COUNT JANOS ESTERHAZY

A. Up to 1918 when the Slovak National Council, meeting in Turocszentmarton (Turciansky Sv.Martin), declared Czechoslovak unity, complete independence and, thus, secession from Hungary.

B. Up to March 1939 when the Slovaks declared their secession from the Republic of Czechoslovakia and, under the sponsorship of Germany, established an independent Slovakia.

C. Up to 1945, when Slovakia lost its independence.

D. The period since 1945.

E. Lessons for the nations of the Danubian Basin

from the Slovak efforts for autonomy and independence.

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Even though the focus of our study is the period after 1918, its understanding requires that we look at Slovak and Hungarian historiographers' views about the origins of the Slovak people -- views which have been often in sharp conflict. We will confine ourselves to the discussion of the substance of the two schools of thought without entering into any argument. That would run contrary to our goals outlined in the Introduction. Still, we feel we must acquaint the reader with these opposing views so that he or she may comprehend the numerous references that will be made to them.

According to one Slovak belief, the ancestors of the Slovak people began moving to the South even before the various Slavic tribes became separated. The most popular Slovak view maintains that the Slovak people are heirs to the Great Moravian Empire. What follows is a review of this concept, based largely on the writings of Slovak authors living in the West.

This belief traces the dawn of Slovak history to the Sixth Century, B.C. That is when the ancestors of the Slovak people crossed the Carpathians and established a permanent home along the shores of the central Danube River and its tributaries. Today's Slovakia had been inhabited already in prehistoric times. The Romans fought there with the neighboring Teutons. The sources name several leaders who had ruled over the Slavic tribes. These tribes were the ancestors of today's Slovaks.

To the West lay the Frank Empire of Charlemagne, which united Austria with the Slavs of Bohemia and Moravia. When Charlemagne defeated the Avars in the late Eighth Century, the Slavs along the upper Danube became part of a larger political unit which was founded by Pribina, Mojmir and Rastislav. The first principality

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was established by Pribina, in 820 A.D., in the territory of todays' Nyitra (Nitra).

Another principality came into being under the rule of Mojmir in the Morava River Valley. Between 833 and 836 Mojmir managed to bring Nyitra under his control, thus laying the groundwork for the Great Moravian Empire. According to historian Pavel Jozef Safarik, in 1843, "Today's Moravia in its entirety, as well as parts of Austria and the Slavic regions of Hungary formed the nucleus of the Moravian Empire" *⁹ For about 10 years after 884 it also included the former Roman province, Pannonia, ultimately even Bohemia for some 17 years, *¹⁰ but the death of Svatopluk (894), changed the situation. His successors, the two Czech princes, seceded from the Great Moravian Empire and swore allegiance in 895 to Arnulf, ruler of the Eastern Frank Kingdom, becoming his vassals and fighting on his side against the Great Moravian Empire. *¹¹

The Great Moravian Empire had to defend itself first against the Eastern Frank Kingdom, then beginning in 895, the Hungarian invaders from Asia who defeated Mojmir II in 906. This battle was fought near Pozsony (Bratislava). The Hungarians gradually united under their rule the territories of today's Slovakia, Pannonia and, eventually, Transylvania.

Slovakia remained an administratively separate entity but it was to become more important culturally than politically in Europe. The only exception was in the 14th Century when much of Slovakia came under the rule of Mate Csak, a powefful member of the Hungarian nobility.

According to the prevailing Hungarian thinking, in a nutshell, the Slovak ethnic group came into being in the centuries following the Hungarian conquest as the ancestors of today's Slovaks gradually infiltrated the Northern regions of historic Hungary. This was not a homogenous ethnic group. It was formed from the merger of different Slavic tribes, as noted by Slovak historians, too.

Hungarian historians place the emergence of Slovak nation building into the 17th Century. They reject the proposition that there existed a politically organized state of sorts when the Hungarians arrived on the scene and that this state was destroyed by the conquermg Hungarians. The Hungarian view also rejects the Slovak hypothesis of a Great Moravian Empire because, according to this view, there is no scholarly evidence in its support. Even the location of that empire is subject of serious scholarly controversy. *¹²

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As noted earlier, we have touched upon these questions only for the sake of clarifying future references to the contrasting views about the origins of the Slovak people. In any event, the prevailing Hungarian view holds that it is pointless to debate which people was first in the region. Such debate can only lead to the creation of romantic myths without any scholarly foundation. Such myths, as we have seen, do not help at all in the creation of the conditions needed for peaceful coexistence.

There is one fact that remains beyond any debate in the Hungarian view, namely that following the fall of the Roman Empire only the Hungarians were able to establish in the region a state which survived for over a millennium, despite the greatest adversities.

Hungarian historians regard the Turkish occupation of Hungary as one of the most important milestones in the history of Slovak ethnicity. The greatest burden of the Turkish occupation of more than 150 years was borne by the Hungarians. Their villages were obliterated, their numbers were reduced beyond belief. Northern Hungary, on the other hand, provided refuge for newcomers. The size of its Slavic population was swelled by Slavic refugees from the South, who were fleeing the Turks. The refugees from the Turks were joined by a steady stream of Protestant refugees from Bohemia and Moravia.

We witness the establishment of a very strong Slavic presence in that period in Northern Hungary. The face of countless villages had completely changed with the arrival of new Slavic settlers. These settlers, along with the Slavs who had been already living in Northern Hungary, laid the foundations of a future Slovak nation. The shift in the ratio between the Slovak and Hungarian populations in this period was to determine the ethnic boundaries between the two peoples, establishing two distinct cultural spheres.

At the same time, many Slovaks gradually assimilated into the framework of Hungarian society and economy, reaching high positions and joining the ranks of nobility. According to the Hungarian view, this demonstrated that the settlers, too, regarded Hungary as their home. The fact that they were also able to take the first steps toward establishment of their nationhood only proves the tolerance and understanding of the host country. This stands in contrast with the allegations of certain Slovak authors about a thousand years of Hungarian oppression, something that the Czech propaganda had exploited for the furtherance of its goals by skillfully planting those allegations into European public opinion. A number of Hungarian

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writers pointed out that if this were true there would not be even today Slovak settlements in the immediate vicinity of the Hungarian capital, where the Slovaks have been able to retain their ethnic identity undisturbed for all these centuries. Those settlements date back to the period following the Turkish occupation when the vacuum left behind by the massacre of the Hungarians was filled by Slovak, rather than Hungarian settlers.

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The awakening of Slovak national consciousness occurred only later, in the 18th Century. Its impact was felt primarily in the use of the language. It was also closely linked to changes in the religious situation of the period. As a result of the religious movements of the 16th and 17th centuries, the Lutheran faith became dominant in Northern Hungary. Refugees streaming in from the Czech regions had brought with them the Czech literary language.

In connection with these events we must mention briefly the role of Peter pazmany *¹³ who had a major impact on the subsequent development of the Slovak language and, thereby, of the Slovak culture. In 1553, Miklos Olah who had received a humanistic education in Italy became the Archbishop and Primate of Esztergom. He made Nagyszombat (Trnava) the center of the Counter-Reformation he had launched. Later, when Ferenc Forgacs, Bishop of Nyitra, became Archbishop of Esztergom, he summoned Peter Pazmany from the Jesuit seminary of Vagsellye to be his assistant.

Eventually, Pazmany became Forgacs's successor He founded in 1635 a University at Nagyszombat (Trnva), and established in Vienna the renowned Pazmaneum where many priests of Slovak origin were trained up to the late 1910's. A printing shop at the University of Nagyszombat was placed at the disposal of the national minorities. In addition to the Hungarian publications, many Slovak and German books were printed there. About half as many publications were in the Slovak language as in Hungarian. Later, when the university was moved to Buda, in 1778, it continued to publish many Slovak books. One of them was Slavy Dcera, a strongly anti-Hungarian work by Jan Kollar.

Pazmany issued strict orders to the Slovak-speaking priests to preach to the Slovak population in their mother tongue. This, too, contributed greatly to the development of the Slovak literary lan-

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guage. One of Pazmany's successors arranged the publication of the Slovak edition of the Cantus Catolicus. Pazmany's Jesuits published the first books in the Midwestern Slovak dialect, rather than in Czech. The Czech publications (in biblictina) were intended to prevent the development of a separate Slovak language.

At this stage we can already see the beginnings of the future Slovak independence movements against the Czechs. The foundations for Anton Bernolak's efforts were laid more than a hundred years earlier by Peter Pazmany's Jesuits, thus greatly influencing the development of Slovak national consciousness.

The Hungarian national consciousness arose earlier than that of the other nationalities. It was manifested above all in the struggles against the oppressive policies of the Hapsburg Dynasty. Vienna had attempted to make German the official language, and in 1784, Joseph II succeeded in doing so. The Hungarian efforts to counter this measure came to fruition 60 years later in 1843-1844, when the renewal of the Hungarian language and literature were accomplished at the Diet of Pozsony and Hungarian was officially recognized as the language of the land. Even though this legislation was not aimed at any of the nationalities, it provoked considerable resentment among them.

Anton Bernolak, a Roman Catholic priest, in the late 1790s contributed to the creation of a unified Slovak literary language. The Slovak people can thank him not only for helping the Slovak literary language prevail over the Czech language but also for the tremendous boost this gave to the development of Slovak national consciousness. He is believed to have been one of the first to use the terms Slovak and Slovensko. It should be noted that Bernolak showed no hostility toward the Hungarian language, he even encouraged the Slovaks to learn Hungarian. He saw the real danger in the Czech language. Later, through the efforts of Ludovit Stur, the unified Slovak literary language emerged.

The ideas of the 18th century philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder had a major influence on Slovak national awakening. The same ideas were also fueling the Panslavic movement.

There commenced a strong incitement against Hungarians among the Slovak students at German universities. This is how Herder saw the future of the Slavs: "The Slavs will be liberated from their ancient dream, they will shed their ancient shackles and rule over their ancient lands from the Danube to the Moldova River."

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These ideas prompted a very violent campaign of slander, directed by Vienna, to project a totally distorted image of the Hungarians before the world. Jan Kollar, a Slovak clergyman in Pest (Budapest), paints an even more enthusiastic picture of the glorious future of the Slovaks in his great poem, Slavy dcera. A few Slovak leaders, such as Ludovit Stur, Josef Hurban and Milan Hodza, offered their loyal services to Baron Haynau *¹⁴ who gave them several assignments. Following the defeat of the Revolution in 1849, they were rewarded by being placed under police surveillance. Stur suffered a nervous breakdown.

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The Slovak leaders summed up their grievances and demands in several petitions. The first petition, submitted March 28, 1848, in Liptoszentmiklos, Northern Hungary, contained demands pertaining to the use of language. The second, dated May 10, demanded a national assembly and the drawing of ethnic boundaries. However, the Slovak leaders failed to present this petition to the Hungarian govermnent. Unfortunately, the same fate befell Kossuth's proclamation of November 18, 1848, which the Hungarian authorities failed to publish.

On June 6, 1861, in Turocszentmarton, also in Northern Hungary, the Slovaks demanded establishment of a Slovak ethnic district (Okolie) where Slovak would be the only official language. They wanted territorial autonomy, just as they did in 1918 from the Czechs, which the Czechs have never granted to them.

The jealousy of the Czechs toward the Hungarians grew by leaps and bounds after the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867. At the same time, the Slovaks were grieved by the emerging Hungarian nationalism. Thus there followed a natural convergence of Czech and Slovak sentiments.

In 1868, the Hungarian Parliament enacted the Nationalities Act, created by Ferenc Deak and Jozsef Eotvos, which was unparalleled in providing legislative protection of the rights of national minorities. By that time, however, the Slovak leaders no longer demanded the protection of minority rights, they wanted to establish a fully coequal nation within the Hungarian state. Because of their insistence on having all their demands met, the Slovak leaders refused to accept the Nationalities Act of 1868 as a basis for negotiations. Neither side was willing to compromise and this resulted in serious mistakes on both sides.

The Hungarians have stated countless times since then that the forced Magyarization did not serve the cause of good relations

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between Hungarians and Slovaks. Count Istvan Szechenyi -- hailed as "The Greatest Hungarian" -- said the desire for unity is of greater importance than the question of what language should be spoken. But the Hungarian political leadership of the time did not have historical foresight and subsequently the Hungarian people had to pay dearly for that shortcoming of their leaders. The leaders should have seen that their mistakes played into the hands of the very people, such as Masaryk and Benes, who did not care about Slovak or Hungarian interests, whose only goal was to destroy the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

There were plenty of mistakes and shortcomings. To name just a few, the closing of Slovak language secondary schools in Nagyroce, Turocszentmarton and Zniovaralja, or the banning of the Matica Slovenska. Laying the legislative basis of forced Magyarization and the policy of enforced assimilation were serious mistakes. However, even when the Hungarians admitted these mistakes, they always emphasized that the nation's universal system of law and order was equally extended to everybody. Thus, the courts passed judgment in an impartial manner, regardless of anyone's nationality. Hungary had no press censorship. There were no restrictions imposed on the economy. Everybody was free to engage in industry or commerce. That made possible the establishment of banks by the national minorities. Nor was there any discrimination in the social sphere: the burdens were shared equally by Hungarians and by the national minorities.

It should be noted that during the debate over the Nationalities Act and even after its enactment into law, there have been Slovak attempts to bridge over the differences. Here we should mention J.N.Bobula, editor of Slovenske Noviny, the Slovak language newspaper in Budapest, who said that instead of establishing ethnic districts (Okolie), as demanded in the 1861 memorandum of Turocszentmarton, the issue could be solved within the framework of county self-government whereby counties with a Slovak majority would come under Slovak administrative rule.*¹⁵

Similarly, the 1895 Congress of National Minorities in Hungary, which produced a political program for the national minorities, also came out in favor of the county system. The Congress called for, in effect, total freedom for the non-Hungarian nationalities. The Slovaks were represented by Pavol Mudron. On the Hungarian side, mainly politicians of the Independence Party sought a compromise solution in 1870.*¹⁶

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This period witnessed emerging signs of conflict between the Czechs and Slovaks also. Aside from the struggles, already noted, to establish an independent Slovak literary language, there began economic and even social conflicts, albeit they remained below the surface for the time being. The roots of these conflicts can be traced to the growing strength of the Czech bourgeoisie after 1849. These conflicts became increasingly apparent following the Austro-Hungarian Compromise and, even more so, after 1918 when the Czechs assumed a leading role even in the economic life of the new Slovakia. More of that later.

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Czech-Hungarian relations have also deteriorated sharply after the failure of the 1871 attempts to reach an Austro-Czech Compromise. This, in turn, had an unfavorable impact on the Slovak-Hungarian relations as well.

It is noteworthy that in the course of the Austro-Czech negotiations no mention was made of any Slovak-Czech union. The Czechs then began spreading the idea of the so-called Crechoslovak concept which was to lead eventually to the notion of "Czechoslovakism." As it became increasingly obvious, this was a fictional notion but it proved to be an extraordinarily effective propaganda move in that fateful period.

Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum, the current Vice President of the Slovak World Congress, expressed this the most aptly: "Since 1918, Slovakia became known in European history as a part of Czechoslovakia... The goal of the Czech political parties, of the government and of exile groups was to dominate Slovakia and to assimilate the Slovak people. Therefore, the Slovak people was portrayed as a branch of the Czech nation, with Slovakia as an underdeveloped country which needs to be ruled by the Czechs." *¹⁷ Kirschbaum also quotes Professor Watson Kirkconnell who said: "One cannot emphasize strongly enough that there is no such creation as Czechoslovakia." *¹⁸

Prior to World War I, one of the seemingly most effective arguments put forth by the Czechs was that a Czech-Slovak union would provide the best defense against German expansionism. Later on it became abundantly clear for all to see that this argument was just as empty as the notion of "Czechoslovakism."

In the early 1900s it had not yet occurred to the Czech leaders to destroy the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. This is clear from a speech delivered by Thomas G. Masaryk in 1902 in Chicago: "The Czechs want a parliament for the Bohemian lands; they would like to

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be as independent as the Hungarians; that is the goal of our struggle." No mention was made here of the destruction of the Monarchy. Nor did Masaryk say anything about territories that he was to demand 17 years later from Hungary, territories that became part of the new Czech oslovakia.*¹⁹

In the subsequent years Thomas G. Masaryk and his chief collaborator, Eduard Benes, played a decisive role not only in determining the fate of Slovaks, Hungarians and Czechs but in the transformation of Europe as a whole. Ancestrally, Masaryk's father was Slovak, his mother was Czech. Benes was of Czech origin, General Stefanik, one of his chief collaborators, was of Slovak ancestry.

As early as February, 1916, Masaryk was trying to convince French Premier Aristide Briand that both France and England had vital security interests in the creation of an independent Czecho- slovakia. He asserted that Pan-Germanism was spreading ever wider in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and that it could not be curbed without rearranging Central Europe. Such rearrangement requires the liberation of the oppressed national minorities, such as the Czechs, the Slovaks, the Croats, the Rumanians and the Poles. That would require, of course, the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy but that would provide the strongest bastion against the Pan-German aspirations. Briand was very much impressed by this argument even though, up to that time, maintenance of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had been a cornerstone of French foreign policy. *²⁰

His success with the French, along with the support he was receiving from England, gave so much encouragement to Masaryk and his colleagues that they began planning their future policies based on a security system that was to be established by the great powers. It was to become apparent for all to see that this policy, built on quicksand, had been doomed to total failure. That, too, demonstrates the validity of our thesis, stated in the Introduction, that the security of small nations dependent on the goodwill of great powers is illusory at best. The great powers, obeying the dictates of their own interests, will scrap any promised guarantees, even if enshrined into treaties, whenever it is in their interest to do so.

The National Council of Czech Provinces was soon established. It was headquartered in Paris, with Benes serving as secretary general. A Czech National Army was also formed from prisoners of war and deserters. Later on this army had an important role in the propaganda campaign of Benes and his company.

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In 1916-1917 Benes was constantly on the road, visiting London, Rome, Geneva, Zurich, Paris. He was setting up press bureaus everywhere to mold public opinion in support of his goals.

General Stefanik who was a citizen of France, was Benes' chief collaborator in Paris. Stefanik helped him establish a close relationship with journalists on the staff of major papers, such as Le Ternps, Paris Midi, Journal des Debars. These papers played a major role in Benes' propaganda campaign.

The Slav Press Bureau in New York was also operating under Benes's direction. He credits this Bureau with winning the support of Senator Kenyon of Iowa, with very important consequences. In May 1917, Senator Kenyon introduced a Resolution calling for the establishment of an independent Czechoslovak state.

At the same time, the New York bureau was busy influencing public opinion with glowing accounts of the heroic deeds of the Czech Legion in Russia and its valiant dash through Siberia. General Syrovy who lost one eye in battle became an instant national hero. Some two decades later he was made Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia.

It goes without saying that Masaryk was the other great hero in America. On September 11, 1918, Lloyd George sent a congratulatory message to Masaryk, hailing the heroism of the Czech forces in Siberia. "We shall never forget the services rendered by the Czechoslovak forces in the struggle against despotism," said Lloyd George. Twenty years later, Neville Chamberlain called the Czechs, "a people about which we know nothing."

Franz Joseph, the emperor-king of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, died on November 21,1916. He was succeeded by the well-intentioned Charles IV. France and England called on Austria and Hungary to seek a separate peace. The secret negotiations toward this end were carried out mostly in Switzerland and it is easy to understand that they caused deep concern among those who were moving full speed ahead toward the realization of the Czech political goals. Had the negotiations for a separate peace succeeded, the Czechs, who were striving for full independence, would have been forced to content themselves with some form of autonomy at best. It was the great good fortune of Benes and company that the Central Powers made many strategic mistakes and the peace efforts failed.

In the meantime Benes had lots of troubles with the Czech Army which was causing disturbances in France. The troops were quartered in barracks in a remote location. They were revolting because of the discomfort they had to suffer and, above all, on account

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of their uncertain legal status. Benes tried to salvage the delicate situation and took strict measures against the revolting troops.

By early 1918, Benes' popularity in Paris was declining. He was hated by many Czech soldiers. Some regarded him a traitor; he even had to deal with assassination attempts. In the end, though, Benes prevailed. The army, as noted before, performed a great service in helping to meet his political goals. Masaryk himself said that nothing would have been gained without the soldiers.

Getting back to the relationship between Czechs and Slovaks... as early as February, 1915, the American Slovak League agreed to a union between Czechs and Slovaks. However, there was no full agreement among the leaders of the Slovak National Party and the Slovak People's Party about the future of the Slovak people. Some wanted autonomy within Hungary, others advocated union with the Czechs. The leaders of the Slovak People's Party met on October 30, 1918, in Turocszentmarton (Turciansky Sv.Martin), where Father Andrej Hlinka called for union with the Czechs. Thus, a new chapter was reached in the Slovak struggle for autonomy and independence.

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Prior to this move, on May 20, 1918, Masaryk signed an agreement in Pittsburgh with representives of American Slovak organizations, promising the Slovaks full autonomy in the new Czechoslovak state that was to be established. However, as noted before, the Czechs have never granted this autonomy. Masaryk also talked with American Ruthenian leaders, holding out the same promise of autonomy. Then, in Philadelphia, he made a separate pact about Ruthenian autonomy with Gregorij Zatkovic, leader of the Ruthenian American Council, even though Zatkovic had not been authorized to do so by the Ruthenian population of Subcarpathian Ruthenia. Subsequently, these agreements made by Masaryk were presented as legitimate documents at the Peace Conference.

By declaring Czechoslovak unity and full independence along with secession from Hungary, on October 30, 1918, in Turocszentmarton, the Slovak National Council tied its destiny to the policies of Benes. It is worth noting that one year later when Father Illinka -- dodging Benes' spies as he arrived in great secrecy at the Paris Peace Conference -- told Stephen Bonsal, a friend of Colonel House, a close associate of President Wilson, that the Czech had doublecrossed the Slovaks into agreeing to the union. More on this later.

Meanwhile, diplomatic events had taken an interesting turn. In September, 1918, Austrian Foreign Minister Burian submitted a peace offer to the governments of the Entente powers. But it was not convincing. Instead of a thorough territorial rearrangement, the proposal only called for administrative reforms. According to these reforms, the empire was to have been divided into four regions:

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Austria, Hungary, a South Slav region and a Polish region in Galicia. *²¹ This was too little and too late. The only remaining question was whether Vienna would be able to offer a new and substantially better proposal?

On September 2, 1918, President Wilson issued a declaration recognizing the Slovaks who were represented in the Czechoslovak National Council as de facto belligerents. On October 14 the Council became a provisional government. On October 28 the Czechoslovak Republic was proclaimed.

Masaryk who was in America at the time learned on October 6, 1918, of the latest German-Austrian peace offer. He at once began a feverish activity to nail down and make public immediately the Czech political goals.

Masaryk was not yet fully clear about Wilson's position. Wilson had proclaimed his Fourteen Points early in the year, on January 8, and they were based on the retention of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. He declared in the tenth point that "The peoples of Austria-Hungary... should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development."

With adroit political skill, Masaryk wanted to make the most of the similarities between Czech political goals and American political traditions. He decided to draft a Czechoslovak Declaration of Independence on the pattern of the American Declaration of Independence. Writing in the newspaper The Nation, Masaryk said that the United States cannot accept the so-called Austrianism because that would contradict, even deny, the principles of the Declaration of Independence and the American ideals in general. He was fortunate to have Secretary of State Lansing share these views. Lansing was convinced that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy must be dismembered and an independent Czech and Slovak state must be established. *²²

Wilson was still undecided about how to respond to peace feelers from Germany and Austria-Hungary. As he was drafting a reply, he summoned Colonel E.M.House, his closest friend and confidential adviser, seeking his counsel. Colonel House found Wilson's draft too moderate. Secretary of State Lansing was drawn into the process and he told the press about the new jointly drafted reply.

The reply, strangely, did not mention Austria. That made Masaryk uneasy. His discomfort was aggravated by a report in The New York Times about the intention of the Austro-Hungarian cabinet to grant autonomy to the national minorities. On October 12, it was reported in the press that a new state would be formed from the

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South Slav territories of Austria and that a proclamation was about to be issued granting the right to the various peoples in the empire to determine their own destiny.

Masaryk knew that he had to act immediately. He and his colleagues set out at once to draft the Czech Declaration of Independence. With feverish work, they completed the first draft by October 13. The finished product was ready the next day. Its main thrust was acceptance by the Czechs and Slovaks of the American principles as laid out by President Wilson.

Masaryk declared that the Czechoslovak state will be a republic whose citizens will be given full freedom of conscience, speech, press and assembly. The rights of the national minorities will be preserved and protected. He promised that the new state would participate in the rearrangement of Eastern Europe. He indicated that far reaching social reforms would be forthcoming. He stressed that according to the American principles, government derives its power from the will of the people and that this is in full accord with Czech democratic principles dating back to the time of Jan Huss. It is obvious from the foregoing how anxious Masaryk was to conform the declaration to the American principles.

ln the meantime Masaryk learned that President Wilson was working on a reply to a new German note. He was under the impression that the Germans were anxious to end the war as soon as possible. They had given assurances to Wilson of their acceptance of the Fourteen Points, as well as subsequent declarations, even the required evacuation of disputed territories.

Masaryk went to work again. He had to act before Wilson responded to the German note. So on October 13, in addition to the Declaration of Independence, he was also drafting a memorandum pertaining to the new German note. He sent copies of the memorandum to Lansing, to Colonel House and to several diplomats of the allies.

In this memorandum Masaryk expressed his doubts regarding the German intentions and suggested several conditions for inclusion into the reply. But his most significant and perhaps strangest suggestion was that the Fourteen Points be revised. They have become obsolete, he wrote, and new terms of peace were required, foremost among them the recognition of Czechoslovakia.

Wilson's response to the German note was most decisive. He demanded absolute guarantees for the maintenance of the military superiority of the allies. He indicated that he would send a separate

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note to Austria-Hungary.

All the while, in Paris, Benes was also working feverishly. He called in Philippe Barthelot who was in charge of the political department of the French Foreign Ministry. Barthelot assured Benes that under no circumstances would the allies engage in separate negotiations with Austria-Hungary.

At Barthelot's urging Benes drafted a note regarding the conversion of the Czechoslovak National Council into the Provisional Government of Czechoslovakia. *²³ He had the note delivered at once to French Foreign Minister Stephen Pichon. With Masaryk's approval which he had obtained earlier, Benes announced that the head of the new government and its Finance Minister would be Masaryk; Benes would become Foreign Minister, as well as Minister of Home Affairs, while Stefanik would be Minister of War. *²⁴

Benes' note was delivered in the French Foreign Ministry on October 14. Since the Czechoslovak Declaration of Independence was not yet proclaimed, Benes sent a letter to Masaryk to explain why his action had to be taken without delay. *²⁵

On October 13, King Charles IV of Hungary (Emperor Charles I of Austria) reached a momentous decision regarding the national minorities of Austria-Hungary. He ordered the drafting of a Manifesto. It was discussed in Crown Council in Vienna on October 15. The ruler wished to emphasize that the Manifesto would be but the first step toward turning Austria into a federated state . *²⁶

On October 16 U.S. Secretary of State Lansing takes delivery of the Czechoslovak Declaration of Independence. At the same time, Benes' proclamation is being studied in Paris. In Vienna, officials are busy drafting the Manifesto and it is being approved by the Monarch. According to the Manifesto, Austria was to become a federated state, with each nationality establishing its own state in its own territory. *²⁷

The Manifesto had one crucial shortcoming. It failed to deal with the national minorities in Hungary. Thus, a federal transformation could have been carried out only in the Austrian half of the Empire. Meanwhile in America, the anti-Austrian propaganda campaign was moving full steam ahead. Masaryk received valuable support from his friend Ira E. Bennett, Editor of The Washington Post. He and Professor H.A.Miller of Oberlin College, another friend of Masaryk, were instrumental in the propaganda effort.

Masaryk wanted to have the Declaration of Independence published before the proclamation of the Austrian Manifesto lest it be overshadowed by the Austrian document. Eventually, both appeared

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in the press on the same day, October 18. Ira E. Bennett very skillfully juxtaposed the two documents, accompanied by an editorial entitled Freedom and Forgery. President Wilson's response, dated October 19, appeared in the American press on the next day. It dispelled all hopes for safeguarding the territorial integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy -- hopes which were based on the tenth of Wilson's Fourteen Points. Wilson explained in his reply that certain events had caused him to change his position, foremost among them the recognition of the Czechoslovak National Council as a de facto belligerent.

Lansing, in a private memorandum on September 7 urged that Germany and Austria-Hungary be treated differently. "Let us not give the impression that we intend to destroy the German Empire, and let us give the impression that we intend to end forever the Austro-Hungarian Empire," wrote Lansing.*²⁸

On October 19 the Czech politicians rejected Charles's Manifesto and declared their full solidarity with the Czech revolutionaries in the West.

The most significant declaration to be issued by the Slovaks was the resolution, noted earlier, which was approved on October 30 in Turocszentmarton, proclaiming Czechoslovak unity and declaring that "The Slovak nation is part of the Czechoslovak nation... therefore we demand for the Czechoslovak nation the absolute right of self-determination, based on full independence." *²⁹

Hungarian historians have noted repeatedly that this document was not approved by every Slovak leader. Thus, the Slovak National Council at its meeting in Eperjes (Presov) decided not to secede from Hungary and demanded a plebiscite. Furthermore, the Slovak National Assembly in Kassa (Kosice) also called for a solution within a Hungarian framework.

Representatives of the Slovak National Party, the Slovak Peoples Party and the Slovak Social Democratic Party formed a Slovak National Council under the chairmanship of Matus Dula, with Karol A. Medvecky serving as its Secretary: *³⁰

On October 23, 1918, the Hungarian Parliament met for the last time. On October 31 the Hungarian cabinet resigned and the Hungarian National Council which had been formed some time earlier under the chairmanship of Count Mihaly Karolyi came to power. On November 16 the Hungarian Republic was declared, Parliament was dissolved and Mihaly Karolyi became the chief of state.

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A Hungarian government representative traveled to Prague to negotiate with the Czech National Committee about a peaceful solution for the Slovak question so that the territorial integrity of the state may be preserved. *³¹

Karolyi himself, in a message to the Slovak National Council, emphasized the Slovaks' right of self-determination but none of his attempts succeeded. The Hungarian churches, too, supported Karolyi's efforts. Archbishop Janos Csernoch of Esztergom, of Slovak descent himself, reminded the Slovak clergy of the dangers the Slovaks would face at hands of the anticlerical Czech leaders. He predicted that the Czechs would force the Slovaks to surrender their ethnic identity. The Archbishop pointed to his own example of a Slovak clergyman having been elevated to the highest ecclesiastical post in Hungary. Lutheran Bishop Sandor Raffay addressed a similar appeal to the Slovak ministers.

Father Hlinka replied to the Archbishop on behalf of the Slovak clergy. He said that they support the decision of the Slovak National Council. Personally, Hlinka added, he endorses the establishment of Czechoslovakia, which he sees as the dawn of the fulfillment of ancient Slovak dreams and a protection against a thousand years of injustice. *³²

There arose military conflicts between the Karolyi government and the Czechoslovaks. The armistice signed with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy on November 3, 1918 in Padua did not authorize the Czech legions to cross the Hungarian border. The armistice did not touch upon the question of national boundaries and did not give the Czech troops the right to occupy Hungarian territory.

On November 7, 1918, in Belgrade, Mihaly Karolyi reached a military agreement with French General Louis Franchet d'Esperey, the head of the Entente mission. According to this agreement, all Hungarian territories, with the exception of Croatia and Slovenia, were to remain under Hungarian administration. *³³ The Prague government did not accept this agreement.

Karolyi requested Franchet d'Esperey to forbid the Czechoslovak government to send troops to Hungarian territory at least until the Peace Conference. Benes, however, did everything in his power to occupy as much land as possible in order to create a fait accompli before the Peace Conference. When V. Srobar, a Slovak politician, declared that "He who first puts his hands on Slovakia will get to keep it," he just echoed Benes' oft-voiced opinion that Slovakia must be occupied and a fait accompli must be created. *³⁴

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French Prime Minister Clemenceau ignored Karolyi's protestations and sided with Benes. Even though his troops have already crossed the line of demarcation in Slovakia, Benes wanted to lend this move at least an appearance of legitimacy and once again he turned to Paris. Clemenceau agreed to place the Czechoslovak troops in France under the command of Marshal Foch, supreme commander of the French forces, so that -- as requested by Benes -- they may be available "If need be, to maintain order and halt the Bolshevik expansion." *³⁵

Lieutenant Colonel Vyx, chairman of the Armistice Control Commission in Belgrade, was visiting Budapest on December 3 and sent a note to Karolyi, demanding the immediate withdrawal of his troops from Slovak territory. Karolyi rejected this demand. This was followed by talks between Hungarian Minister of War Albert Bartha and Milan Hodza, Czechoslovak Ambassador in Budapest, about a line of demarcation between the two countries. We will discuss these negotiations in greater detail in Part Two. But it should be noted here that Hodza's position was based largely on the same ethnic principles that were to be agreed upon at the time of the so-called Vienna Decision of 1938. *³⁶

The peace negotiations at Trianon (Versailles) might have taken a different turn and the subsequent events also might have turned out in radically different fashion if Benes had not repudiated and recalled Hodza. But Benes had already gained the approval of the Western powers for his plan to condemn Hungary at Trianon without giving her a chance to defend herself. The damage so brought was beyond description. In the Hungarian view it matched or exceeded the tragedy of the lost battle of Mohacs in 1526, which led to the country's Turkish occupation

In a legislative act passed on March 19, 1919 Hungary recognized the autonomy of Slovenska Krajina as the Slovak territory was called. This meant, in effect, recognition of an ethnic district, called Okolie, originally demanded back in l861. *³⁷ Later, in June 1920, the government of Hungarian Prime Minister Karoly Huszar proposed autonomy for Slovakia, with an independent national assembly, with Slovak ministers in the national government and proportional Slovak representation in the Hungarian national assembly. *³⁸

The Slovaks did not accept these far reaching proposals. In the Hungarian viewpoint, the rejection was due to pressure from the Czech political leaders. As a result of the Czechs' worldwide anti-Hungarian propaganda campaign, the question could no longer be

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solved within the framework of the Hungarian state. This propaganda campaign destroyed the last opportunity for a mutually agreed upon settlement. And the same shortsighted, selfish policies of Benes were to drive subsequently both the Slovaks and the Hungarians into the embrace of Hitler's Germany.

Returning to the controversy over the line of demarcation, it is worth noting that on March 19, 1919 Franchet d'Esperey instructed General de Lobit to inform the Hungarian government of the February 26 decision of the Peace Conference in this matter. At the same time, he instructed General Gondrecourt to deliver the Entente Powers' demarche to Mihaly Karolyi. Re also ordered General de Lobit to extend the neutral zone in Galicia to the south to include the city of Munkacs (Mukachevo), even though this move had not been authorized by the Peace Conference. *³⁹ He requested therefore Clemenceau's approval after the fact. *⁴⁰

Colonal Yates, the British Military Attache in Belgrade, met Karolyi on March 15. Karolyi registered his protest against the one-sided French instructions to change the line of demarcation in favor of the Czechoslovaks.

On March 20, Lieutenant Colonel Vyx was instructed to deliver a Memorandum from the Entente powers to the Hungarian government and to demand a reply within 48 hours. *⁴¹ The Memorandum stated, among others, that the Peace Conference has given Czechoslovakia permission to have a common border with Rumania across Subcarpathian Ruthenia.

The Vyx Memorandum came to be known as the Vyx Ultimatum. The Berinkey government (Karolyi having become President of the Republic in the meantime, replaced by Denes Berinkey as Prime Minister) found the Ultimatum unacceptable, rejected it, and resigned. *⁴²

On March 21, a Revolutionary Government Council was established under Sandor Garbai. But the real power was in the hands of Foreign Commissar Bela Kun. On March 24 the new government sent a note to the Entente powers, which created a heated debate among them. British Prime Minister Lloyd George was concerned whether Vyx had made it clear that the boundaries of the neutral zone will have no impact on the final borders because it was essential that the defeated countries must not be thrust into the arms of the Bolsheviks. He proposed sending a mission to Budapest. headed by General Ian Smuts. Smuts promised that the new line of demarcation will not influence the drawing of the final borders and that he would suggest

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that the representatives of Hungary be invited to the Peace Conference. *⁴³

Meanwhile, General Franchet d'Esperey began organizing Czech and Rumanian troops for an attack against the Hungarian Communist government, even though this was not expressly authorized by the Entente powers. Rumanian, then Czech troops crossed the line of demarcation. Their goal was to overthrow the dictatorship of the proletariat. In May, the Rumanians reached the Tisza river and the Czechs occupied Subcarpathian Ruthenia. In the North, however, the Hungarian forces were advancing. *⁴⁴

In Vienna, in the meantime, an Anti-Bolshevik Committee was formed by Count Istvan Bethlen and Count Pal Teleki, and it sought closer ties with the Entente powers.

On May 5, 1919, Count Gyula Karolyi formed a government in Arad, which soon moved on to Szeged where it was reorganized. Dezso Abraham became Prime Miniszter, Count Pal Teleki Foreign Minister and Admiral Miklos Horthy Minister of War.

On June 15, Clemenceau sent an ultimatum to Budapest, outlining the final boundaries and demanding that the Hungarian troops be withdrawn within four days beyond those boundaries. The Communist government accepted the ultimatum and, to the great jubilation of the Czech troops, evacuated the Northern territories. *⁴⁵

On June 28, 1919, the Treaty of Versailles with Germany was signed in Paris. Wilson and Lloyd George left Paris, leaving Clemenceau in charge. it was his idea to overthrow the Hungarian dictatorship of the proletariat with Czech, Rumanian and Yugoslav troops. But the French plan was thwarted by the reluctance of the other Entente powers.

The Hungarian government launched one more military attack to liberate the region East of the river Tisza but it was halted by a Rumanian counterattack. *⁴⁶

At the end of July, the Peace Conference declared that it will sign a Peace Treaty with Hungary only if the dictatorship of the proletariat is replaced by a government acceptable to the Entente powers. With the Rumanian forces approaching Budapest, the Communist government resigned on August 1 and was replaced by a new government formed by Gyula Peidl.

On August 3, the Rumanian troops entered Budapest. Two days later, in an ultimatum, the Rumanians issued new armistice conditions which were unacceptable because their acceptance would have led to total economic ruin for Hungary. On August 6, the coun-

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terrevolutionary group of Istvan Friedrich forced the resignation of the Peidl government. Archduke Joseph Hapsburg who had been named earlier by King Charles IV as homo regius assumed the position of Regent and appointed Istvan Friedrich as Prime Minister.

Since the Entente powers were unable to force the Rumanians to leave Hungary, they sent -- under British and American pressure -- Sir George Russell Clerk, a British diplomat, to Bucharest to deliver an ultimatum drafted by Prime Minister Arthur Baffour, ordering a Rumanian withdrawal from Hungary. Clerk was then sent to Budapest to negotiate with the political parties about the formation of a coalition government. *⁴⁷

On November iS, the Entente sent another forceful ultimatum to Rumania. One day before the delivery of this ultimatum, on November 14, the Rumanian forces left Budapest. Clerk informed Admiral Horthy that his troops may enter Budapest to maintain order.

On November 22, Karoly Huszar formed a new government which was invited by the Entente powers, on December 1, to send its representatives to the Peace Conference. In January, 1920, Admiral Horthy had several talks in Budapest with British High Commissioner Thomas Hohler and General Reginald Gordon. Hobler's reports to London reflected a very favorable impression of Horthy.

On March 1, 1920, the National Assembly elected Miklos Horthy Regent of Hungary.

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COUNT JANOS ESTERHAZY