![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Regicide at Marseille |
The delay in presenting the Yugoslav memorandum supporting the accusation against Hungary caused some impatience in the diplomatic and press circles of Geneva. I was particularly annoyed, for, beyond a denial, it is hardly possible to devise an intelligent defense against general accusations which have not been specified. If Hungary was to be subjected -as planned - to continuous slander for two months more, she might face condemnation by world opinion before having had a chance to state her case. I had to intensify in the press, my counterattacks against Yugoslavia, our highly vulnerable opponent. So I resorted to every imaginable means of publicity. The New York Times reported (November 24) that in the park surrounding the Palace of the League of Nations and in hotel lobbies I held press conferences, explaining over the microphone that "Hungary cannot wait until January to remove the stain" caused by unfounded accusations. Mr. Eden who "had hoped to postpone public debate until January - was compelled to change [his] mind."1 He admits now that "with both sides demanding a discussion, delay would only have increased the dangers." My decision to expedite the public debate proved useful, for it shortened the persistent smear-campaign.
I also threatened to call my strongest card. On the morning of November 28, the Journal de Geneve reported that "in answer to the Yugoslav note devoid of all documentation, Mr. Eckhardt will reveal important facts concerning the internal policies of Yugoslavia," which had caused acts of terrorism. It may have been this warning which expedited the immediate results. That same evening, a seventy-eight-page Yugoslav memorandum, comprising forty-eight annexes and eighteen photographs, was submitted to the Secretary of the League of Nations, with the request that "the Council consider the question of the Hungarian Government's responsibilities for the terrorist action directed against Yugoslavia."
This long-awaited Yugoslav memorandum began with the accusation that preceding the creation of the Croat Ustasha there already existed in Hungary organizations preparing illegal actions. No such case was
1 Facing the Dictators, p. 125.
158
mentioned, however, in the memorandum, for in the said period, there occurred none about which Yugoslavia could complain. The second chapter dealt with the handling of Yugoslav refugees in Hungary since 1931, the time at which the violent Croat reaction to Serb terrorism did develop. I have to state that there had occurred no change in the routine handling of the Croat refugees in Hungary. The Croat refugees gathered in Hungary in eight localities; one among them was Jankapuszta. These refugees, at first, passed through police control, but they were not given financial aid by the Hungarian authorities. A number of them were employed by small businesses and farmers, for there was much sympathy for the persecuted Croats, with whom Hungarians had lived at peace for eight centuries. The rest were usually taken care of by the Croat, Perchetch, who had rented the farm Jankapuszta for this purpose and acted in Hungary as the chief of the Croat refugees.
There was nothing illicit or even unusual in this procedure, particularly not before the Marseille crime had occurred. What Hungary gave these refugees was far less than what the Hungarian revolutionaries received through the generousity of the U.S.A. in 1956, when they arrived in Camp Kilmer, following Hungary's fight for freedom. Hungary gave the Croats nothing more than what every civilized nation in Europe was granting to political refugees. The Yugoslav memorandum referred to the deposition of Mijo Krajl, an accomplice in the Marseille regicide, who testified in France that the Croat refugees drew lots in a Hungarian town, when, on orders of the Ustashi Command, three among them were selected to travel to Switzerland. Deceitfully, the memorandum did not include the relevant part of Krajl's deposition; which added that at the time these Croats left Hungary, they did not know and no one had told them why they were to travel to Switzerland, nor had they been informed that they had been selected for the purpose of perpetrating the Marseille or any other crime. Regardless of this, no Hungarian authority or private person was involved in this procedure.
The Yugoslav memorandum classified the members of the "terrorist bands established in Hungary" into five categories, but no Hungarian name appeared among them. The first category was composed of former Austro-Hungarian officers, most prominent among them General Sarkotitch and Colonel Perchevitch, both Austrian residents of Croat descent and not connected with Hungary in any way. Then, three
160
categories consisting of Croat refugees were enumerated: those with a criminal record; jobless Croat workers abroad; and Croat peasants who fled across the Yugoslav border. As a fifth category, members of the Macedonian organization, Orim, were mentioned, who allegedly gave instruction to the Croats in terrorist techniques. Again, no Hungarian official or private person was mentioned in any of these categories. A sixth, probably the most important category, however, was omitted from the Yugoslav enumeration: the Croat patriots, who had formed the Ustasha for self-denfense against Serb terrorism after their leader, Stephen Raditch, on June 20, 1928, was assassinated in the Belgrade Parliament.
The Yugoslav memorandum, however, did insist that the Hungarian authorities had knowledge of the aims and terroristic methods of these refugees. As the only evidence, it referred to a letter by the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Yugoslav Legation in Budapest expressing its regrets over violent acts committed by Croat refugees in Yugoslav territory. This was an admission of guilt, accused the memorandum. Attached to the memorandum was a photograph of Croat refugees in Ustashi uniforms, equipped with daggers and hand grenades, grimly parading "in Jankapuszta." I rubbed my eyes; there were high mountains in the background of the picture, whereas Jankapuszta lies on a flat plain. It did not take much time to establish that the picture showed the Apennines at Fontecchio, near Arezzo, in Italy, where a camp for the Ustashis was located.
This disclosure of the truth had hardly occurred inadvertently. The text of the Yugoslav memorandum accused Hungary, but the picture pointed its finger at Italy. Could the Serbs, a fundamentally honest people, go to extremes in their reprisals against Hungary knowing that their accusation was unfounded? Very shortly thereafter, threatened by the invasion of Hungary and war at the instigation of General Zhifkovitch, I was able to reject offers of an unworthy compromise because I had this information.
The next paragraph of the memorandum, however, dissipated my pleasant expectations. It cited a number of cases, when Hungarian passports were given to Yugoslav citizens (which is unlawful), even to three accomplices in the Marseille regicide who had been staying for a while in Jankapuszta. Photographs of these passports were attached to the memorandum with their serial numbers, etc. This revelation
161
disturbed me immensely. I called up Budapest and reported to Prime Minister Gombos that during my inquiries back home no mention had ever been made of this irregularity, nor did I know that the Hungarian passports of three accomplices were genuine and not faked like the Czechoslovak papers. None of my statements would ever have been believed in Geneva, had I unwittingly denied this error.
I asked the Prime Minister to send to Geneva with utmost urgency a fully informed police officer of high rank - other than Police Chief Hetenyi, in whom I had lost confidence - and also the Chief of Hungarian Counterintelligence, both under strict orders to tell me the whole truth. The defense lawyer, I pleaded, must know every fact in the case, particularly those which might be harmful to the cause he was to defend. I felt it would be far better that I disclose our mistake and give an honest explanation for it, than to wait for our opponents to exploit it maliciously. Gombos fully agreed and promised to send the requested experts to Geneva without delay.
For the past two weeks, Foreign Minister de Kanya had been away from his office on a sick leave, and had only resumed his duties three days before the dispute in Geneva was ended. For over a decade, I had opposed the governments of Hungary for their reluctance to put through such timely changes as the land reform. But all the time, I had been collaborating in perfect understanding with Mr. de Kanya on international affairs. I now missed his wide experience and keen judgment. I also felt the need to eliminate the negative influence of scary bureaucrats who abound in every foreign office of the Old, as well as of the New, World, eager to delay timely decisions.
I therefore asked Prime Minister Gombos to give me a free hand to deal with the Marseille affair in Geneva as I saw fit, within the limits of his general instructions. He granted my request, and I remember gratefully how firmly he upheld all my decisions which some of our diplomats wished to water down. It is life-long regular practice of diplomats to seek a compromise to any and every conflict, which practice often with them becomes an ingrained habit. Yet, concessions have to be excluded by a self-respecting nation when its honor is thereby affected. Before I left for Geneva, Regent Horthy gave me a hint of his feelings: "The honor of Hungary has resisted until now every trial," was his last sentence when I took leave of him. The Admiral's expectation was perfectly in line with my resolution.
162
The next point in the Yugoslav memorandum brought up against Hungary was the alleged financing of Croat terrorism, including the Marseille assassinations. This accusation was quite ludicrous and completely undocumented. It was also widely known that the mint of the Ustashi currency was not in Hungary. If the Marseille regicide was carried out "in an atmosphere of luxury"- as the memorandum asserted - certainly the funds were not collected in Hungary where the Croat refugees had to earn their modest living, mostly as simple farmhands.
The Yugoslav memorandum contained serious misgivings because of the Hungarian Government's reluctance to extradite Croat political refugees at the request of the Yugoslav authorities, and to deny information on them. It reproached the Foreign Ministry because it was only on the 21st of November of the current year that it had transmitted to Belgrade a list of the suspicious Yugoslavs who had been living at one time or another in Hungary. Preceding the Second World War, did any civilized government extradite or denounce political refugees at the request of their persecutors? If guilty of a crime while in Hungary, the Croat refugees did stand trial by the competent Hungarian court. The Croat refugee Premec, enjoying asylum in Hungary, was sentenced - as mentioned - to fifteen years in prison by a Hungarian court for a crime committed in Yugoslav territory. This procedure did not fit into the Yugoslav intention to liquidate every Croat revolutionary. The memorandum objected that the Hungarian court only dealt with the case of Premec in order "to publicize the internal conditions in Yugoslavia and to establish an alibi for the Hungarian Government." Premec was convicted many months before the Marseille murders were perpetrated. Could the Hungarian Government prepare this much in advance its defense against yet unknown Yugoslav accusations?
In its summation, the Yugoslav Government complained of twenty terrorist acts committed in Yugoslavia, all of them since 1929. Indeed, terrorism was quite widespread in Yugoslavia at that time. But why should Hungary be made responsible for it? Would the real cause not be closer to home, i.e., the suspension of the Yugoslav constitution on January 6, 1929?
The memorandum condensed in three points Hungary's responsibility for the Marseille regicide: 1) the criminals were deliberately trained in Hungary for the murder of the King - a statement which
163
the Yugoslav Government knew to be untrue on the basis of its own investigation; 2) three accomplices left Hungary with Hungarian passports - an undeniable fact for which Hungary was responsible; 3) the Marseille regicide was the culmination of a terrorist action inspired and aided by the Hungarian Government - a little soul - searching might have led the Yugoslav Government to a different conclusion.
In its last chapter, the Yugoslav memorandum accused the Hungarian Government of a "policy of systematic negation." It concluded that the Marseille crime was nothing else, but the natural consequence of a conspiracy against Yugoslavia, organized and sustained from abroad. It ended with a declaration that the Hungarian Government had taken upon itself a grave responsibility which the Yugoslav Government considered as its first duty to denounce before the League of Nations.
Late the same evening, having glanced through the Yugoslav memorandum, I issued a short statement in time to be published in the press together with the Yugoslav accusation. I promised evidence that would prove that Hungary could not be held responsible for a plot which was decided upon, prepared, and perpetrated outside of Hungary. I emphasized that "the legal and illegal Croat revolutionary movement exists everywhere, where Croat refugees reside, for its exclusive source is the discontent caused by internal conditions in Yugoslavia."
In terms of the Yugoslav memorandum, I concluded: "The Marseille regicide was nothing else, but the natural consequence of a conspiracy organized in the very interior of Yugoslavia."
In spite of the late evening hour when it was issued, my retort was again published together with the Yugoslav accusaflon. The technical perfection of the American communication system was quite admirable. Next morning (November 29), the New York Times presented the Yugoslav memorandum to its readers and judged it as exceedingly grave because it spoke of direct responsibility of the Budapest Government. And then came an extract of my statement which charged that the murder plot originated in Yugoslavia and that it had its "exclusive source" in the discontent with the internal situation in Yugoslavia due to Belgrade's policy.
Although doubtful of Hungary's role in some respects, the Swiss press, as usual, showed much objectivity. The Yugoslav memorandum was criticized as incomplete. The name of Pavelitch, for instance, had
164
not even been mentioned, nor did the memorandum expose the vast terrorist organization of the Croats, spread all over the world. The Swiss press believed that a complete dossier on the Croat revolutionary movement should have been presented by the Yugoslav Government. Democratic naivete was mixed in this opinion with a keen sense of fairness. For the internal rift, bordering on civil war, was exactly that sore spot which the Yugoslav Government tried to hide most of all from the world.
Through the medium of the Swiss press, however, I was warned that the Yugoslav memorandum had raised some doubts concerning Hungary's conduct toward Yugoslavia. It stated that Budapest could not be exonerated, unless it was proven that the Croats guilty of the Marseille regicide had obtained in Hungary nothing else but asylum, to which they were entitled. The question was asked, did Hungarian authorities grant the Croat refugees valid passports, or had the papers in their possession been faked? More resented than the passports were the Hungarian official contradictions and evasions, thoughtlessly committed by the reckless "Uncle Chocho." It was also brought up that Jankapuszta had not been liquidated rapidly enough and that for a while "Hungary was playing with fire."
I knew nothing about the Hungarian passports as yet, but I could give, at my next press conference, competent answers and firsthand information on Jankapuszta. It was not a camp, I explained but a privately owned farm, rented to a Croat named Perchetch, who settled his refugee compatriots there as farmhands. Perchetch refused to disband his workers all at once, before the crops, which he did not wish to lose, had been harvested. By the end of the summer, there were still about a dozen stragglers left on the farm, who were ejected by gendarmes. Perchetch demanded a considerable sum as compensation for the losses he had suffered through the government action. It was from this last uprooted batch of Croat revolutionaries, forcibly removed to a neighboring town, that three accomplices in the Marseille Regicide had been selected by Colonel Perchevitch, who came in September from Vienna to Hungary for this purpose.
The Italian press resented much more sharply the Yugoslav accusations against Hungary than did the Swiss papers. It called attention to the fact that there were Croat refugees all over the world, the greatest number of them in America, the haven of political refugees.
165
They all were working against Yugoslavia, as bitterly as were the Croats in Hungary. The relevant question was: did the Hungarian Government know of the preparations to murder King Alexander? There was no evidence whatsoever in this respect. The criminals met in France; received funds and firearms in France; and committed the crime in France. Why, then, was Hungary called to task?
The Hungarian daily papers had also sent their correspondents to Geneva. They observed, as requested, a moderate tone in their reports. The semi-official Budapesti Hirlap shrugged off lightly the Yugoslav documents which "could be considered as ridiculous, if the honor of a nation were not involved."
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Regicide at Marseille |