A Case Study on Trianon

Bleyer's pleas fell on deaf ears, partly because Friedrich's was only a caretaker government without broad support. Thus, as Admiral Horthy, soon to become regent of Hungary, rode into Budapest at the head of his troops, the minority problem still rankled, and the Burgenland crisis was as acute as ever. Hungary refused to vacate the area, Austria lacked the strength to seize it, and the Entente temporized, fearing a crisis in an already volatile region.

After Horthy's power seizure, the Burgenland impasse gained instant attention. Hungary's external difficulties defied resolution either through diplomacy or by force. It appeared far more profitable to influence events by applying selective domestic remedies. The Burgenland controversy could be amenable to such an indirect solution. Accordingly, Prime Minister Karoly Huszar decided to eliminate what seemed to be a mere technical obstacle to a Hungarian-German entente, by appeasing the Germans. Huszar agreed to activate the Nationality Law through enabling decrees. The first act aimed at the violations in the minority school system, but attempted to please everyone, while hidden caveats and complexities plagued the law's proper application and execution. As in the past, Hungarian or Magyarized officials sabotaged the regulations. The other Ministries took nearly one year to issue their enabling laws, and none brought the Germans closer to their ethnic goals. By the end of 1920, growing Hungarian opposition to concessions left the Hungarian authorities little choice but to interpret the minority legislation in the more conservative spirit of the 1868

Nationality Act.³⁷ Grievances by non-Hungarian citizens were adjudicated on individual merit, but complaints tendered by minority groups were frowned upon.

Complaints poured into Bleyer's Ministry and to the editorial offices of the Neue Post. Most involved abuse of German minority education rights by clerics, teachers, notaries, and intimidation of parents' conferences in rural constituencies. Bleyer frequently petitioned the Minister of Education for corrective measures, but rarely instigated redress or violations.³⁸ Conservative Hungarian governments apparently had no more intentions of relinquishing Hungarian hegemony than the radicals had. The Germans' oft-repeated slogan that Hungarian patriotism had less to do with proficiency in the Hungarian language than with observing the supranational spirit of St. Stephen, Hungary's medieval Westernizer, found no acceptance in government circles or among the Hungarian public.

Mutual misunderstandings plagued attempts by Bleyer and the government to gain the support of Burgenland's Germans. Notwithstanding the fiasco of the Nationality Law, the government sought to woo Germans with other impressive-sounding programs. The Hungarians even outbid Bleyer, his followers, and his German opponents, by proposing some sort of self-government in Burgenland. Aspirations for German autonomy in the conservative era dated back to 26 August 1919, when a Bleyer antagonist, Dr. Guido Gundisch, demanded political autonomy for Burgenland. Bleyer and the Neue Post termed proponents of self-government unpatriotic. Unfortunately, scant communication, if any, existed between Bleyer and the rest of the cabinet, including the Prime Minister, who released an autonomy plan of his own. On 14 February 1920, Huszar proposed a plebiscite for Burgenland. If the Germans remained with Hungary, they would receive self-government. Huszar's offer was ill-timed and counterproductive. Few Burgenlanders believed him, the Austrians scoffed, and Bleyer, who had only recently condemned autonomy in any guise, lost face.

By bungling his autonomy card, Huszar encouraged a spate of German proposals on the status of Burgenland. On 1 August 1920, Huber delivered a speech in Parliament, which reiterated Huszar's earlier demand for a plebiscite, but, like Bleyer, he rejected autonomy. In Huber's view, there had to be a compromise between the two extremes of denying the vote to anyone not fluent in Hungarian,

and a Karolyi-type of autonomy plan, which was tantamount to nationalistic agitation.³⁹ In less than four months' time, Huber changed his mind. On 9 November 1920, supported by his Swabian Christian Social caucus in Parliament, he unveiled an autonomy plan for Burgenland through the Pester Zeitung. Austria and Hungary would negotiate a territorial settlement on the basis of an autonomous Burgenland, which would remain an integral part of Hungary. Austria's economic interests would be safeguarded, and in deference to the sensitive strategic position of Vienna, only local militia would be stationed in the demilitarized province. This ill-considered proposal once again revealed the gap between Germans and their government. Apart from the fact that the daily press was not the place for launching a new plan on a sensitive issue during a period of crisis, Huber and his colleagues were private citizens, and hence could not speak for the government. The embarrassed Bleyer, still at the time Minister of Nationalities, failed to sign the manifesto, although he claimed to approve the plan because his trusted friend and collaborator, the diplomat Gustav Gratz, found it acceptable.⁴⁰

Still loyal to Hungary, Bleyer had to resign his portfolio as Minister of Nationalities on 16 December 1920, but he issued a position paper before that on the nationality question. In his view, the recent upheavals had created a new national awareness among Hungary's minorities. Consequently, the government could no longer pacify them with mere bagatelles. The Hungarians would have to decide soon if they really wanted to regain their lost peoples and territories and maintain their grip on those still wavering.⁴¹

At year's end, in a crisis atmosphere, the new Pal Teleki government resumed Huszar's pacification efforts in Burgenland. The Peace Conference was deliberating on what action to initiate in view of Hungary's refusal to vacate the disputed region, and Hungary's chances of retaining the area were steadily diminishing. On 16 November 1920, Teleki declared in Parliament that Hungary's minorities would be offered cultural and administrative opportunities. The government would establish three levels of ethnic autonomy: communal self-government with unrestricted use of non-Hungarian tongues; this plan would apply anywhere in Hungary where non-Hungarian majorities resided; district (jaras) self-government in jurisdictions with sufficient numbers of uni-lingual non-Hungarian communities; and county self-government was to apply wherever

non-Hungarians composed a clear majority of the population. The last was to sway Burgenlanders in Hungary's favor. Indeed, this was welcome news to the harassed Germans.⁴²

During the first week of 1921, Hungary was ordered to cede Burgenland to Austria forthwith. The Allied Note triggered the last of many major schemes to secure Burgenland for Hungary under the guise of autonomy. The author of this audacious April plan was none other than Bleyer, who had the tacit support of Prime Minister Istvan Bethlen. It followed on the heel of a series of setbacks for both the Hungarians and the pro-Hungarian Germans. A Habsburg restoration attempt by ex-King Charles IV had been only recently averted, leaving Austria more suspicious and resentful than ever about Hungary's aims and purposes. Bleyer's March visit to Germany at Hungary's behest had misfired. Bleyer had sought German support in Burgenland. A delegation composed of Hungary's German parliamentary contingent returned home from Vienna empty-handed after discussing the fate of Burgenland with Mayr. The Chancellor rejected any solution that would have left the region under Hungarian control. Bleyer wanted to indoctrinate and organize Burgenland's Germans for the impending November parliamentary elections. Hopefully, the people would vote for Bleyer's handpicked pro-Hungarian candidates. Hungarian troops would depart, and be replaced by "reliable" Burgenland detachments. These "civic guards" would prevent Austrian forces from occupying Burgenland, which would then be incorporated into Hungary as a German autonomous region. Although official Hungarian communique's rejected West Hungarian autonomy, important Hungarians in and out of government supported the scheme.⁴³

West Hungarian Germans' support for Hungary was not consistent. Their traditional loyalties gradually eroded in favor of association with fellow Germans in neighboring Austria. The victorious powers arbitrarily transferred most Burgenlanders to Austria, yet most Germans desired to join Austria only during the Karolyi and Kun interludes. Throughout Friedrich's tenure, and especially after Horthy's conservative forces swept into office at the end of 1919, German public opinion shifted sharply toward Hungary. Czechoslovakia's Corridor Plan, which would have created a common Czechoslovak-Yugoslav frontier in the heart of Burgenland, infuriated the Germans. They refused to become either Czech or Yugoslav subjects. The Germans were exasperated with the Hungarians

and many distrusted Austrian motives, but they all feared the Czechs, and despised the Yugoslavs. The Hungarian German press publicized Austria's betrayal of Hungary, a wartime comrade-in-arms, hoping to dent the Germans' Austrian preferences.⁴⁴

Sopron's Mayor, Michael Thurner, a vocal German Hungarophile, unceasingly urged his German fellow citizens to spurn Austria and remain true to Hungary. Thurner ventured that, under Austrian rule, West Hungary would atrophy and die. Germans wanted to maintain their ethnic identity, but only in Hungary, and they wished no part of Austria.⁴⁵ Thurner apparently struck a responsive chord in the Germans, at least in the more sophisticated "Magyarones" residing in Sopron and other West Hungarian urban centers. This, and fears that the Czech Corridor Plan might be revived despite Allied rejection in March of 1919, united West Hungary's Hungarian and German-speaking inhabitants in righteous indignation against the "godless" Austrian "half-Communist" regime, and its leader, the "anti-Christ" Renner.⁴⁶

Count Kuno Klebelsberg, a Magyarized German of partial Austrian parentage, parliamentary representative of Sopron, and future minister of education and religion under Bethlen, confidently spoke for his constituency, a good half of whom were Germans. The eleven-member German parliamentary contingent issued its own statement defying Austria on 11 February 1920, in a spirit echoing Thurner's earlier sentiments.⁴⁷ Several months later, Klebelsberg warned Austria that the Hungarians and Germans would gladly fight Austria for West Hungary.⁴⁸

By early 1921, the hysteria concerning the Corridor Plan had subsided, and the Germans had experienced life in conservative-dominated Hungary over a protracted period. They became far more receptive to Austria. In his dispatches to the Wilhelmstrasse, Count Egon von Furstenberg, Germany's Minister in Budapest, perhaps exaggerated when he claimed that Hungary's recent ethnic persecutions had engendered a great change of heart among West Hungary's Germans. In his view, Burgenland's parliamentary contingent, though formerly loyal to Hungary, now favored Austria. Even Bleyer had allegedly lost heart and wished to retire. Other sources concurred. The Austrian legation in Budapest, for example, reported that Burgenlanders now hoped for an Anschluss with Austria in order to become German citizens. They apparently believed in an imminent German-Austrian fusion.⁴⁹

On the eve of the plebiscite, Hungary's treatment of Burgenland's Germans had indeed deteriorated. German-speaking Hungarians were disturbed by press reports revealing gross neglect in their minority schools. For decades, the Germans of Hungary had enjoyed the highest literacy level in the nation. This hegemony was now clearly in danger. German leaders called on Prime Minister Bethlen, assured him of their loyalty to Hungary, but regretted the frustration and diminished prospects of Hungary's German minority. They demanded the immediate implementation of the existing minority laws, especially in education, administration, and justice, and solicited Bethlen's protection against the arbitrary obstruction of the statutes by local officials. Bethlen blandly reassured the delegation.⁵⁰ About the same time, nine German members of Parliament for Western Hungary tendered a memorandum to the Interallied Military Mission in Sopron, protesting West Hungary's unjust cession to Austria.⁵¹

But the non-Magyarized German intelligentsia remained just as true to the Crown of St. Stephen as their Magyarized brethren, even while deploring the anti-German prejudice and shortsightedness of the Hungarian establishment and public. They hoped that nationalistic passions would eventually subside, and Hungarian-German amity would resume. These unassimilated German leaders welded aggressive ethnic nationalism with Hungarian patriotism. They urged Burgenlanders to remain loyal to Hungary. But they also feared that losing some 300,000 West Hungarian Germans to Austria would weaken the German cause in Hungary. The remaining Germans would be isolated from the German-speaking world, and be submerged in the Hungarian multitude.⁵² Hence, partly for patriotic reasons as Hungarians, and partly for the sake of long-range German preservation, a small but decisive majority of Germans in the Sopron area heeded the pleas of their leaders, and in the eleventh hour threw their support behind Hungary.⁵³

The Sopron plebiscite demonstrated that, under certain conditions, nationalism may be restrained by countervailing forces. A formidable trinity-the assimilated and the non-assimilated German intelligentsia, and Hungary's conservative government, supported loyally by both German elements, wielded greater influence over the majority of the population than either pro-German sentiments engendered by the war, or Austrian propaganda. These leaders were grounded in the royal-imperial Habsburg tradition, and never

flagged in their devotion to that authority. Austria had turned republican, with no hopes of a Habsburg restoration. But Horthy retained the monarchy, and Hungary thereupon became the hope of all royalists.⁵⁴ The German intelligentsia in Hungary counseled fidelity to the Crown of St. Stephen as a matter of patriotic regard for the House of Habsburg. Had either Karolyi or Kun remained in power, the German leaders' devotion to the Hungarian State might not have survived their German loyalties. This contest pitted German ethnic nationalism against Habsburg dynastic patriotism. Economic considerations, blown out of proportion by both parties to the dispute, merely obscured the nature of the real struggle.

Notes

1. Actually nine: Agfalva (Agendorf), Balf (Wolfs), Harka (Harkau), Ferto-Boz (Holling), Ferto-Rakos (Kroisbach), Kophaza (Kohlenhof), Nagyczenk (Gr. Zinkendorf), Sopron-Banfalva (Wandorf), and Brennberg, but the last belonged administratively to Sopron, and its vote was included in Sopron's results.

2. Magyar Kiralyi Kozponti Statisztikai Hivatal, Magyar statisztikai kozlemenyek. Az 1920. evi nepszamlalas (Budapest, 1924), pp. 296-97.

3. 17,318 Germans vs. 15,022 Magyars in 1910; 16,911 Germans vs. 17,166 Magyars in 1920 in Sopron; 9,983 Germans vs. 2,369 Magyars in the rural communities in 1920. Census of 1910, ibid. (Budapest, 1912), pp. 44-45; Andrew F. Burghardt, Borderland. A Historical and Geographical Study of Burgenland, Austria (Madison, Wisc., 1962), p. 155.

4. Sarah Wambaugh, Plebiscites Since the World War I (Washington, D. C., 1933), pp. 291-93; Katalin Soos, Burgenland az europai politikaban 1918-1921 (Budapest, 1971), pp. 161-64.

5. Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hungarian Peace Negotiations I (Budapest, 1921), p. 516ff. Also see Burghardt, Borderland, pp. 176-178. Ludmilla Schlereth, Die politische Entiwicklung des Ungarlandischen Deutschtums wahrend der Revolution 1918-1919 (Munich, 1939), p. 63, maintains that the Germans remained faithful to Hungary even during the Kun era.

6. For a more thorough coverage, see Thomas Spira, German-Hungarian Relations and the Swabian Problem from Karolyi to Gombos 1919-1936 (New York, 1977), especially chapters 2 and 4.

7. The Austrian viewpoint was corroborated by Professor A.C. Coolidge's factfinding reports. See Jon D. Berlin, ed., Akten und Dokumente des Aussenamtes (State Department) der USA zur Burgenland Anschlussfrage 1919-1920 (Eisenstadt. 1977), Doc. 10, January' 29, 1919,

p. 42, among others. For a detailed economic account in Austria's favor, see Major Lawrence Martin to A.C. Coolidge, ibid., Doc. 12, February 28, 1919, p. 44ff. Also see Elizabeth de Weiss, "Dispute for the Burgenland in 1919," Journal of Central European Affairs, III (1943), p. 157; Wambaugh, Plebiscites, I, pp. 274-75: Jon D. Berlin, "The United States and the Burgenland, 1918-1920," Austrian History Yearbook, 8 (1972), pp. 39-58.

8. Karl Gottfried Hugelmann, "Deutsch-Osterreich und seine Grenzzgebiete," in Karl von Loesch and Max Hildebert Boehm, eds., Grenzdeutschland seit Versailles (Berlin, 1930), p. 341. Even a Hungarian observer noted subsequently that Burgenland's population enjoyed far more meaningful economic ties with Austria than with Hungary. See Bela Beller, Az ellenforradalom nemzetisegi politikajanak kialakulasa (Budapest, 1975), p. 97.

9. Hungarian Peace Negotiations I, p. 516ff.; Pester Zeitung, January 19, 1921; de Weiss, "Dispute," p. 147; Lajos Remenyi, Kulkereskedelempolitika Magyarorszagon 1919-1924 (Budapest, 1969), p. 76, note 129; pp. 80-1; F. L. Carsten, Revolution in Central Europe 1918-1919 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1972), p. 285; H. W. V. Temperley, ed., A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, IV (London, 1921), pp. 383-84. These arguments were proffered by Hungarian Foreign Minister Count Csaky during his first meeting with the Austrians on February 23, 1921. Dezso Ujvary, ed., Papers and Documents Relating to the Foreign Relations of Hungary, II (Budapest, 1946), doc. 143, pp. 136-37; Gustav Gratz's statement before the sixth meeting on May 25, 1921, ibid. doc. 449, pp. 481-96; the statement of Rudolf Patzenhofer, a sugar refinery owner of Zinkendorf, and Siegfried Spiegel, president of the Sopron Chamber of Commerce, before the third meeting on February 24, 1921, doc. 151, pp. 158-62; Hungarian Minister in Vienna Szilard Masirevics to Chancellor Schober, note, August 4, 1921, with Memo, "Odenburg und Umgebung," doc. 678, pp. 686-92.

10. Jakob Bleyer, "A hazai nemetseg kerdesehez," Budapest Szemle (July 1917), p. 4.

11. Jakob Bleyer, "An die Deutschungarn," Neue Post (NP), October 25, 1918.

12. NP, November 3, 1918. See Hedwig Schwind. Jakob Bleyer. Ein Vorkampfer und Erwecker des ungarlandischen Deutschtums (Munich, 1960), pp. 57-72. on Bleyer's activities in the Volksrat.

13. NP, November 10, 1918.

14. "Deutschungarn, rasche Organisation!" ibid., November 12, 1918.

15. Ibid., November 16, 19, and 20, 1918.

16. Ibid., November 21 and 24, and December 22, 1918.

17. Laszlo Koncsek, "A becsi es Sopron megyei ellenforradalom kapcsolatai 1919-ben," Soproni Szemle, 10(1956), p. 107. Also see C.A. Macartney, Hungary and her Successors (London, 1937), p. 50.

18. Johannes Huber, "Was trennt uns von Herrn Brandsch?" NP, November 9, 1918, Also see issue of January 11, 1919.

19. The provisions of the law are listed in Orszagos Leveltar, Miniszter Tanacs, January 27, 1919, point 67, The Pester Lloyd, January 4, 1919 and the NP, January 30, 1919, published the full German text, Also see Budapesti Hirlap, January 25, 1919, and "Was sagt Professor Bl[eyer]?" Deutsches Tageblatt, February 13, 1919.

20. NP, January 30, February 1, and March 12, 1919; "Christen, zur Rettung der Kindenseelen," ibid., March 7, 1919.

21. Pester Lloyd, April 29, 1919.

22. "Heftige Kampfe in Westungarn. Eine Denkschrift der Heinzen an den steirischen Landtag," Reichspost, June 12, 1919. Austria's Socialist government feared that the Hungarian Marxist regime might instigate a bolshevik revolt in Austria. See Viktor Reimann, Zu gross fur Osterreich,. Seipel und Bauer um Kampf um die Erste Republik (Vienna. Frankfurt, and Zurich, 1968), pp. 315-24; G. Katalin Soos, "Adalekok a Magyar Tanacskoztarsasag es az Osztrak Koztarsasag kapcsolatainak tortenetehez," Soproni Szemle, 13 (1959), pp. 289-304, Also see Otto Bauer's explanation of why Austria deserted Kun. Die Osterreichische Revolution (Vienna. 1923), pp. 156-57.

23. Law XXVI, paragraph 2, provisional constitution, April 2, 1919, cited In S. Gabor, ed., A magyar munkasmozgalom valogatott dokumentumai (MMTVD), VI (6 vols., Budapest, 1956-69), pp. 100-101; and "A nyugatmagyarorszagi nemetek a szovjetallamban," Soproni Voros Ujsag, April 30, 1919.

24. Budapesti Kozlony, March 24, 1919; Law XLI, April 7, 1919, is listed In B. Halasz, I. Kovacs, and V. Peschka, eds., A Magyar Tanacskoztarsasag jogalkotasa (Budapest, 1959), p. 86.

25. School nationalization Law XXIV, April 1, 1919, cited in MMTVD, VI, p. 73; School order no. 87039, May 5, 1919, "Instruction to Insure the Undisturbed Continuance of Education," cited in K. Petrak and Gy. Milei, eds., A M. T. K. szocialpolitikaja. Valogatott rendeletek, documentumok es cikkek (Budapest, 1959), pp. 2, 31-35. Also see "Az uj iskola," Voros Ujsag, April 3, 1919. Order XCI of the Revolutionary Governing Council, May 14, 1919, is listed in MMTVD, VI, p. 482: Order no.28 of the Commissar of Education, May 12,1919, is listed in Jeno Pongracz, ed., A Forradalmi Kormanyzotanacs es a nepbiztosok rendeletei, 111(5 vols., Budapest, 1919), pp. 21-23, 104-105.

26. Law XXIV, April 1, 1919 is cited in Petrak and Milei, M. T. K., p. 1, and MMTVD, VI, p. 73. Vilma Bresztovszky, "A tortenelem az uj iskolaban," Faklya, April 29, 1919; Gyula Krudy, "Uj tortenelmet kell irni," Magyarorszag, April 6, 1919; Zsigmond Kunfi, "A vallas szabad gyakorlasa," Nepszava, April 18, 1919; "A tanitok atkepzese," ibid., July 1, 1919. Also see Kun's speech before the National Party Congress, June 12-13,

1919, Bela Kun, Valogatott irasok es beszedek, H. Vass, I. Friss, and E. Szabo. eds., 1(2 vols., Budapest, 1966), p. 107.

27. Halasz, et al., A Magyar tanacskoztarsasag, p. 71; F. Eckelt, "The Internal Policies of the Hungarian Soviet Republic," Ivan Volgyes, ed., Hungary in Revolution 1918-1919 (Lincoln, Nebr., 1971), p. 101; Katalin Gulya, "Die Westungarische Frage nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg," Osterreichische Osthefte. 8 (1966), pp. 91-93.

28. "Die Autonomie der Deutschen," Volksstimme. August 5, 1919; Budapesti Kozlony, August 15, 1919, August 1 and 16, 1919. Law I. paragraph 6, cited in Budapesti Kozlony, February 29, 1920, pp. 1-2. On the Peidl and Friedrich regimes, see Bela Beller. "Az ellenforradalmi rendszer elso eveinek nemzetisegi politikaja (1919-1922)," Szazadok, 6 (1963), p. 1279ff.

29. "A nemzeti kisebbsegek rniniszteriumanak nyilatkozata." Budapesti Kozlony, August 17, 1919, p. 6.

30. See Spira, German-Hungarian Relations, p. 38; Arpad Torok, "Jakob Bleyer als Nationalititenminister," Jakob Bleyer als Nationalitatenminister. Denkschrift fur Jakob Bleyer (Berlin and Leipzig, 1934), pp. 40-43. Describes Bleyer's attempts at home and abroad to assure Burgenland's incorporation into Hungary.

31. Orszagos Leveltar. Miniszterelnokseg (OL ME) 1919, XXII 5768.

32. See text in Budapesti Kozlony, November 19, 1919; NP, November 23, 1919; Volksstimme, November 20, 1919.

33. Spira, German-Hungarian Relations. pp. 39-42.

34. OL ME 1919, XXII 5440.

35. Paragraph 16 of the Nationality Law made this quite plain. Budapesti Kozlony. November 19.1919.

36. OL ME 1920. (XLII) a 8634. meeting of October 2, 1919.

37. Law 209494-1919.B.II. "A nemzeti kisebbsegek nepoktatasugye," Budapesti Kozlony. December 28, 1919; NP, January 11,1920.

38. Hans Eninger. "Die Rechte der nationalen Minderheiten," NP, May 4, 1920; NP, May 4,1920; NP, January 23, 1920; Budapesti Kozlony. January 11, 14, and 23, and November 28, 1920.

39. "Das Treiben der Gruppe Gundisch und Comp.," NP, November 25, 1919; "Ein Protest der westungarischen Abgeordneten." ibid., February 5, 1920; "Fine ehrliche Nationalitatenpolitik auf christliche Grundlage," ibid.. July 14, 1920; "Die Treue der nationalen Minderheiten zum ungarischen Vaterland," ibid., July 31, 1920; "Die Losung der Nationalitatenfrage. Protest gegen die Losreitzung Westungarns." ibid., August 1, 1920.

40. Auswartiges Amt. Politische Abteilung (AA PA), IIb, Pol. 6, Osterreich-Ungarn, Bd.I, Furstenberg to Foreign Ministry, dispatch of 17 January 1921: "Vorschlag zur Losung der westungarischen Frage," Pester Zeitung, November 9, 1920.

41. "Die Verdienste des Ministeriums der nationalen Minderheiten," NP, October 23, 1920,

42. "Regierungserklarungen uber die Nationalitatenpolitik," and "Altungarische Nationalitatenpolitik," Pester Zeitung, November 16, 1920; "Politische Nachrichten," ibid., November 28, 1920.

43. See Spira, German-Hungarian Relations, pp. 82-83; Wulf Schmidt-Wulffen, "Das Burgenland und die deutsche Politik 1918-1921," Osterreichische Osthefte, 5 (1969), pp. 270-287, especially pp. 274-275, discusses German and Hungarian intrigues concerning Burgenland. At the end of August 1921, Hungary did withdraw regular troops from Burgenland, and irregulars under Pal Pronay and Ivan Hejjas occupied the region, and on October 4, declared the area to be an independent province called Lajtabansag (Laita-Banat); however, Bleyer and his associates apparently had no role in this abortive undertaking. See Gyula Juhasz, Magyarorszag kulpolitikaja 1919-1945 (Budapest, 1969), pp. 82-83; and a participant's view is found in Paul Szemere and Erich Czech, Die Memoiren des Grafen Tamas von Erdody. Habsburgs Weg von Wilhelm zu Briand. Vom Kurier der Sixtus-Briefe zum Konigsputschisten (Zurich, Leipzig, and Vienna, 1931), especially pp. 184-95 and 264-74,

44. See "Das letzte Wort werden wir sagen," NP, February 24, 1920; Jacques Hannak, Karl Renner und seine Zeit (Vienna, 1965), pp. 387-91.

45. Berlin, Akten und Dokumente, pp. 58-65.

46. "Wir bleiben Deutsche, aber in Ungarn," NP, January 15, 1920; "Westungarn will bei Ungarn bleiben," ibid., January 20, 1920. Gratz to Somssich, report, January 14, 1920, Ujvary, Papers and Documents, I, doc, 75.

47. Also see the statements by Bolgar and Cserny, parliamentary representatives from Sopron and Moson Counties respectively, to Major Lawrence Martin. They claimed that "their German constituents had never expressed the slightest desire to leave Hungary and be united with Austria." Berlin, Akten und Dokumente, pp. 55-58.

48. Orszaggyulesi Naplo, XII (1921), 254th session, August 23, 1921, pp. 616-17.

49. AA PA/IIb. Pol. 6, Osterreich-Ungarn, Bd I, January 8, 1921; Viktor Miltschinsky, Das Verbrechen von Odenburg (Vienna, 1922), passim, recounts Burgenlanders' resistance to incorporation into Hungary at that time.

50. Nikolaus Degenhardt, "Braucht das Volk Kultur oder nicht?" Sonntagsblatt, November 6, 1921; "Selbsthilfe," ibid., October 30, 1921; "Wir halten mit deutscher Treue an dem ungarischen Vaterlande und mit derselben Liebe an unseren Muttersprache," ibid., December 4, 1921.

51. Ujvary, Papers and Documents, II, docs. 692, 692A.

52. Johannes Huber, "Ein Mahnruf an die Deutschen Westungarn," NP, November 20, 1918.

53. Alternately, the Sopron victory can be attributed partly to Allied vacillations, Magyar terrorism, and Austrian Christian Social diffidence, See Karl R. Stadler, "Fifty Troubled Years: The Story of the Burgenland," Austrian History Yearbook, 8 (1972), pp 59-79, citing p. 75. For additional arguments, see Burghardt, Borderland, pp. 185-87.

54. Hannak, Renner, p. 391.

A Case Study on Trianon