobilization until the attitude of the German and Italian Governments was known.

Ex-Prime Minister Daranyiis flying to Munich at 9 a.m. today and Count Csakyto Rome in order to ascertain this.

1 German Documents IV. 67-68.

Prague. October 15. 1938, 2:15 a.m.
My telegrams Nos. 959 and 962.

I was received this evening by Dr. Krno, Political Director at Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who had returned this morning from Komarno.

He left with me statement of Czechoslovak case of which following is a translation:

"Czechoslovak delegation had gone to Komarno with firm desire to reach lasting, fair, and rapid settlement.

(1) They had agreed to open negotiations not later than ten days after Munich Agreement though it had contemplated a delay of three months;

(2) To show their readiness to make territorial sacrifices they had agreed on first day of negotiations to symbolic cession of Sahy and station of Novi Mesto;

(3) They had proposed a frontier involving cession of about 400,000 persons including 330,000 Hungarians and leaving approximately the same number of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia as Slovaks and Ruthenes in Hungary;

(4) They had emphasized that even this proposal was not final and that they wished to continue discussions on basis of mutual concessions.

The attitude of the Hungarian delegation had on the other hand been as follows:

(1) They had submitted proposal, which would not only have deprived Slovakia of nearly all her important towns and vital lines of communication but have involved cession of about 510,000 Slovaks and Ruthenes (apart from 300,000 already in Hungary) leaving only about 20,000 Hungarians in Czechoslovakia;

(2) They had refused to put forward second proposal despite earnest request of Czechoslovak delegation;

(3) They had abruptly broken off negotiations only a few days after their opening."

In further conversation Dr. Krno emphasized that figures which Hungarian delegation had produced were entirely different from Czech figures based on the same 1910 census. He added that Austrians had had similar experience of unreliability of Hungarian figures in dispute over Burgenland. Good commentary on Hungarian figures was fact that

Dr. Tiso head of Czechoslovak delegation appeared . 2 as a Hungarian.

Dr. Krno made further point that Hungarians had demanded amongst other things plebiscite for Slovaks and Ruthenes, a matter which was no concern of theirs.

His personal feeling was that Hungarians had received encouragement from Italy.

Somewhat surprisingly he did not in speaking to me challenge the main principle of Hungarian argument that 1910 census should be used as basis. Its acceptance by the Powers would nevertheless ripen by international agreement the points [sic ?fruits], subsequently surrendered, of 50 years of a Magyarisation policy which has been generally condemned (see Macartney's "Hungary and her Neighbours", page 2).

Repeated to Berlin, Budapest, Rome, Warsaw, Bucharest and Belgrade.

1 British Documents. 111. 184-186.

2 A word appears to have been omitted here.

Polish Embassy in Berlin
(Excerpts) Strictly Confidential

(......)

Herr von Ribbentrop exposed at length his personal objections to the Hungarian way of behavior. He recalled that during Horthy's visit the Chancellor quite frankly told the Regent that he had decided to act on the problem of the Sudetenland, and he advised the Hungarians to be ready for any eventuality. During this visit, to the utter surprise of the German government, Kanya showed Ribbentrop a communiqui from Bled,2 which evidently made the worst possible impression in Berlin. The Hungarian side, during this visit, constantly warned against war entanglements, owing to the Anglo-French stand. lt came to Ribbentrop's knowledge that upon their return to Budapest the rumor was spread there that he was conducting a madman's policy. Ribbentrop's resentment centered mainly on Kanya.

He further mentioned that on the eve of the Godesberg Conference the Chancellor invited Imredy to Berchtesgaden and gave him detailed

information on the situation. On Imredy's request, the Chancellor firmly supported Hungarian claims at the conference in Munich. Hungarians knew all about this, but not a single word of thanks followed, since they considered that German efforts were self-explanatory.

Next, von Ribbentrop discussed the Problem of the German government's mediation. In the.conversations with Daranyiat Berchtesgaden the Hungarian ethnographic line was discussed. It was established that Bratislava would remain outside the line and that Nitra would be subject to a plebiscite; Koszyce (Kosice) would remain within the Hungarian line, while Uzhorod and Munkacz (Mukacevo) would fall beyond the line (as far as I could understand, they were to be subject to a plebiscite).

Ribbentrop used his influence on Chvalkovsky to accept such a Hungarian line and discussed it also with the Slovaks and representatives of Carpathian Ruthenia.

The Slovaks were hurt by the Koszyce question; the representative of Carpathian Ruthenia was rather pleased that Uzhorod and Munkacz had been left outside the line of claims. Ribbentrop emphasized here that he did not take any sides and was acting merely as a mediator.

When the results of these conversations were communicated to Budapest by Erdmannsdorf, the Hungarian government bluntly rejected the proposal, in spite of Daranyis earlier approval. Under these circumstances the German government withdrew from mediation and washed its hands of the matter. The ltalian side, informed about this, is allegedly also discouraged to some extent by the Hungarian methods.

Ribbentrop is of the opinion that, as matters stand, talks will continue for the time being between Budapest and Prague.

Asked about arbitration, he replied that at present he does not think arbitration could take place; besides, he raises the following objections:

1) Whether, with two other signatories of the Munich Agreement, arbitration with the participation of Germany and Italy would be possible.

2) In case of arbitration, its execution should be guaranteed. Here a military engagement would possibly be needed.

For my part, in accordance with my instruction, I only stated that, in case Germany and Italy agree on arbitration, Poland would join it also.

In my discussion with Ribbentrop I laid special detailed emphasis on our stand regarding the Polish-Hungarian frontier and Carpathian Ruthenia. I am not repeating my arguments here. I think that Ribbentrop was impressed by the Ukrainian argument contained in your instructions. In conclusion he said he would still reconsider this matter in the light of my deliberations. He asked whether we had territorial claims to Ruthenia; I replied that we did not, that we limited ourselves to support of Hungarian claims to that country.

Ribbentrop pointed here to difficulties created by Rumania's attitude, stressing the Reich's desire to maintain good relations with that country. He was also informed that Rumania does not insist on a territorial revision in Carpathian Ruthenia to its advantage.

( . . . )

Ribbentrop stressed that in conversations with him the Chancellor kept returning to his idea of finding a solution to the Jewish problem through an organization for the purpose of emigration. We had an exhaustive talk on this subject. Ribbentrop interrogated me at length on the Jewish situation in Poland.

Speaking about our action with regard to Teschen,3 Ribbentrop remarked that the Chancellor repeated again and again to the circle of his collaborators his appreciation for our determined move, stating: "The Poles are tough guys. Pilsudski would be proud of them."

1 Lipski Papers. pp. 453-58.

2 See Document No. 2, above.

3 Immediately after the Munich Agreement, Poland presented an ultimatum to Prague and occupied the Teschen territory.

No.476 Telegraphic (C 12924-2319-12)
Foreign Office, October 26,1938.9:20 p.m.
Berlin telegram No. 632.1.

Czechoslovak Minister informed me this morning on instructions that his Government regarded as quite unacceptable the Hungarian demand for plebiscites in the disputed districts on the basis of the 1910 census. On the other hand, the Czechoslovak Government would be in favour of arbitration by Germany and Italy. In response to an enquiry, M. Masaryk later ascertained from Prague that his Government were opposed to Poland being included among the arbitrators and thought that if Poland were included, Rumania should be included also. M. Masaryk said that the Czechoslovak Government would have to reply today to the Hungarian demand, and before doing so wished to have the views of His Majesty's Government on their attitude.

In reply the Czechoslovak Minister was informed this afternoon that His Majesty's Government saw no objection to the settlement of the Czech-Hungarian question by means of arbitration by Germany and

Isritish standpoint of October 26, 1938, concernmg the settlement of the Hungaro-Czechoslovak question by arbitration.

Italy, if the Czechoslovak and Hungarian Governments agree to settle their differences this way. It was added that if the two parties to the dispute preferred to refer the matter to the four Munich powers, His Majesty's Government would be ready to join in any discussions.

If the views of the Italian Ambassador, reported in Berlin telegram under reference, represent those of his Government, it seems that the Italian Government would prefer that Great Britain and France, as signatories of the Munich Agreement, should participate in any arbitration. If this is indeed the attitude of the Italian Government, it is no doubt occasioned by their desire to obtain support against Germany, who is believed to oppose the acquisition of Ruthenia by Hungary. Herr von Ribbentrop may of course settle the whole question when he arrives in Rome tomorrow, but it may be of value to the Italian Government to have an indication of our views on this question before the German Minister for Foreign Affairs arrives.

I should therefore be glad if you would seek an early interview with the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs and inform him that while it is difficult for us to adjudicate between the line claimed by the Hungarians and that offered by the Czechs, and to decide whether or not the 1910 census offers a fair basis, His Majesty's Government are, in principle, in favour of the return to Hungary of those districts in which the population is predominantly Hungarian, subject possibly to certain modifications that may be desirable for economic reasons, e.g., Bratislava. The holding of plebiscites in those regions where the races are so ethnographically entangled and where there is a difference of opinion regarding the figures to be taken as a basis for the voting would, however, in the view of His Majesty's Government be extremely difficult, especially at such short notice as the Hungarian Government propose (before November 30.)

His Majesty's Government would, therefore, be happy to see the Czechs and Hungarians agree to settle their differences by reference to arbitration by the Italian and German Governments. If, however, it were deemed preferable or necessary that the question in dispute between the Czechoslovak and Hungarian Governments should be referred to the four Munich Powers, His Majesty's Government would be ready to take their part in trying to bring about an agreed settlement.

An expression of the views of His Majesty's Government on the above lines might, I feel, be welcome to Signor Mussolini as an indication that they are anxious to co-operate with him in the discussion of European questions. You will, of course, appreciate that His Majesty's Government do not wish to give the impression of trying to profit by any Italo-German disagreement over the future of Ruthenia.

Repeated to Berlin, Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Bucharest, Belgrade and Paris No. 404

1 British Documents. 111. 202

London, October 28, 1938

Dear Admiral Horthy:

I was very pleased to receive by the hand of Sir Thomas Moore the letter which Your Highness wrote to me on the 8th October, appealing for my support for your country's claims and referring to a conversation you had held with my brother.

I should like first of all to assure Your Highness that neither His Majesty's Government, nor myself are disinterested in the negotiations which your Government have been carrying on with the Czechoslovak Government for the purpose of adjusting the existing political frontier so as to bring it into closer harmony with the ethnic situation in that area. If we have abstained from intervention and comment upon the merits of the intricate problems which have been under discussion, it has not been from any indifference to the importance of the issues at stake. On the contrary it is our sincere desire that this opportunity should be taken to reach a settlement, inspired by good will and based on the rights and interests of all concerned, such as will lessen racial grievances and lay the foundations for a lasting and fruitful collaboration between Hungary and Czechoslovakia. As Your Highness may have seen Lord Halifax made it clear in a speech at Edinburgh on October 24th that His Majesty's Government recognise that Hungary has had legitimate claims and hope that means can be found, in peaceful negotiation, to give effect to them. I enclose the relevant extract.

I appreciate that difficulties have already arisen and may still arise during these negotiations but it has been and still is our hope that the two Governments most directly concerned may be able, with good will, patience, and moderation on both sides to reach a direct agreement.

Finally, I should like to say that, if at any time you feel that my good offices could be of service, I shall of course be very glad to do what lies in my power to help, in concert with the other parties to the Munich agreement, in reaching a solution of Hungary's claims such as will form the basis of an equitable settlement.

Yours sincerely,

1 Horthy, Confidential Papers, pp. 109-11. The first and the last sentences of the letter were written by Chamberlain himself in ink.

Edward Chaszar : The Czechoslovak-Hungarian Border Dispute of 1938