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DIPLOMACY IN A WHIRLPOOL |
The Peace Treaty
Hungary's status after the first World War was particularly difficult. After the defeat and disintegration of the Red Army of Bela Kun, Rumanian troops occupied Budapest and the major part of the country.1 The occupation was accompanied by extensive looting, which caused damages of almost three billion gold crowns.2 This was followed by a disastrous peace treaty. As Francesco Nitti put it: " By a stroke of irony the financial and economic clauses inflict the most serious burdens on a country which had lost almost everything: which has lost the greatest number of men proportionately in the war, which since the war has had two revolutions, which for four months suffered the sackings of Bolshevism led by Bela Kun and the worst elements of revolutionary political crime and, finally, has suffered a Rumanian occupation, which was worse almost than the revolutions of Bolshevism".3
Negotiations with Hungary did not precede the peace settlement; the provisions of the treaty were established by the victorious states. Subsequently the Hungarian peace delegation was merely heard on one occasion. The Treaty of Trianon made Hungary the most dissatisfied of all the Danubian states.4 The Peace Conference decided the claims of the neighboring states put forward against Hungary, but did not consider the cumulative effect of these claims on the new Hungary itself. As one outstanding chronicler of the Peace Conference, Harold Nicolson, points out, the Conference "approached its problems in terms, not of the enemy Powers, but of the respective 'claims' of the succession and smaller States".6 Dealing with the problem of the Territorial Committees, Nicolson noted the defects in their proceedings, pointing out that the main task of the Committees was not to recommend a general territorial settlement, but to pronounce on the particular claims of certain states.6 The adverse effects of such a procedure are obvious.
The American recommendations concerning Hungary's frontiers were more favorable than the final provisions of the Trianon Treaty.7 A member of the American Peace Commission, Professor Archibald C. Coolidge of Harvard, visited Hungary in January of 1919 and prepared a very objective report on the conditions in Hungary and the repercussions to be expected from the projected peace settlement.8 And as Lloyd George himself pointed out in a memorandum of March 25, 1919, "There will never be peace in Southeastern Europe if every little state now coming into being is to have a large Magyar irredenta within its
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borders". Therefore he recommended that the different races should be allocated to their motherlands, and that this criterion "should have precedence over considerations of strategy or economics or communications, which can usually he adjusted by other means".9
Such considerations were discarded. The frontiers of the new Hungary were fixed principally according to Rumanian, Czechoslovak, and Yugoslav demands, and after consideration of their geographical, strategic, economic and ethnographic arguments. Territories inhabited by Magyars figured as a sort of "no man's land".10 A remark attributed to Benes was characteristic of the general atmosphere of the conference. "I am alarmed" Benes said to a friend, "when I see that they give me everything that I ask for. It is too much".11
The upshot of the matter was that the peace settlement was incomparably more severe for Hungary than for Germany or Bulgaria. True, Austria lost even more than Hungary, but Austria was a frequently changing federation of heterogeneous territories gradually acquired by the House of Habsburg and the Germans formed only a little over one-third of its population. Hungary had existed for centuries as a unitary state which demonstrated a remarkable degree of stability and stamina through the vicissitudes of history. The Treaty of Trianon reduced Hungary proper to less than one-third of her former territory and about two-fifths of her population.12 Over three million Magyars were attached, against their wishes, to the neighboring states. The Hungarian peace delegation vainly proposed a plebiscite for the territories in dispute.13
As a result of the territorial changes effected under the peace treaty the population of Hungary decreased to a figure considerably less than the actual number of Magyars residing in Southeastern Europe, while the population of Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia became, in every case, considerably greater than the actual number of any of their respective national groups. This situation is especially evident in the light of the 1910 and 1920 censuses, but it can also be clearly seen from the 1930 censuses which were least favorable to the Magyars.14
It is generally known that because of the complication of ethnographic conditions in the Danube Valley it was impossible to establish completely satisfactory frontiers. However, about one and a half million Magyars who lived in compact blocks along the new frontiers were detached from Hungary. This artificial separation could not be justified, even in the eyes of a disinterested observer, let alone to the Hungarian people themselves.
The dissolution of the Monarchy in itself had a very unfavorable effect on the economy of Hungary. The great internal market and
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balanced economy suddenly ceased to exist. Most of the factories and industrial areas remaining in Hungary were deprived of their markets and were cut off from their sources of raw materials within the neighboring states. In addition, the Trianon frontiers produced a whole series of special economic difficulties. For example, the new frontiers cut in half the areas of twenty-four flood control companies. As a result of the uncooperative attitudes of Czechoslovakia and Rumania, Hungary became exposed to grave risk of floods on the lower reaches of her rivers without being able to establish sufficient protection against them. A careless deforestation policy in both countries increased the flood danger to Hungary. The major part of Hungary is a lowland, and nearly one quarter of the productive area of the country consists of land which had been protected against inundations only at an enormous cost in money and labor. In many cases such troubles could have been avoided by minor frontier rectifications or other suitable arrangements, if Hungary's case had been seriously considered and Hungarian experts had been consulted at the peace settlement.
The general economic difficulties created by the peace settlement were increased by the refugee problem. More than 350,000 Magyars were forced to leave the neighboring states and move to the reduced territory of Hungary. These homeless masses, largely middle-class people, greatly increased Hungary's economic and social difficulties. They also became, as a matter of course, the moving spirits of revisionist movements.
The situation created by the peace treaty would have been unacceptable to any self-respecting people, but the Magyars were particularly proud of having organized and maintained a state on one of the most dangerous spots of Europe for a thousand years. Their bitterness was made even greater by their conviction that after Hungary had defended the whole of Europe against invasions in the past a claim asserted by a number of the countries of Eastern Europe the West had, so to speak, "stabbed them in the back".
The Magyars looked with great confidence to the United States and especially to the principles promulgated by President Wilson.15 However, the vindictive peace settlement imposed by the victors in the name of democracy gave that term a rather doubtful meaning to many Magyars. It seemed to them that, at the peace table, the lofty principles were applied only against them and never in their favor. Trianon had a harmful effect in domestic politics as well. It gave an evil connotation to the term "democracy", and indirectly retarded democratic forces in the country.
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Consolidation of the Status Quo.
After the upheavals of the revolutionary years of 1918-1919, the National
Assembly, in March, 1920, elected Admiral Nicholas Horthy as Regent.16 Hungary
remained a monarchy with the kingship in abeyance. The Treaty of Trianon was
signed on June 4, 1920, and ratified by Hungary under pressure from the great
powers on November 13, 1920.
The period preceding the ratification of the peace treaty was eventful in
Hungarian foreign politics. Early in 1920 confidential parleys took place
between France and Hungary.17 These were followed by formal negotiations.
French foreign policy endeavored to bring about a Danubian integration. In
connection with this plan France was inclined to support Hungarian claims
aimed at correcting some of the territorial provisions of the Trianon
Treaty.18 The French High Commissioner in Budapest, Maurice Fouchet, declared
that France was determined to base her whole policy in Southeastern Europe
upon Hungary as a pivot.19 In return Hungary was expected to give important
concessions to France. These included leasing the Hungarian State Railways and
Railway Locomotive Works, the exploitation of navigation on the Danube by a
French concern, the building of a Danube port in Budapest by SchneiderCreusot,
and the transfer of control over the Hungarian Credit Bank to a French
financial syndicate. This bank owned a considerable part of Hungarian
industry. The French negotiator, Maurice Paleologue, secretary general of the
Quai d'Orsay, was supported by Prime Minister Millerand, but many influences
worked at cross purposes. The FrancoHungarian negotiations provoked Italian and
British protests, and Hungary's neighbors were greatly alarmed.
Since official French documents have not yet been published, the ultimate
French objectives in these negotiations are not quite clear. Isolated Hungary
obviously hoped that an understanding with France might improve her
international situation. Paleologue gradually played down the prospects of a
long-term Franco-Hungarian rapprochement and promised assistance to Hungary in
negotiating with her neighbors for friendly settlements. Eventually the
pro-Hungarian French policy in Danubian Europe was abandoned. Paleologue
resigned in September, 1920. His successor, Philip de Berthelot, energetically
supported a maintenance of the status quo. This remained thereafter the main
line of French foreign policy.
One of the results of the Franco-Hungarian rapprochement may have been the
vague promise inserted in the Covering Letter of Millerand which was
transmitted to the Hungarian peace delegation with the draft peace treaty on
May 6, 1920. 20 But the Hungarian public greatly
21
overestimated the extremely cautious passage of the letter which mentioned
possible revision of the frontiers, and disappointment was great when the
commissions of delimitation later recommended only a few minor frontier
rectifications.
Another important development of the postwar years was the formation of the
Little Entente, an alliance system almost completely encircling Hungary. The
creator of the Little Entente was Eduard Benes, who foresaw the Hungarian
reactions to the Trianon settlement and began negotiations with Yugoslav and
Rumanian representatives as early as the end of 1918. Yugoslavia and Rumania
shared Benes' feelings towards Hungary, but were reluctant at first to
conclude a formal alliance with Czechoslovakia. A treaty of alliance concluded
between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia on August 14, 1920, and directed against
Hungary, was the first success of Benes' policy. Two attempts by King Charles
to return to the Hungarian throne gave impetus to the movement among Hungary's
neighbors for further integration.21
The concept of the Little Entente was not viewed with sympathy by
re-established Poland a state which was to become an important factor in
Eastern Europe. Marshal Joseph Pilsudski, President of Poland, and the Polish
Foreign Minister, Prince Eustace Sapieha, would have preferred a
Polish-Hungarian-Rumanian rapprochement with French blessing.22 Such
developments had some chance of success during the RussoPolish war, which broke
out in February, 1920. Even before the outbreak of the war, the Polish
Government, anticipating a Bolshevik attack, inquired as to whether the
munition factory at Csepel could supply Poland with ammunition.23 The
Hungarian Government reacted positively and later the Minister of National
Defense put at Poland's disposal the army's whole reserve of ammunition and
instructed the factory at Csepel that for fourteen days: all production should
be for the benefit of Poland.24 Beyond this material assistance, the negative
Czechoslovak attitude excluded large-scale military cooperation between
Hungary and Poland. Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia was attached to Czechoslovakia,
and thus Hungary and Poland had no common frontier. The Poles especially
asked for twenty to thirty thousand cavalry troops, which Hungary was not able
to supply. But other troops of considerable strategic value were offered.25
Negotiations continued, but there were great difficulties to overcome.
Irrespective of the unfriendly Czech attitude, the disarmament clauses of the
peace treaty made major Hungarian assistance an impossibility, and Hungary's
neighbors were reluctant to modify the pertinent treaty provisions. Polish
diplomacy cautiously supported Hungary and a special Hungarian
diplomatic-military mission was dispatched to Paris to obtain French
endorsement. The French were inclined to
22
comply with the Hungarian request but they made their decision conditional upon
the approval of the Rumanians and the Czechoslovaks who refused to give their
consent. Sapieha informed the Hungarian Government that the chief reason why
the Allied Powers declined Hungary's assistance against the Bolsheviks was the
refusal of Czechoslovakia to permit the transportation of Hungarian troops. He
explained that the Allied Powers were unable to force their will upon
Czechoslovakia, thus they preferred to adopt a position of intransigence
toward Hungary rather than to admit their impotency.26 Eventually it was
decided to send Hungarian legions of volunteers to Poland, but due to the
favorable turn of the military operations against the Bolsheviks, this plan
was not carried out.27
The Polish victory over the Red Army in August, 1920, followed by an
armistice in October, and the peace treaty of Riga the following March, made
military cooperation between Hungary and Poland superfluous. Although relations
between the two states remained cordial throughout the interwar period, their
international positions and political interests were really widely divergent.
While Hungary was the greatest loser of the peace settlement and consequently
almost inevitably a revisionist state, Poland was quite naturally a
pro-status-quo power and an ally of Rumania and France. The manifest political
difficulties notwithstanding, however, Polish diplomacy endeavored several
times to bring about a reconciliation between Hungary and Rumania. But these
attempts met with little success.
The return of King Charles to Hungary in March, 1921, soon further troubled
the already difficult waters of Hungary's foreign relations. Charles received
French encouragement 28 and appeared unexpectedly in Hungary on March 26, and
remained until persuaded to leave the country by Regent Horthy on April 5 of
the same year. Nevertheless, the damage was done. Czechoslovakia and
Yugoslavia threatened armed intervention, and the great powers lodged
protests. Italy also strongly supported the anti-Habsburg campaign.29 The
Hungarian Government considered the return of Charles a matter which concerned
Hungary exclusively, but obviously Hungary was not in a position to resist the
whole of Europe.
Under the impact of Charles' return, Rumania signed a treaty of alliance with
Czechoslovakia on April 23, and with Yugoslavia on June 17, 1921.30 Charles
returned to Hungary for a second time on October 21, 1921, and marched with
some Hungarian army units on Budapest. As the military threat of the
neighboring states was even more serious than in March, the Hungarian
Government resisted by force and interned the King. The Allied powers exiled
him to the island of Madeira
23
where he died shortly thereafter. Hungary was, however, obliged to enact a law
declaring the dethronement of the House of Habsburg.
The two attempts of Charles to return to the Throne of St. Stephen
complicated Hungary's foreign relations in many other respects, and especially
increased suspicion among the neighboring countries. Following the signing of
the peace treaty the government of Count Paul Teleki succeeded in stabilizing
somewhat the internal conditions of the country, and sought to improve
relations with the neighboring states. On March 14 and 15, 1921, Prime
Minister Count Paul Teleki and Foreign Minister Gustave Gratz negotiated with
Benes in Bruck.31 The two delegations discussed certain problems connected
with the execution of the peace treaty and the larger aspects of political
relations between Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The possibility of territorial
revisions of the Trianon Treaty was also discussed, and Benes made interesting
suggestions.32 But, after these negotiations, relations deteriorated between
the two countries, although Masaryk himself visualized a close cooperation and
even an alliance between Hungary and Czechoslovakia.33 Negotiations took place
again in Marienbad on June 23 and 24, between Benes and the new Hungarian
foreign minister, Count Nicholas Banffy, but these were restricted to certain
technicalities connected with the execution of the peace treaty.34 Meanwhile,
political events in Danubian Europe began to take a course which excluded a
sincere reconciliation between Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Masaryk maintained
a friendly attitude toward Hungary throughout his presidency and was disposed
to make important concessions, including territorial revisions, but Benes
resolutely opposed such a policy.35
After the Trianon Treaty became effective, Yugoslavia finally withdrew her
troops from the occupied territories in southern Hungary in July, 1921. At the
same time, the ratification of the treaty gave rise to an acute tension
between Hungary and another neighbor, Austria. Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and
Yugoslavia occupied the Hungarian territories promised to them by the principal
Allied powers at the close of hostilities, but western Hungary (Burgenland)
remained under Hungarian administration. Hungary was obliged to transfer this
territory to Austria within a month after the treaty entered into force. This
placed the government in an extremely embarrassing position, since the
Hungarian public bitterly resented this territorial claim, particularly since
the war had been fought with Austria as an ally, and the Hungarian Prime
Minister, Count Stephen Tisza, was the only leading statesman in the Monarchy
who energetically opposed in July, 1914 those diplomatic steps which lead to
war.
It was true that the overwhelming majority of the population was
24
German, but Burgenland had belonged to Hungary for a thousand years. Under
pressure from the principal Allied powers Hungary evacuated the region in
August, 1921, but immediately after the evacuation irregular detachments took
over the territory and ejected Austrian gendarmerie.
Italian mediation helped to solve the ensuing deadlock. Under the presidency
of the Italian foreign minister, Marchese della Torretta, Hungarian and
Austrian representatives met in Venice and signed a protocol providing for a
plebiscite in the city of Sopron and in eight small villages. The plebiscite
took place and resulted in 15,334 votes for Hungary and 8,227 votes for
Austria.36 Thus occurred the first territorial revision of the Trianon Treaty.
After the settlement of this question relations between Austria and Hungary
gradually improved.
Meanwhile, following the first attempt of King Charles to recover the
Hungarian throne, Count Paul Teleki resigned in April, 1921, and Count Stephen
Bethlen took over the government, which he subsequently headed for more than
ten years. Bethlen continued the work of internal and external consolidation
began by Teleki. They suppressed the counter-revolutionary extremist
movements.37
Since relations with her neighbors improved to some extent in 1923, Hungary
was able to begin financial reconstruction with the help of the League of
Nations.38 A reconstruction loan was floated abroad, the currency was
stabilized and the budget balanced. An American citizen, Jeremiah Smith of
Boston, became the League's Commissioner-General in Budapest. With his
energetic cooperation Hungary made rapid progress on the road to economic
recovery.
The government adopted a protective tariff and especially supported the
development of textile and manufacturing industries. Increased
industrialization was a necessity because Hungary, as an agricultural state,
was overpopulated. But the Government failed to carry out an adequate agrarian
reform. A large scale agrarian reform was a foremost social necessity; however,
this alone could not have solved the economic problems of the country.
Bethlen's idea was first to develop an industry and then to carry out an
agrarian reform, when the necessary capital had been made available by the
Hungarian industry.
Bethlen's conservative administration was supported by a strong parliamentary
majority. The franchise was restricted and balloting was secret only in towns,
being open in the countryside. Considerable progress was made in the fields of
social legislation and public education. Intercultural relations were greatly
developed, particularly with western countries, and hundreds of students were
sent to foreign universities with the aid of government scholarships.39
Hungary gradually concluded a network of commercial and other
25
treaties, and in September, 1922, became a member of the League of Nations.
Despite the assistance the League gave in connection with the financial
reconstruction of the country, it never became popular in Hungary. The
Hungarian political scene was dominated by the idea of revision, and the League
was considered, with some justification, as the guardian of the status quo.
Article XIX of the Covenant theoretically made possible the revision of
treaties and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance
might endanger the peace of the world, but actually this provision remained a
dead letter.
Another cause of dissatisfaction was connected with the fate of the Magyars
in the neighboring states. Immediately following the occupation of Hungarian
territories, the successor states began to apply oppressive measures against
them. These continued with varying intensity throughout the interwar years.
The Magyar minority was almost completely cut off from Hungary and even
cultural intercourse was barred.40 The special 'Minority Treaties' provided
for certain minimum rights for the minorities; the execution of these
provisions was under the ultimate control of the League of Nations. The
Hungarian public felt that the League had failed to do its duty in this field.
Certain adverse criticism was undoubtedly justified, since the competent
organs of the League did not show much interest in this delicate matter, and
the procedure had many shortcomings. The Hungarian public did not realize that
the very existence of such machinery acted, in many cases, as a restraint upon
governments planning oppressive measures against minorities. They saw only the
negative side of the League and a spirit of exasperated opposition developed in
the country against the whole postwar international order.
During the interwar period the revision of the Trianon Treaty remained an
almost inevitable policy of all Hungarian governments. The Hungarian people
probably would not have tolerated any government which neglected this program,
for all social classes were convinced of the injustices and absurdities of the
new peace settlement. The peace treaty was considered the source of all evil.
The government authorized the activities of some revisionist associations,
since such authorization promised to be a means of controlling the general
exasperation and preventing violent outbursts against the Treaty. The aim of
these societies was to win world opinion for a peaceful revision of the Peace
Treaty by application of Article XIX of the Covenant. Their enthusiastic but
rather naive propaganda usually ignored the mentality of foreign countries. The
false optimism and emotional exaggerations caused by the Rothermere campaign
are the best examples of this mood, so favorable to self-deception.41
26
The Hungarian public enthusiastically received the news in April, 1927, that
Bethlen had signed in Rome a treaty of friendship and arbitration with Italy.
Although the text followed the usual pattern of treaties of the same nature,
it was considered as a break in Hungary's isolated diplomatic position. The
Italian orientation of Hungary's foreign policy was further favored by the
fact that in the next year Mussolini openly sponsored the Hungarian
revisionist case.42
From this time on friendship for Italy remained a characteristic feature of
Hungarian foreign policy. Bethlen visited Italy again in 1930, and expressed
his thanks to Mussolini for the support given to Hungary by the Italian
Government during the conference on Eastern reparations.43
When the world economic crisis reached Hungary in 1931 and shook the economic
structure of the country, Bethlen resigned (August, 1931). His successor,
Count Gyula Karolyi, continued Bethlen's Italian orientation,44 and sought to
resolve the crisis by introducing into the budget measures of economy. But
world developments further aggravated the economic and financial situation of
the country, and resulted in the overthrow of his government (September,
1932). With the resignation of Count Karolyi, the period of old-type
conservative policy in Hungary came to an end. Germany was on the eve of
revolutionary transformations which in turn affected political developments in
Hungary and throughout Europe.
Fateful Years.
The new prime minister, General Gyula Gombos, was an outstanding
representative of the strongly pro-Nazi elements in the Hungarian army. These
officers despised the liberal traditions of the Hungarian upper class,
cherished great admiration for Mussolini and had a profound sympathy towards
the rising Nazi power in Germany. Contempt of democracy, worship of
totalitarian methods, and propagandistic use of popular slogans characterized
their way of thinking. Even though Gombos was more of a special fellow
traveller than a simon pure Nazi, his confused rhetoric prepared the ground
for the eventual spread of extremist slogans. His most fateful contribution
was the introduction of politics into the army. He appointed army officers to
important posts in the state administration and under his protection extremist
secret societies were organized. Nazi ideas took the place of real patriotism
in many quarters. Although there were many fine patriots among the Hungarian
army officers, few of them were appointed to leading positions during these
crucial years. Jingo-nationalist elements of the lower middle class were put
into key positions and able persons of independent
27
mind were gradually eliminated from the higher positions of public life.
Another officer full of political ambitions was the mentally unbalanced Major
Ferenc Szalasi, the later Arrow Cross 45 leader. Gombos was much above the
intellectual standard of Szalasi and most of the pro-Nazi officers and
politicians. He could accommodate himself to political realities, and in spite
of his German leanings wanted to be an independent master in Hungary. He soon
visited Hitler and maintained intimate relations with him, but several times he
protested strongly to Germany against organizing German minorities in Hungary
along Nazi lines, and approved closer cooperation with Italy and Austria to
check growing German influence. For the same reason Gombos visited Marshal
Pilsudski and sought to strengthen the ties of Hungary's traditional friendship
with Poland.
The result of the pro-Italian policy was the signing by Gombos, Mussolini and
Chancellor Engelbert Dollfus of the three Rome Protocols (March 17, 1934)
providing for cooperation among Austria, Hungary and Italy. The first protocol
dealt with political matters and established the principle of common
consultation. In the second protocol Austria and Italy promised to take
measures to overcome the difficulties incurred by Hungary when the prices of
grains fell. Moreover, the contracting parties agreed to facilitate transit
traffic to the Adriatic ports and to set up a permanent committee to formulate
concrete proposals for the development of their economic relations. A third
protocol provided for some special aspects of Italo-Austrian economic
relations.
The ultimate object of Hungarian diplomacy was to establish an economic union
with Austria and Italy. It was thought that this would have solved to a large
extent the problem of marketing Hungarian agricultural products. Because of
German opposition this goal was never achieved. Although the Rome protocols
were of momentary help, they did not solve Hungary's economic difficulties.
While Italo-Austrian-Hungarian cooperation was developing, the Little Entente
established permanent political and economic organs among Czechoslovakia,
Rumania and Yugoslavia. Besides, Greece, Rumania, Turkey and Yugoslavia
concluded the Balkan Pact, mutually guaranteeing one another's frontiers on
the Balkans and accepting the principle of consultation.
These two groups of states, together with those states involved in the Rome
protocols, were composed of members with widely divergent political interests,
and with mostly competitive rather than complementary economies. None of these
groupings possessed inherent strength. The Danubian situation was
characterized from 1919 on by the lack of real power in the area. Exaggerated
nationalism and economic forces
28
worked at cross purposes within the area, and outside powers France and Italy
supported the various states and groups of states.
Since the European power situation underwent fundamental transformations in
the 1930's, which revitalized the two really great outside forces, Germany and
Russia, and which had strong repercussions in the Danubian Valley it is
necessary to glance at some of these changes.
In these fateful years the impotence of the League of Nations in political
matters became obvious. The Four-Power Pact initiated by Mussolini and signed
by Great Britain, Germany, France and Italy (June 7, 1933) purported to
recreate the old Concert of Europe, but this Pact was not ratified by France
and Germany. Thus, the active cooperation of the major representatives of
Western European civilization never became a reality. Although Hitler's
arbitrary actions gradually isolated Germany, his treaty violations never
evoked punitive measures.
The semblance of Western European unity was momentarily established by the
common declaration of France, Great Britain and Italy in February, 1934,
concerning the maintenance of Austrian independence. Four months later, when
Chancellor Dollfuss was killed, Mussolini mobilized, and the Italian army
moved to the Brenner Pass.
But Hitler's aggressive policy caused the most fateful changes in the
relations between Soviet Russia and the Western world. After Hitler's siezure
of power, the Kremlin initiated a rapprochement with the Western democracies
and instructed the foreign Communist parties to cooperate with Social
Democrats and other left-wing parties. In September, 1934, the Soviet Union was
admitted into the League of Nations; and Litvinov, who skillfully used the
jargon of Geneva, became the champion of collective security. Moreover, the
Soviet Union renewed diplomatic relations with the United States of America
and concluded treaties of mutual assistance with France and Czechoslovakia.
Thus, a Communist state, aiming at the destruction of the Western state
system, was accepted as a full-fledged leading member of the family of
nations.
Germany's repudiation of the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty (March
1935) caused general consternation in the Western democracies, and France
demanded a special session of the League to censure Hitler's action. Before
this session, the representatives of Great Britain, France and Italy met at
Stresa in April, 1935, and under the chairmanship of Mussolini drafted a
resolution for the Council which condemned Germany. They agreed on the
necessity of an independent Austria, and reaffirmed their determination to
resist aggression. At the same time, however, the British delegation made it
clear that Britain "would not consider the possibility of sanctions in the
event of Treaty violations".
29
The French delegation professed similar feelings. Thus Mussolini left the
conference with the impression that, in case of a showdown with Germany, Italy
would not get effective military help from the Western powers. Moreover, he
thought that Italy's actions in Africa would not be resisted beyond verbal
protestations. This belief of Mussolini, first gained from earlier contacts
with Laval, was strengthened by the attitude of the English and French
delegations at Stresa.46
But the first serious shock administered to Italy's Stresa policy was the
British-German naval agreement, concluded in June, 1935. Such a step could
have been part of a wise policy and might have had a beneficial effect in the
midst of the growing international tension. Italy and France, however, were
not informed of the preceding negotiations although the agreement was clearly
a modification of the Versailles Treaty. Thus it could be considered as
another treaty violation committed by Germany this time with British
connivance. The resultant weakening of faith in British reliability, both in
Italy and France, contributed to the further general deterioration of the
political atmosphere in Europe.
The Ethiopian war (October, 1935), and the sanctions that followed,
definitely alienated Italy from the Western powers.47 The first direct
political consequence of Italy's changed relations with France and Great
Britain was the German occupation of the Rhineland, a move which immensely
strengthened Germany's power position in Eastern Europe. Although Hitler, on
this occasion, repudiated the freely negotiated Locarno Treaty, France and
Great Britain again satisfied themselves with formal protestations. The
Council of the League of Nations branded Germany as a treaty breaker but
remained passive. French passivity was particularly strange in that France
alone could easily have crushed the German army at this time. Her attitude had
the worst possible psychological and strategical effect throughout Europe. It
set the pattern for a large-scale appeasement in the West, it opened wide the
door for German expansion in the East, and it strengthened pro-Nazi political
trends, especially in the Danubian countries.
The occupation of the Rhineland was followed by an Austro-German agreement
(July 11, 1936), and by a steady Italo-German rapprochement. In October, 1936,
the Rome-Berlin Axis was created, and a year later Italy adhered to the
Anti-Comintern Pact.48
This new situation weakened day by day the political value of
ItaloHungarian-Austrian collaboration, since, economically, Germany could
offer much more than Italy. The Hungarian public followed these developments
with anxiety as pro-Nazi political forces grew in strength.
In October, 1936, Gombos died. His successor, as head of the govern-
30
ment, was Coloman Daranyi a correct civil servant with little political
dynamism. He vaguely followed the policy initiated by his predecessor. Under
his weak government Nazi seeds began to grow in Hungarian politics. The
demagogic agitations of the various Nazi groups, supported by Germany, made
good use of the defects of the social system and the economic difficulties of
the country. Anti-semitic slogans became the order of the day.49 In foreign
affairs, Nazi propaganda emphasized the inability of the Western powers to
bring about a viable political system in the Danube Valley, and promised that
Germany would correct the injustices of Trianon. This political game was
greatly strengthened by the eastward economic penetration started by the Third
Reich.
The deceptive economic diplomacy of Hitlerite Germany was, as a matter of
fact, of great momentary help to Hungary and to the other overwhelmingly
agricultural Danubian states, which had been unable to sell their products
since the crisis of 1931.50 Germany solved their marketing problems, and this
German help, resulted in a steady increase of the influence exerted by the
Third Reich in these countries. It became apparent only later, that because of
ingenious clearing agreements, the Danubian states themselves had to finance
exports to Germany. This started an inflation and impoverishment which were
camouflaged for a short time by a false prosperity. Mouth organs, aspirin, and
other similar commodities soon flooded the Danubian markets, and later the
Germans generously exported some scrapped armaments.
In economic matters there were only poor alternatives, but in home politics
Daranyi finally sought to check the spread of Nazism by dissolving the Arrow
Cross Party and imprisoning its leader, Major Szalasi. In the meantime,
however, he brought the first anti-Jewish bill before Parliament in the spring
of 1938.51 He was led astray by the vain hope that moderate anti-Semitic
measures could dam the rising flood of antiSemitism, swollen by the Extreme
Right.
Meanwhile, Hungarian diplomacy developed further cooperation with Italy,52
and tentatively explored possibilities of rapprochement with neighbors.
Various Polish endeavors to bring about a reconciliation between Hungary and
Rumania failed. Stakes were too great for both countries.
As early as 1926 Hungary made overtures toward Yugoslavia, and
Hungaro-Yugoslav relations were, in general, slightly better than those with
Rumania and Czechoslovakia. After the assassination of King Alexander in
Marseilles on October 9, 1934, this relationship was greatly disturbed.
Yugoslavia accused Hungary, before the Council of the League of Nations, of
having supported the Croatian underground movement, and several thousand
Magyars were expelled by the Yugoslavs.
31
Constant Hungaro-Yugoslav negotiations in 1935-1937 did not produce any
really positive results, but did improve the somewhat strained relations
between the two countries.53 Hungary considered Czechoslovakia the weakest
Little Entente state and as least capable of resisting revisionist
aspirations. Official relations were formally correct but reserved. Meanwhile,
private feelers were put out concerning the possibilities of a larger
settlement. For example, a Smallholder politician, Paul Auer,54 repeatedly
discussed with Benes, Foreign Minister Kamil Krofta, and Prime Minister Milan
Hodza the problems of Hungaro-Czechoslovak reconciliation. Auer suggested to
Krofta the formation of a Hungaro-Austrian-Czechoslovak collaboration or
possible union. The leaders of Czechoslovakia's foreign policy stiffly
rebuffed these overtures. Krofta explained to Auer that Czechoslovakia would
not enter such a tripartite union in which the Austrians and Hungarians would
vote together and Czechoslovakia be isolated and relegated to a minority
position. In vain Auer tried to persuade him that within a tripartite union
Hungary and Austria would not follow an anti-Czechoslovakian policy, but that
the position of the member states would shift in the various issues according
to their individual interests. Krofta retorted that Czechoslovakia was not
afraid of the Germans, with whom they had learned to deal in the past
centuries.
Hodza had a very friendly conversation with Auer on June 29, 1938, concerning
the amelioration of the fate of the Hungarian minorities. He offered to
intervene in Bucharest for a more liberal treatment of the Magyar minorities
and added that in this spirit one could negotiate even on territorial
adjustments in a few years. Auer, amazed, replied that because of the Germans,
there were only a few months, at the utmost, in which to settle the
differences between Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and to create a close
collaboration in the Danubian Valley. "We are not afraid of Germany" replied
Hodza.55
Benes was especially irritated by the pro-Habsburg propaganda of the Hungarian
legitimists and declared to Auer who himself was not a legitimist that he
would prefer Anschluss to restoration. Moreover, he put the blame on Hungarian
revisionism and contended that Hungary could not be satisfied by minor
concessions, which would only stimulate revisionist ambitions. Actually the
extreme revisionist claims were harmful to Hungary's cause abroad and played
into the hands of the Little Entente. They used them in persuading the West
that Hungarian grievances could not be taken seriously. Meanwhile, Hungarian
revisionism had become embittered, and blocked sound political developments in
many ways.
32
Under the influence of Nazi successes and propaganda, the revisionist policy
cautiously advocated by Bethlen was openly pursued. This emotional state of
mind, however, had an objective cause: the situation brought about by Trianon.
Irrespective of the impact of Hitlerism, a real democratic evolution would
have been very difficult in Hungary without the removal of some of the
economic absurdities and political injustices created by the peace settlement.
Reconciliation between Hungary and her neighbors thus was hindered by a sort of
vicious circle.
Hungarian diplomacy tried to extricate the country from the German grasp by
relying on Italy and Poland. In March, 1936, new protocols were signed with
Italy and Austria which bound the three states more closely together than had
been the case under the original act of 1934. Horthy visited Victor Emmanuel
III (November, 1936) and the visit was returned in Budapest (May, 1937). Both
occasions were manifestations of Italo-Hungarian friendship. In February, 1938,
Horthy paid an official visit to Warsaw in order to emphasize friendship with
Poland. The German orientation of Hungarian foreign policy, however, became
almost inevitable, due to the general trend of European events. Representatives
of the powers of the Rome protocols met for the last time in January, 1938, in
Budapest.56 After the Austrian Anschluss there was no further possibility of
Italo-Hungaro-Austrian collaboration. Germany became Hungary's immediate
neighbor and acquired an almost monopolistic position in the Hungarian
economy.
The Crisis.
In May, 1938, Dar_nyi was succeeded as premier by Bela Imredy, a former
President of the National Bank of Hungary, and noted up to that time for his
liberal views and pro-English sympathies. Imredy was promptly attacked by the
Germans and the extreme right as an Anglophile. This probably was true, but
under the influence of European political events Imredy gradually changed his
political views.57 This excellent financial expert proved to be a poor
statesman, and in the latter stage of his Prime Ministership, underwent an
amazing transformation in the direction of Nazism. In spite of Imredy's drift
toward a German orientation, Foreign Minister Coloman Kanya, an old career
diplomat, succeeded in maintaining the relative independence of Hungarian
foreign policy.
Imredy and Kanya visited Rome in the middle of July 1938, and discussed with
Mussolini and Ciano the Czechoslovak crisis.58 Kanya declared that Hungary
would never take the initiative in the action against Czechoslovakia but would
intervene after the conflict had been begun by Germany. The Duce assured them
that a German attack
33
against Czechoslovakia would not cause a European crisis. Italy would give
complete support to Germany, and Hungary would not run the risk of attacks on
the part of the Little Entente. He also promised to tell the Yugoslavs that
Italy approved of an increase in Hungarian power. At Kanya's request the
communique on the conversation stated that the Rome protocols retained their
economic and political force as far as relations between Italy and Hungary
were concerned.
Hungary's reluctance to take part in the German military action planned
against Czechoslovakia soon became obvious, and this was one of the first
serious incidents in German-Hungarian relations. Hitler invited Regent Horthy
and leading Hungarian statesmen to the Reich, where they attended the
launching of the cruiser, Prinz Eugen at Kiel. At first the Western press
erroneously pictured this visit as a complete submission of Hungary to
Germany. Far from being a submission, the visit coincided with the publication
of the communique on the Bled Agreement, August 23, 1938. The agreement
reached between the Little Entente and Hungary included "the recognition by
the three States of the Little Entente of Hungary's equality of rights as
regards armament, as well as the mutual renunciation of any recourse to force
between Hungary and the States of the Little Entente". The Hungarian
delegation on the S. S. Patria at Kiel became the target of German reproaches.
Ribbentrop blamed Foreign Minister Kanya, who accompanied Horthy, for the
agreement, and pointed out to him that the renunciation of the use of force
would not protect Hungary from Yugoslavia, particularly in the event of a
Hungarian-Czech crisis. On the contrary, said Ribbentrop, this Hungarian
policy would make it more difficult morally for the Yugoslavs to leave their
Czech allies in the lurch. All impartial observers would conclude that Hungary
was, in effect, renouncing revision. Finally, Ribbentrop asked the Hungarians
how they would act if the Fuehrer put into effect his decision to reply, by
the use of force, to any new Czech provocation. The Hungarians hedged on two
points. They argued that: "Yugoslavia must remain neutral if Hungary were to
march northward and, eventually, to the east. Moreover, Hungarian rearmament .
. . would require another year or two to complete." 59
According to the German record, Horthy told Hitler that "Hungary intended to
cooperate", but the Hungarian Ministers were skeptical, and remained so even
later. Imredy was most relieved when the Fuehrer stated that, in this
particular case, he required nothing of Hungary, and that he himself did not
know the precise moment. But Hitler noted that "he who wanted to sit at the
table must at least help in the kitchen".60
Foreign Minister Kanya, visited Ribbentrop in Berlin two days later.
34
Ribbentrop called his attention to the jubilation of the Czech, French and
British press over the Bled communique, and repeated that this event was
regarded as a rift in German-Hungarian friendship and as a renunciation of
Hungary's revisionist aims. Kanya thereupon amended his statement, made two
days before, and explained that Hungary's military strength had in fact
improved and that therefore she could take part by October 1, 1938.61 The
German record failed to explain why Kanya changed so radically his views about
Hungary's military preparedness.
Such conciliatory Hungarian statements notwithstanding, the Germans clearly
recognized Hungary's reluctance to take part in military action against
Czechoslovakia. Otto von Erdmannsdorf, the German Minister to Hungary,
reported on August 29 that Regent Horthy said to him that the extraordinary
situation had arisen whereby he, who for years had desired nothing more
ardently than a speedy realization of Hungarian revisionist aims, was now
forced to sound a warning note owing to the international political situation.
Kanya added that the Hungarians would fight even "if the chances of success
were only 60 to 70 percent. But they could not be expected to commit suicide."
62
The Hungarian public received with enthusiasm the news that the Government
refused to commit the country in a common venture with Germany against
Czechoslovakia. Imredy gave an interview, published in the Daily Telegraph on
September 2, in which he stated that, "The key words of Hungary's foreign
policy . . . were peace and justice, and if any conflict broke out in Europe
Hungary's aim would be to remain neutral". This article was reproduced in a
Hungarian newspaper Az Est under headlines pointing to disagreement between
Hungary and Germany. This in turn evoked an energetic German protest. The
Government suspended the newspaper, and from this time on, the intimidated
Imredy began to show understanding toward Nazi demands and ideas.
In the critical days of September the dissatisfaction of the Nazi leaders with
Hungarian passivity became more vocal. Field Marshal Goering invited Dome
Sztojay, the Hungarian Minister to Germany, to Karinhall, and explained to him
that Hungary was not doing enough in the crisis. He emphasized that the
Hungarian press was keeping comparatively quiet. "There was complete calm
prevailing in the Hungarian minority districts in Czechoslovakia in contrast
to the Sudeten German ones, and the Hungarian Ministers in the various
capitals were not making a practice of going to the Foreign Minister twice or
three times a day, in contrast to their Czech colleagues. Finally neither the
Hungarian Government nor even the leaders of the Hungarian minority had
demanded in clear terms the detachment of the Hungarian region from
35
Czechoslovakia."63
After the German intervention Kanya promised a more active Hungarian attitude.
The Hungarian memorandum of September 17 pointed out to the British Government
that "a more peaceful atmosphere in Central Europe attaches itself to the
principle that . . . no discrimination should be made in the treatment and
ultimate rights between the various minorities in Czechoslovakia." 64
The Hungarian Minister to Great Britain, George Barcza, handed Lord Halifax a
new memorandum on September 20 and at the same time received the British reply
to the insistent Hungarian interventions. The British note purported to be a
sedative, and emphasized that the British Government had concentrated all its
efforts on the problem of the Sudeten minority in Czechoslovakia "on the
solution of which depends the issue of peace or war in Europe". The British
government fully appreciated the interest felt by the Hungarian government in
the future of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia, but trusted that "they
will be careful in the present delicate situation to do nothing to extend the
scope of the present crisis, and will be content that their point of view has
been placed on the record and will receive consideration in the appropriate
moment". 65
Two days later the British government protested to Warsaw and Budapest
against alleged Polish and Hungarian military measures, and expressed the hope
that these would not involve Hungary and Poland in actual aggression against
Czechoslovakia. The note emphasized that there could be no justification
whatsoever for attempting to compel an immediate settlement by direct action
instead of through the process of normal negotiation.66
When Sir Geoffrey Knox, the British Minister to Hungary, presented this note
to K_nya, the latter turned to the claim of the Hungarian minority in
Czechoslovakia for equal treatment with the Sudeten Germans. K_nya told Knox
that the answer Halifax gave to Barcza in London had been a bitter
disappointment to him.
"The Sudeten territories" [said K_nya, as reported by Knox] had lain from
time immemorial inside the frontiers of the Kingdom of Bohemia and the Sudeten
Germans had in history known the Prussians more often as an enemy than a
friend; moreover their case had been backed by threats and military measures.
The Magyar minority on the other hand had been an integral part of the
Hungarian Kingdom, and their case had been put forward for many years with
calm and moderation. Hungary had made it abundantly clear that she sought a
solution only by peaceful and lawful means.
36
Now, if I would allow him to speak with all frankness, it was sadly evident
that it was not the moral wish to see justice done that lay behind the
concessions we [the British Government] had wrung from Prague to the Sudeten
Germans but the threat of overwhelming force". 67
Obviously the overwhelming force did not exist in the case of the Hungarians,
and the evasive British attitude caused disappointment in Hungary. Knox
himself admitted in his report addressed to Lord Halifax that the Anglo-French
message addressed to President Benes on September 19 offered more grounds for
Kanya's suspicion than he (Knox) had supposed to exist. Knox referred to
paragraph two of the Anglo-French message, which envisaged the Sudeten German
problem as a case by itself and therefore anticipated direct transfer instead
of a plebiscite.68
The German and Hungarian positions concerning Czechoslovakia came up once
more in a conversation between the Fuehrer, Prime Minister Imredy, and Foreign
Minister Kanya on September 21, 1938. Hitler, first of all, reproached his
visitors "for the undecided attitude" in the crisis. He told them that Germany
was determined to settle the Czech question even at the risk of a world war,
and that neither France nor England would intervene. "It was Hungary's last
opportunity to join in, for, if she did not, he would not be in a position to
put in a word for Hungarian interests." Hitler demanded that Hungary should
make an immediate demand for a plebiscite in the territories she claimed, and
that she should not guarantee any proposed new frontiers for Czechoslovakia. He
stated that the Czechoslovak problem would be settled by Germany within three
weeks.
Imredy replied that it was thought in Hungary that a settlement would take a
year or two. In the meantime, the Hungarian minorities had already demanded a
plebiscite and "the Hungarian Government would now take this matter into their
own hands. Further, Hungary would immediately put in hand preparations for
military actions, but a time limit of 14 days was not long enough to complete
them".69
Hitler never forgot the "weak" Hungarian attitude demonstrated in the
Czechoslovakian crisis. When Count Stephen Csaky, the successor of Kanya,
visited him in January 1939, he pointed out that unfortunately the relations
between Germany and Hungary were overshadowed by a dark cloud, a fact which
could not be ignored by a great power like Germany. He then described the
Hungarian attitude before the decisions of September, and pointed out that he
had always considered Kanya as an enemy of Germany At the very moment when he
(Hitler) discussed
37
the possibilities of a German-Hungarian collaboration with Horthy, during the
latter's visit, Kanya did not hesitate to support the Little Entente against
Germany in Bled. This was why the Fuehrer had summoned Imredy and Sztojay and
asked them, in their own interest, to publish Hungary's demands before the
world. As events developed, Hungary was about to fall asleep and took only
insignificant steps while Poland started to stir. Hitler further explained
that Germany did not intend to sacrifice herself for friends who let her down
in decisive moments. He stated that if at the right time Hungary had sided
with Germany, he could have laughed in Chamberlain's face.70
The hesitation of Hungarian Statesmen greatly increased Hitler's antipathy to
Hungary.71 Whatever happened in August and September, ]938, the policy of the
Western powers gave a free hand to Germany in the Danube Valley, and Hungary's
agreement with the Little Entente thereby lost all political significance. And
the Munich Conference greatly undermined the forces of resistance to Germany
in the Danubian countries.72 The artificial character of the French alliance
system on the Continent was shown by its rapid disintegration. In the crucial
moment the Little Entente collapsed; Czechoslovakia was liquidated without a
gunshot. The London Times noted: "Self-determination, the professed principle
of the Treaty of Versailles, has been invoked by Herr Hitler against its
written text, and his appeal has been allowed." 73 The Danubian countries found
themselves in the sphere of influence of the Third Reich. In spite of certain
Hungaro-German parallel interests created by the treaties of Versailles and
Trianon, even pro-German Hungarian politicians tried to stave off the Germans.
But the aftermath of the Munich settlement automatically bound the Hungarian
revisionist cause to that of the Axis.
A Declaration attached to the Munich Agreement of September 1938 provided
that "The problems of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia,
if not settled within three months by agreement between the respective
governments, shall form the subject of another meeting of the heads of the
Governments of the four Powers here present." On October 1, the Prague
government accepted all the demands made in a Polish ultimatum of September
28, and Polish troops subsequently occupied the Teschen district. Hungary,
however, desired to solve the frontier problem by direct negotiations and
plebiscite.
The Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia, Kamil Krofta, took the initiative in
solving the problem of the Hungarian minority. He handed a note, on October 1,
to the Hungarian minister in Prague proposing that a Committee of Czechoslovak
and Hungarian experts should be set up to deal with the question.74 At the
same time, the Hungarian
38
minister delivered a note to him, pressing for direct negotiations between the
two Governments. The Rumanian and Yugoslav Governments had been advised of the
steps taken by the Czechoslovak Government. Both of them informed the German
Government that they did not object to the cession to Hungary of areas of
Slovakia inhabited by Magyars.75
As is well-known, German foreign policy in the post-Munich period favored the
liquidation of Czechoslovakia and opposed all attempts at integration in areas
east of Germany. The objectives of this policy, as it appears in published
documents, is clearly defined. The Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht explained,
in a memorandum addressed to the German Foreign Ministry on October 5, 1938,
that the creation of a compact bloc of states along Germany's eastern
frontier, with lines of communication to southeast Europe, would not be in
accordance with German interests. Hence, "for military reasons a common
HungarianPolish frontier was undesirable." 76 The German Foreign Ministry
prepared a similar memorandum for Hitler on the Slovak and CarpathoUkrainian
question.77 The memorandum opposed an autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine oriented
toward Hungary, and advocated an independent Slovakia or a Czechoslovak
solution for the Slovaks.78
In accordance with these general ideas the German Government decided to
support Hungarian demands for adjacent Magyar territory and Slovak demands for
autonomy within the Czechoslovak state, but rejected plans for a common
Hungarian-Polish frontier, supporting Ukrainian national aspirations. German
missions abroad were instructed along this line. Nonetheless, the hostile
attitude of the German press toward the creation of a common frontier between
Poland and Hungary was resented in Budapest, and K_nya explained to the German
envoy that with reincorporation of the territory, Hungary would strengthen the
Rumanian front against Bolshevism and form a strong bulwark against it on the
Carpathian passes.79
Polish and Hungarian foreign policy aimed at the reestablishment of the
centuries old common frontier on the Carpathian mountains. The British
ambassador to Poland, Sir H. Kennard, reported on October 6 that the Polish
government favored attainment of this goal by a grant of autonomy to Ruthenia
under Hungarian sovereignty. He was informed in the Polish Foreign Ministry
that there was a 20 percent Hungarian minority there, and that if the
Hungarian districts were detached, including essential railways therein, the
rest of Ruthenia could not exist. The Polish press pointed out that in any
case Czechoslovakia never had any proper historical or economic claim to
Ruthenia. It asserted that the problem of Ruthenia's restitution to Hungary
was a Polish problem and involved Poland's military security.80 In
accordance
39
with these ideas, Foreign Minister Joseph Beck attempted to persuade the
British ambassador in Warsaw of the reasonableness of the Polish attitude
regarding Ruthenia, which he considered to be a no-man's land and Hungarian
rather than Czechoslovak. He explained to him that Poland had no territorial
claims in Ruthenia, but he felt that no definite stabilization in Central
Europe could be hoped for, unless Hungary's aspirations were satisfied.81
Meanwhile the United Hungarian Party in Ruthenia demanded the right of
self-determination for all inhabitants of Ruthenia, including Hungarians, and
asked that the maintenance of order in Hungarian districts be entrusted to the
Party. This appeal was addressed to the British, German, Italian, French,
Polish and Hungarian Governments as well as to the Czechoslovak Government.82
The British and French policies were rather cautious with regard to the
importance of Ruthenia, and of a stronger Hungary. Knox reported from Budapest
on October 8, 1938, that a Rome-Warsaw Axis could not form a barrier against
German penetrations because of the weakness of the central link, Hungary. He
expressed the opinion that no opposition to Germany could be made in Danubian
Europe north of the Save river. Knox disagreed with the view of the British
ambassador to Poland, who held that Slovakia in a Hungarian orbit could be an
obstacle to German penetration. Knox thought that German domination of
Hungary's indefensible western frontiers remained complete irrespective of
strong defenses in the north. On the other hand, he considered Hungary to be
a very solid link with all the power of Germany behind her if the Axis was to
be a barrier built with the participation of Germany to cut of Russia from
Western Europe.83 Viscount Halifax, in his instructions sent to the British
Embassy in Berlin on October 26, 1938, expressed the opinion that the solution
of the Ruthenian question depended to a considerable extent on Germany's
policy. According to his evaluation Germany intended to use Czechoslovakia to
spread German influence along the frontiers of Poland and Hungary to the
Rumanian border. He suggested, specifically, that Ruthenia, in German minds,
was a spring-board to the Ukraine and a starting point for fomenting a
Ukrainian movement. Halifax was not disposed to attach too much importance to
the argument that Poland and Hungary would be able to form a bloc to resist
further German expansion if Ruthenia fell to Hungary. But he thought it
possible that "a common frontier between them might strengthen Poland and
Hungary in their desire to retain sufficient independence to avoid becoming
the vassals of Germany". The British Foreign Secretary seemed to appreciate
the Rumanian objection both to the aggrandizement of Hun40
gary and to the separation of Rumania from Czechoslovakia. But he raised the
question as to whether the maintenance of the connection between the three
Little Entente States was, at that time, of such great importance and whether
the separation of a German-controlled Czechoslovakia from Rumania might not
compensate the latter for the success which would be won by Hungary.84
While new policies were pondered and decided upon in various quarters of
Europe, negotiations between Hungary and Czechoslovakia (October 9-13) had
broken off, since Czechoslovakia was prepared to give up only a fraction of
the territory inhabited by Magyars.85 Since Czechoslovakia had not demobilized,
Hungary partially mobilized, pending an appeal to the four great powers.86
Dar_nyi visited the Fuehrer for support on October 14. On this occasion Hitler
recalled that he had given the Hungarians many warnings, both on board ship
[S. S. Patria at Kiel] and also during the visit of Imredy and Kanya to the
Obersalzberg. He had told them plainly enough that he would solve the
Czechoslovak problem one way or another in October. Poland had recognized the
right moment, taken action, and achieved her goal. This problem could only be
solved by means of negotiation if one were determined to act. Only in this way
had he (the Fuehrer) obtained all he wanted. M. Kanya however, had expressed
nothing but doubt, although the Fuehrer had told him that France and Britain
would not fight. The position now was that, if it came to a conflict, Hungary
would be completely alone and the outcome would be very doubtful. If it came
to a conference of the Great Powers the outcome would also be doubtful, as no
one was willing to fight, even if the Great Powers were in agreement,. . .
The decisive factor in any case would not be who was right but who had the
power. He, the Fuehrer, had told M. Kanya all this in detail and he had proofs
of the Hungarian Government's actions during the crisis which had not
particularly impressed him, such as the statements made by the Hungarian
Ambassador [sic] in London and the Bled Agreement during Horthy's visit.
Whereas we and Poland had prepared ourselves to stake everything we had and
had also suffered loss of life, Hungary constantly stated that she insisted
on her rights but did not wish to achieve these by aggressive means. The
moment had passed. He, the Fuehrer, was glad that for Germany the matter was
settled. 87
Daranyi's visit to Hitler did not bring concrete results, although he
presented himself cap in hand, and offered various gestures such as Hungary's
resignation from the League of Nations and adherence to the
41
Anti-Comintern Pact.88 But, simultaneously with Daranyi's visit, Ribbentrop
received the Czechoslovak foreign minister, Frantisek K. Chvalkovsky and
advised a speedy resumption of the negotiations with Hungary.89
After renewed and protracted negotiations and exchanges of notes between
Hungary and Czechoslovakia the Hungarian Government, in a note of October 24,
suggested a plebiscite in the areas still under dispute. In the event of Czech
disagreement on a plebiscite, the Hungarian note proposed arbitration by
Germany and Italy, with the inclusion of Poland for the eastern sector. The
government of Prague chose arbitration and proposed the inclusion of Rumania,
if the Hungarian proposal to include Poland was accepted. Eventually Ciano and
Ribbentrop arbitrated the dispute in Vienna on November 2, 1938.90 The award
was based mainly on ethnographic factors and restored to Hungary 12,103 square
kilometers of territory with over one million population. In the course of the
arbitral procedure Ribbentrop supported the Slovak, and Ciano the Hungarian
case.91 The overwhelming majority of the people living in the territories
reattached to Hungary were Magyars,92 but the fate of the Slovak and Czech
settlements planted in Magyar districts caused further frictions and was
settled only by protracted negotiations.93
British foreign policy was rather favorable to the settling of the
Hungaro-Czechoslovak conflict according to the principles adopted by the
Vienna Award. The Earl of Perth, British ambassador to Italy, advised the
Czechoslovak foreign minister, Chvalkovsky, on October 7, 1938, to meet
immediately Hungarian claims to regions bordering on Hungary where Magyar
populations predominated.94 Sir Nevile Henderson, British ambassador to
Germany, in his report of October 18, 1938, envisaged a settlement along the
lines subsequently put forward in the Hungarian note addressed to
Czechoslovakia on October 24. It seemed essential to him that full justice
should be done to legitimate Hungarian claims in order to avoid the criticism
of having treated Hungary less well than Germany, solely because the latter
was more powerful and dangerous. He even added as a "less worthy consideration"
that Prime Minister Imredy's position would be seriously compromised if Hungary
failed to obtain all reasonable justice, and that he could conceivably be
replaced by a pro-German who might get greater concessions as a result of
German help.95 The British Government informed the Czechoslovak Minister in
London on October 20, 1938, that they saw no objection to the settlement of
the Czech-Hungarian question by means of arbitration by Germany and Italy, if
the Czechoslovak and Hungarian Governments agreed to settle their differences
in this way. Simultaneously Lord Hali
42
fax instructed the British ambassador to Italy to inform the Italian
Government that "His Majesty's Government are, in principle, in favour of the
return to Hungary of those districts in which the population is predominantly
Hungarian, subject possibly to certain modifications that may be desirable for
economic reasons, e.g., Bratislava." 96
In the period between the Vienna Award and the total break-up of
Czechoslovakia, Hungarian diplomacy continued its efforts for the
reincorporation of Ruthenia. Meanwhile, the Prague Parliament hurriedly passed
a law in November, 1938, which granted the Ruthenians their own legislative,
executive and judicial organs. Defense, finance, foreign affairs and
transportation still remained in the hands of the central Czechoslovak
Government. Thus the autonomy of Subcarpathian Ruthenia, guaranteed by the
Trianon Treaty and vainly demanded by the Ruthenian people for twenty years,
was established. This new political status was received with enthusiasm in
Ruthenia, and the province became the center of a Ukrainian independence
movement aimed at the unification of all Ukrainians living in Soviet Russia
and Poland. Germany supported and fostered this trend. The Nazis prepared for
future events. Their goals included the detachment of the Ukraine from Soviet
Russia and the possible use of Ukrainian ambitions against the Poles. Nazi
influence increased in Slovakia and Ruthenia.97 The German Foreign Ministry
sent agents to the Carpatho-Ukraine and the German Security Service financed
the study, in Germany, of German state and party institutions by Slovak
ministers and other official Slovak personages. 98
A Hungarian plan to seize the Carpatho-Ukraine with Italian help was opposed
and vetoed by Germany in November, 1938.99 In the following month the
provincial government of Monsignor Augustin Voloshin in the Carpatho-Ukraine
gave, to a German company, complete prospecting rights for minerals in any part
of the country and the right to exploit fully these minerals.100 The German
press showed an extremely friendly attitude toward Carpatho-Ukraine and
Ukrainian national ambitions. Ukrainian propaganda was broadcast regularly
from Vienna. Despite the fact that defense was under the control of the
Central Government, the Voloshin Government organized with German help a
semi-military body, called the Ukrainian National Guard (Sitsch) . Ukrainian
refugees from Poland were incorporated into this organization which fought,
with German blessings, against occasional intrusions by Hungarian irregulars.
The Government of Voloshin was strongly Ukrainian nationalistic, a tendency
which was bolstered by German help and encouragement.101
Strengthened by German support, the Voloshin Government eliminated
43
from public life politicians and political parties opposing Ukrainian
natonalist tendencies, and suppressed the Hungarian party. On February 12,
1939, elections were held on the basis of a single, unopposed slate of
candidates. The "Magyarophile" list was declared invalid by the electoral
commission and all elected deputies represented the nationalistic Ukrainian
trend.102 The Hungarian Minister in Berlin informed the German Government in
February, 1939, that the Hungarian Government expected serious disturbances to
break out in the Carpatho-Ukraine, due to these events. He reminded Berlin that
in a situation such as this Hungary might be forced to intervene "for the
protection of her own nationals". Berlin advised the Hungarian Government to
"keep to the Vienna Award".103
Meanwhile British foreign policy began to show some understanding toward
Hungarian aspirations. The British parliamentary undersecretary of state for
foreign affairs, R. A. Butler, explained on February 17, to the Hungarian
envoy, Barcza, that, in his opinion, Great Britain and France had committed a
mistake in not supporting the establishment of a common Hungaro-Polish
frontier. Czechoslovakia, he said, became a German colony after Munich. Thus,
the attachment of Ruthenia to Hungary would have been in accordance with
British interests. By the same act German expansion toward the Ukraine and the
Rumanian oil fields would have been checked. Butler pointed out that it was
difficult for him to understand the political blindness which had overlooked
these facts. A few days later Sir Alexander Cadogan, permanent undersectary of
state for foreign affairs, stated to Barcza that he had recently studied the
Ruthenian problem and had become convinced that the vital interests of the
Ruthenian people demanded their reattachment to Hungary; irrespective of such
local interests, the interest of the great powers and European peace demanded
that the German push to the East should be barred by a common Hungaro-Polish
frontier. He recognized that it would have been to the Franco-British interest
to attach Ruthenia to Hungary and that this interest still existed. The
question, however, was not definitely closed, and at an opportune time Great
Britain was willing to give political support to Hungary as well as the
economic support necessary to strengthen Hungarian independence against
Germany.
Butler and Cadogan apparently intended to stimulate Hungarian resistance
against Germany with these goodwill remarks, but they were twenty years late
in trying to form a bloc of states capable of resisting the eastward expansion
of Germany.
Meanwhile Danubian Europe was heading toward new developments. On March 4,
the German Government was still refusing the Hungarian
44
proposal asking that Hungary's first claim to the territory of CarpathoUkraine
be recognized.104 The Poles still hoped to secure a common frontier with
Hungary.105 The Italian Government did not bolster Polish optimism in this
respect. When Ciano was visiting Warsaw in early March, 1939, he told Beck
that he considered the question settled by the Vienna arbitration, and that
Italy would do nothing further in the matter.106 A few days later the Polish
Government informed Prague that Poland, while not pursuing any interests of
her own in the Carpatho-Ukraine, would support Hungarian claims in view of
Polish-Hungarian friendship.107 At the same time Hungary declared, in Prague,
that she had no interest in Slovakia and proposed only to purchase
Carpatho-Ukraine.108
A reversal in the German attitude toward the common HungarianPolish frontier
then took place. On the eve of the complete break-up of Czechoslovakia and the
creation of an independent Slovakia, Germany probably wanted to give some
satisfaction to Hungary and Poland. On March 13, the Hungarian authorities in
Budapest received the green light for the occupation of Carpatho-Ukraine.109
Regent Horthy expressed his thanks in an enthusiastic letter to Hitler, in
which he announced that a frontier incident would take place on March 16, to be
followed by the "big thrust".110
But, in view of the declaration of independence by Slovakia on March 14, the
Voloshin Government, on the same day declared the Carpatho-Ukraine to be an
independent state "under the protection of the German Reich". 111 The local
Diet met the next day, and, in its only session, sanctioned the proclamation
of independence and elected Voloshin as president of the republic. Voloshin
asked the German Government to state whether or not the Carpatho-Ukraine had
been promised to Hungary. Berlin advised Voloshin not to resist and regretted
that Germany was not in a position to assume responsibility for the
protectorate.112 These political events were overshadowed by military events.
The Sitsch first fought the Czech troops and then the invading Hungarian
army.113 In these critical days the Poles reinforced their troops in the areas
facing Ruthenia. The freshly recruited Hungarian troops completed the
occupation of the much coveted region from March 15 to 18.114 Rumania sought
to intervene at the last moment and attempted to seize the eastern part of
Ruthenia where there were villages inhabited by Rumanians, but she was
decidedly too late.115
Simultaneously with the memorable visit of the Czechoslovak President Emil
Hacha to Hitler, German troops invaded Bohemia and Moravia.116 On March 16
Hitler proclaimed a German protectorate over these historic Czech lands.117
Amidst the general indignation over the
45
German action, the Western countries observed with tacit satisfaction, and
perhaps not without malice, the occupation of Carpatho-Ruthenia by Hungary.
The economic and strategic position of Hungary thus improved. The common
frontier with Poland, through which 140.000 Poles escaped into Hungary a few
months later, was reestablished.118 At the same time the Rumanian Government
asked London for financial support and informed the British Government "that
within the next few months Germany would reduce Hungary to vassalage and then
proceed to disintegrate Roumania".119
During this period a few important changes took place in the Hungarian
Government and in domestic politics. Foreign Minister Kanya, repeatedly
attacked because of his well-known anti-Nazi attitude, resigned shortly after
the Vienna Award. Under his successor, Count Stephen Csaky, the threatening
shadow of the Third Reich stretched over Hungary's foreign policy. The Western
powers revealed some understanding of Hungary's difficulties, but Soviet
Russia severed diplomatic relations when Hungary joined the Anti-Comintern Pact
in February, 1939.120
Regent Horthy, displeased with the increasingly pro-Nazi trends of the Imredy
cabinet, replaced the prime minister in February, 1939, with Count Paul
Teleki. Imredy's formal resignation occurred under spectacular circumstances.
It was discovered, just when he was advocating a strong anti-Semitic policy
and proposing the enactment of a second anti-Jewish bill, that he had had a
Jewish great-great grandparent.
Teleki dissolved the National-Socialist Party and prohibited the socalled
"Hungarist" movement. These measures notwithstanding, the rightist parties
gained some ground. Nazi propaganda made good use of German successes and
pointed out that some of the injustices of the Trianon Treaty had been
corrected only with the consent and help of the Axis powers. In the general
elections of May, 1939, held by secret ballot all over the country, a
governmental majority was obtained, but the presence of a great number of
Nazi-minded deputies and the decrease of deputies belonging to the left-wing
opposition was significant. The balance in Parliament had shifted decidedly to
the right.
Foreign Minister Csaky displayed great activity and had frequent contacts
with the leaders of Italian and German foreign policy. He thought that Hungary
could not maintain her independence, and, in case of war, her neutrality
without some coordination of her policies with those of the Axis. Teleki and
Csaky visited Mussolini and Hitler in April, 1939.121 In the following month
Italo-German cooperation was solidified by the conclusion of the Steel
Pact.122
During 1938, and 1939, Hungarian statesmen had repeatedly told the
46
German government that Hungary was not willing to take part in any hostile
action against Poland. Teleki desired to make Hungary's position absolutely
clear. On July 24, 1939, he addressed identical letters to Hitler and
Mussolini in which he confirmed the adherence of Hungary to the Axis, and in a
second letter to both Hitler and Mussolini, written on the same day, he stated
that "Hungary, for moral reasons, can by no means take part in any military
actions directed against Poland".123 The Italian Foreign Minister, Count
Galeazzo Ciano, suspected that the "first letter was written in order to
launch the second".124 This letter caused such a furore in Germany that Csaky
had to meet Ribbentrop in Fuschl on August 8, and upon Ribbentrop's insistance
Csaky instructed the Hungarian envoys in Berlin and Rome to retract both
letters. This, however, did not change Teleki's attitude. He overruled Csaky's
retractions and ordered him to return to Budapest.125
A few days after this incident, Csaky suddenly arrived in Rome, and submitted
to Mussolini the idea of a Hungarian alliance with the Axis in order to save
Hungary from a German invasion or a "friendly occupation". For the same reasons
the Hungarian Government thought of putting a member of the House of Savoy,
possibly the Duke of Aosta, on the throne of Hungary. Csaky sounded out the
Italian Government on both these propositions. He described the temper of the
times in Hungary by pointing out that "95 percent of the Hungarian people hate
the Germans. The Regent himself, speaking of them [the Germans], called them
'buffoons and brigands', and Madame Horthy said that even she would take up
arms if they had to fight the Germans".126 Mussolini and Ciano, baffled at
this unexpected outburst, remained diplomatically reserved toward Csaky.
Thus, on the eve of the Second World War, the Hungarian Government made some
desperate moves to maintain independence and some freedom of action. The
alternatives were poor. And after the conclusion of the Russo-German pact the
prospects reached their lowest ebb. The unfortunate Danubian nations were
nothing but "puppets of fate" 127 in the hands of unscrupulous and
overwhelming outside forces. The Teleki Government faced an international
situation in which there were insoluble difficulties for Hungary. Geography,
revisionism and the weakness of Western Europe limited the possibilities of
Hungarian foreign policy.
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DIPLOMACY IN A WHIRLPOOL |