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A thousand years of the Hungarian art of war |
CONQUEST OF THE CARPATHIAN BASIN
1. Robert S. Hoyt and Stanley Chodorow, Europe in the Middle Ages (New York: Harcourt. Brace, Jovanovich, lnc., 1976), 3rd ed., p. 188. (Hereafter referred to as Middle Ages.) It meant that the rulers (kings) granted land to their lords to hire and supply armored knights for their armies while attempting to secure the loyalty of the lords by demanding a loyalty oath from them.
2. C. W. C. Oman, The Art of War in the Middle Ages: A.D. 378-1515 (Ithaca, New
York: Cornell University Press, 1968), p. 16. (Hereafter referred to as Art of
War.)
3. J. F. C. Fuller, Major General, A Military History Or the Western World (New
York: Minerva Press, 1967), 3 vols., I, pp. 352-353. (Hereafter referred to as
Military History.)
4. Ibid., p. 353
5. Ihid.
6. Jeno Pilch, Istvan Berko, Jeno Gyalokay, Istvan Marko, A Magyar Katona,
Vitezsegunk Ezer Eve. "The Hungarian Soldier. Thousand Years of Our Valor."
(Budapest: Franklin Tarsulat Kiadasa, 1933), 2 vols., 1, 4. (Hereafter referred
to as Hungarian Soldier.)
7. Erik Molnar, Ervin Pamlenyi, Gyorgy Szekely (eds.), Magyarorszag Tortenete.
"History of Hungary." (Budapest, A Magyar Tudomanyos Akademia Tortenettudomanyi
Intezete, Gondolat Konyvkiado, 1964), 2 vols., 1, p. 33. (Hereafter referred to
as Hungarian History.)
8. The following narrative is based on Ibid., pp. 33-34.
9. Lajos Mangold, A Magyarok Oknyomozo Tortenete. "The Pragmatic History of the
Hungarians." (Budapest, 1907). Sth. ed.. p. 16. (Hereafter referred to as
Pragmatic History.)
10. In the Russian annals. the Carpathians are called "Hungarian mountains."
Antal Hodinka, Az Orosz Evkonyvek Magyar Vonatkozasai. "The Hungarian
References in the Russian Annals." (Budapest: Magyar Tudomanyos Akademia
Kiadasa, 1916), p. 41. (Hereafter referred to as Annals.)
11. Anonymous, Chronicum Pictum. "Illustrated Chronicle" (Budapest: Magyar
Helikon Kiadas, 1964), pp. 85-86. Photocopy of the original chronicle dated
1358.
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12. It is not clear when the Hungarian-Bulgarian friendship came to an end. In
839. a Hungarian army fought alongside the Bulgarians against the (Greeks; half
a century later, the friendship already had turned to hostility. Molnar,
Hungarian History, p. 36.
13. The army of Levente joined the main forces of Arpad in the MarosTisza
triangle after crossing through Transylvania. Pilch, Hungarian Soldier, p. 12.
The army, which raided the Khazars, could never return. They lived in Persia
around 950, according to Emperor Constantine VII of Byzantium. Mangold,
Pragmatic History, p. 17.
14. C. A. Macartney, Hungary, A Short History (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co.,
1962), p. 9.
15. The sources cite different numbers from 20,000 to 200,000. Here, Mangold's
(Pragmatic History) figures are accepted as the most realistic.
16. Hodinka, Annals, p. 41.
17. Pilch, Hungarian Soldier, pp. 13-14.
18. Molnar, Hungarian History, p. 35.
19. Hans Delbruck, Ceschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der Politischen
Geschichte (Berlin: Georg Stilke Verlag, 1907), 4 vols.,111, p. 79.
20. See pp. 9- 10 above.
21. The following description is based on the Hungarian references of Emperor
Leo Vl (886-911) of Byzantium, Tactica, Chapter XVIII, No. 44-75, published in
Henrik Marczali Dr., A Magyar Tortenet Kutfoinek Kezikonyve. "Handbook of the
Sources of Hungarian History." (Budapest: Athenaeum Irodalmi es Nyomda Rt.
1901), pp. 12-19. (Hereafter referred to as Handbook.)
22. In the year 937, a Hungarian army of 8-10,000 light cavalrymen rode 5,000
miles in ten months. Unmatched achievement in military history, Ferenc Julier,
Magyar Hadvezerek. "Hungarian Warlords." (Budapest: Stadium Rt., 1930), pp.
19-20. (Hereafter referred to as Warlords .)
23. Leo, Tactica, No. 48-50, in Marczali, Handbook, p. 15.
24. Curiously, the use of phalanx formation against invaders from the East was
not considered to be "anti-Christian." See p. 10 above.
25. Leo, Tactica, No. 45, in Marczali, Handbook, p. 15.
26. Hoyt-Chodorow, Middle Ages, pp. 198-199.
27. Viktor Vajna-lstvan Naday, Hadtortenelem. "War History. (Budapest: Stadium,
1935), p. 81.
28. A huge army compared with his predecessor's armies of 500-800 knights.
THE MONGOL INVASION OF l24 l
1. For a concise description of Hungary's history from the conquest of the
Carpathian Basin to the turn of the fourteenth century, see: C. W.
Previte-Orton, The Shorter Cambridge Medieval History (Cambridge:
172
University Press. 1962). 2 vols., 1l, pp. 736-740; also Macartney, Hungary,
pp, 18-36.
2. The Golden Bull may be regarded as the first written constitution of
Hungary. For the text, see: Anthony Komjathy, "Hungarian Jobbagysag in the
Fifteenth Century." in East European Quarterly, Vol. X, No. 1, 1976, pp.
77-111.
3. Balint Homan and Gyula Szekfu. Magyar Tortenet. "Hungarian History."
(Budapest: Kiralyi Magyar Egyetemi Nyomda, 1935), 5 vols., l, p. 210.
4. Ibid., p. 406.
5. Previte-Orton, Cambridge Medieval History, 11, p. 751.
6. Homan-Szekfu. Hungarian History. Map following p. 544.
7. For the attempts of kings Andrew and Bela to find and resettle the Magyars
still living on the banks of the Volga River, see Ibid., pp. 533-536.
8. The statement in this letter is true. The Mongols kept law and order in the
conquered territories and for a yearly tribute offered relative freedom to
their subject people. On the other hand, they burnt the towns and massacred
their populations if they did not capitulate at once. Previte-Orton, Cambridge
Medieval History l1, p. 752.
9. Pope Gregory IX urged a great alliance to rescue Hungary, but "Emperor
Frederick, now busily engaged in conquering the Papal States in Italy, refused
to be deflected." The French and English kings followed his example. Steven
Runciman, A History of the Crusades (Cambridge: University Press, 1955), 3
vols., 111, p. 253.
10. See p. 15 above.
11. Vajna-Naday, Warhistory, p. 89.
12. Homan-Szekfu, Hungarian History, 1, pp. 538-539.
13. The chronicles and other sources of contemporary writers exaggerate the
number of Mongols and mention huge (sometimes half-a-million) numbers of
Tatars. Taking into consideration the road conditions of the Carpathian passes
in wintertime, and the speed at which the Mongol armies crossed, makes the
above numbers a realistic maximum. See also: Vajna-Naday. Warhistory, pp.
98-99.
14. Previous examples: the Huns, Avars, Magyars.
15. The reasoning that they could not cross the Danube River before it froze
over is simply ridiculous.
16. The Crusades of King Thibaud of Navarre in 1239 and Richard of Cornwall in
1240. James A. Brundage, The Crusades, A Documenrary Survey (Milwaukee,
Wisconsin: The Marquette University Press, 1962), pp. 232-233.
17. See above, 2n.
18. Dr. Gyula Erdelyi, A Magyarok Hadmuveszete. "Art of War of the Hungarians."
(Budapest: Konyv es Lapuzem, 1933), p. 138. (Hereafter referred to as Art of
War.)
19. Ibid., p. 139.
20. Ibid., p. 142.
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21. Vajna-Naday, Warhistory, p. 116. Jobbagylot was a measurement of land. On
an average it equalled 40 medieval English acres. It provided a livelihood for
a peasant family. Komjathy. "Hungarian Jobbagysag". in East European Qarterly,
X, 1, p. 107n.
22. Erdelyi. Art of War, pp. 144-145.
23. Vajna-Naday. Warhistory, p. 125. The Western European armies were still
small feudal-type armies. For example. in the last battle of the Hundred Years.
War at Bordeaux (1453). the French mustered 8.000. the English only 6,000
soldiers. Fuller, Military History, 1, p. 496.
24. Only 10,000 Hungarians fought in the Battle of Varna (1444). Vajna-Naday,
Warhistory, p. 125. The campaign of 1463-64 against the Turks was fought with
15-26,000 Soldiers. Pilch, Hungarian Soldier, I, p. 144
JANOS HUNYADI, CHAMPION OF CHRISTENDOM
I . The Turks occupied Constantinople in 1453, besieged, although without
success, Nandorfejevar (Belgrade} in 1456, conquered the principality of Serbia
in 1459, and raided Hungarian territories from that time on.
2. Ernst Breisach, Renaissance Europe 1300-1517 (New York: Macmillan Co.,
1972), p. 205.
3. Ibid., p. 203.
4. George Podebrady in Bohemia (1457-1471), Mathias l. Corvinus in Hungary
(1458- 1490).
5. Homan-Szekfu, Hungarian History, 11, p. 404. The number seems to be an
exaggerated figure.
6. For the military clauses of the Law of 1439, see p. 22 above.
7. Elemer Malyusz (ed.), Zsigmond-Kori Okleveltar (Documents of Sigismund's
Era) (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1958), 2 parts. Part II, Vol. II. Doc. No.
7135.
8. The familiaris was different from the vassal known in Western-type
feudalism. He hired himself out as a soldier, but kept his noble privileges and
rights. For further details, see: Anthony Komjathy, "Hungarian Jobbagysag in
the 15th Century," in East European Quarterly, X, 1, pp. 77-111.
9. The following description of Hunyadi's career is based on Homan-Szekfu,
Hungarian History, II, pp. 432-433.
10. According to Major-General Dr. Ilie Ceausescu, The Entire People's War for
the Homeland's Defense With the Romanians (Bucharest: Military Publishing
House, 1980), pp. 8, 37, 72. 83 passim, 349, 362., lancu of Hunedoara was "a
great Romanian army commander." Ceausescu omits Hunyadi's real name and role as
Hungarian magnate, regent and Commander in Chief of the Hungarian Army. He
meticulously follows the demands of Marxism-Leninism, as well
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as the requirements of the new Romanian chauvinistic. communist nationalism.
but frequently loses sight of historical truth. Therefore his interpretation is
below scholarly standards and cannot be accepted or used as reference.
11 . See pp. 21 . 23 above.
12. The abstract of Hunyadi's proposed law is in Homan-Szekfu. Hungarian
History. 11. pp. 448-449.
13. Molnar. Hungarian History, 1 p. 127.
14. Homan-Szekfu. Hungarian History. 11, p. 456.
15. With his departure the king practically voided the noble insurrection,
since the nobles were obliged to join only if the king personally led the army.
As a result. very few of the lesser nobles joined Hunyadi and the king's royal
army under Hunyadi's command numbered only 20.000.
16. They were Janos Korogyi. Raynald Rozgonyi and Laszlo Kanizsai. Their
estates were already occupied or threatened by the Turkish army advancing to
the Hungarian frontiers.
17. Antal Por, Hunyadi Janos Budapest: Szent 1stvan Tarsulat, (1873), p.292.
18. Previte-Orton. Cambridge Medieval History 11. p. 1009. stated that
Hunyadi's "peasant troops were inspired by .... Capistrano." However,
Capistrano was not only a preacher, but also the commander of the crusaders
whom he recruited. On the other hand, the bulk of Hunyadi's army was not this
peasant crusader group. but professional soldiers.
19. The description of the battle of Nandofejervar has been omitted from the
standard works of military history, even in Hungary. Without exploring the
reasons for this omission. a short, general description of the battle is given
here to show that it provides many precious lessons for the military leaders of
every nation at all times.
HUNGARIAN RENAISSANCE WARFARE
1. Homan-Szekfu;. Hungarian History, ll, p. 406.
2. The Hunyadi estates included 28 forts, 57 cities. nearly 1.000 villages and
over 58 million acres. Ibid.. Table facing p. 432.
3. Due to the Turkish occupation of Hungary almost a century later. historians
judge Mathias grand strategy from this point of view. Some of them blame
Mathias for not concentrating all of his efforts on the Turkish danger and for
"let himself be drawn into an ever widening circle of campaigns in the Lands of
the Bohemian Crown and Austria.". Macartney. Hungary. p. 58. Others tried to
find excuses for him and interpret his Bohemian and Austrian campaigns as part
of a great design. According to this interpretation. Mathias wanted to secure
for himself the resources of those two countries first, then with the combined
strength of all of his domains, defeat the Turkish forces once and for all.
Vajna-Naday. Warhistory, p. 122. Professor Szekfu;
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does not feel that Mathias should be condemned for his preoccupation with
Bohemia and Austria. According to his interpretation, Mathias was a the
renaissance ruler whose aim was simply to increase his own power as Hungarian
king. While the possession of the Austrian and Bohemian crown secured respect
and reputation for him throughout all of Europe, the reconquest of the Balkans
(for which his forces were not sufficient) would have given him control only
over an uncivilized, remote land. Homan-Szekfu, Hungarian History, 11, pp.
476-478.
4. Jeno Ronai-Horvath, Magyar Hadi Kronika. "Hungarian War Chronicle."
(Budapest: Military Science Department of the Hungarian Academy of Science,
1895-1897), 4 vols., 111, p. 308.
5. Oman, Art of War, pp. 91, 129.
6. Vajna-Naday, Warhistory, p. 39.
7. Oman, Art of War, p. 155.
8.Vajna-Naday, Warhistory. p. 40; Courtlandt Canby, A History of Weaponry
(London: Recontre and Edito Service, 1960), p. 62.
9. See pp. 22 above.
10. Vajna-Naday, Warhistory, p. 121.
11. Calculated on the basis of Ibid.
12. Ronai-Horvath, War Chronicle, III, p. 298.
13. Quoted in Homan-Szekfu, Hungarian History, 11, p. 482.
MILITARY THEORETICIAN AND GENERAL: COUNT ZRINYI
1. Quoted in Mangold, Pragmatic History, p. 232.
2. Lennart Torstensson was the generalissimo of the Swedish forces in
Pomerania. In 1645, he invaded Bohemia and in the battle of Jankow opened the
road to Vienna. Unable to exploit his victory and crippled by gout, he was
forced to resign his command. For details, see: J. Feil, Torstensson before
Vienna (New York: C. H. Ludwig, printer, 1855).
3. The most famous mercenary generals serving in the Thirty Years' War were:
Johann Tilly and Albrecht Wallenstein. Following their strategic principles,
the Habsburg army remained unchanged under the command of Generalissimo
Raimondo Montecuccoli. For a short review of Gustavus Adolphus'art of war,
see: Richard A. Preston and Sidney F. Wise, Men in Arms. A History of Warfare
and its Interrelationships with Western Society (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1979). Fourth printing, pp. 110-113.
4. Pilch, Hungarian Soldier, I, pp. 329-330.
5. Ibid., p. 33l.
6. The following paragraph is based on Zrinyi's pamphlet entitled: "To the
Best General," quoted in Ibid., pp. 330-333.
7. Mangold, Pragmatic History, p. 237.
8. Robert A. Kann, A History of the Habsburg Empire I S26-1918
176
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), p. 64. (Hereafter referred
to as Habsburg Empire.)
9. Ronai-Horvath, War Chronicle, l1, p. 223, passim.
KURUC WARFARE IN 1703- l711
1. Kann, Habsburg Empire, p. 64
2. John B. Wolf, Louis XIV (New York: W. W. Norton Company, Inc. 1968), pp.
199-212.
3. R. W. Harris, Absolutism and Enlightenment, I C60-1 789 (New York: Harper
& Row. Publishers, 1966), p. 36. (Hereafter referred to as Absolutism.)
4. See p. 41 above.
5. Molnar, Hungarian History, I, p. 274.
6. Ibid.
7. Wolf, Louis XIV, pp. 219-227.
8. Ibid., pp. 235-236.
9. The Hungarian rebels called themselves Kuruc, the "magyarized" form of the
German Kreuzfahrer, Crusader. Their enemies were the "Germans," i.e., the
Habsburgs, and the Labanc, those Hungarians who supported the Habsburgs.
10. Two agreements were drawn up. The first in 1675; the second in 1677
coordinated the French and Hungarian attack to be launched simultaneously in
1678.
11. Homan-Szekfu, Hungarian History, IV., p. 197. The Turkish-Russian War
ended in 1681.
12. Ibid., pp. 222-223.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., p. 229.
15. Harris, Absolutism, p. 200.
16. Molnar, Hungarian History, 1. pp. 295-297.
17. See pp. 39-40 above.
18. The best sources for Rakoczi's life are his own Confessions and Memoires,
both written in French during his exile in Turkey and in the years 1716-1719.
The full text of both works were published in: Rakoczi, Ferenc, Vallomasok,
Emlekiratok. "Confessions, Memoires." (Budapest: Szepirodalmi Konyvkiado,
1979), (Hereafter referred to as Memoires.) written in Hungarian. More easily
accessible for Western researchers, Kopeczi, Bela (ed.). 11. Rakoczi, Ferenc
Fejedelem emlekiratai. "Memoires of Prince Ferenc Rakoczi II." (Budapest:
Akademiai Konyvkiado, 1978), which also contains the French text.
I9. Rakoczi, Memoires, pp. 299-300.
20. Ibid., p. 299.
2l. See p. 45 above.
22. Rakoczi, Memoires, p. 302.
23. The Turkish authorities persecuted the Catholic clergy, who were
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regarded as agents of the Habsburgs, but tolerated the Protestant preachers.
The Catholic clergymen were either eliminated or escaped from the Turkish
occupied Hungary. The population, left without spiritual leaders. willingly
accepted the directions of Protestant preachers.
24. Church tax: one tenth of the products, yearly paid for the Church.
25. Rakoczi, Memoires, p. 325.
26. Mangold, Pragmatic History, p. 254.
27. Molnar, Hungarian History, 1, p. 299.
28. Rakoczi, Memoires, p. 325.
29. Ibid., p. 327.
30. Ibid.
31. Wolf, Emergence, p. 173.
CHAPTER II.
CHAPTER III.
CHAPTER IV.
CHAPTER V
CHAPTER VI.