A Case Study on Trianon

Connected with notions of quasi-liberal parliamentarianism were, of course, more general traditions of constitutionalism, to which the gentrified elite also remained quite remarkably loyal and devoted. While it is undoubtedly true that the idea of monarchy and the

symbolism of the Holy Crown of St. Stephen had more than a touch of irredentist instrumentalism about them, they also represented a nearly spontaneous revulsion by the "historic classes" against what was viewed as the a-historic and un-Hungarian republicanism, if not worse, of the discredited Karolyi and Kun regimes.⁴⁶ Fear and loathing of demagogic dictatorship, not revanchist ardor or tactical flexibility, reinforced the revival of historic constitutionalism and parliamentarianism during the consolidation period.

Domestic Policy in the 1920's

Not only the institutions and processes, but the actual domestic policies, as well, of the Bethlen regime shed light on the theme of our investigation. Although these latter were also conditioned and constrained by Trianon, they reflected a concern with the restoration of pre-war conditions that was independent of the treaty and its impact.

Industrial and commercial policy under Bethlen, almost malgre lui, brought about an expansion of urbanization, especially in the Budapest area, and the development of light industry. As a result, by the end of the interwar period Hungary had advanced from being a predominantly agricultural country to being at least a semi-industrialized one. Already in the 1920's this process had resulted in the expansion of employment opportunities for the semi-skilled and for women.⁴⁷ But in areas outside of Budapest, at least, this produced no dramatic social change. The proportion of landowners, capitalists (including merchants), and middle strata among the ranks of the largest taxpayers-the so-called virilistak-remained both high and stable from the 1880's until the 1940's.⁴⁸ Given the professed hatred of the extreme rightists for the economic and social privilege of the "historic classes" and the alleged decisive influence of the former on the character of the Bethlen regime, one would have expected a somewhat different distribution in the 1920's. This avoidance of fundamental change in social or economic policy was sustained by the cooptation of right-radical leaders like Miklos Kozma and Gyula Gombos into positions of political visibility or economic influence, coupled with largely symbolic posturing against the injustices of the Treaty of Trianon. In consequence, these disruptive elements were integrated into the Bethlen system and thus sapped of their potency.⁴⁹

Policy toward the peasantry followed the same pattern. While taking pains publicly to extol the virtues of the peasantry-as did subsequent prime ministers-and to stress the political importance of this class, and especially of its leaders like Istvan Nagyatadi Szabo, Bethlen successfully sabotaged the one major effort at land reform introduced during his tenure as prime minister.⁵⁰ In the realm of political relations with the peasantry, Bethlen's regime succeeded in effecting the reduction of the peasantry to its pre-war role of largely passive and accepting spectator of the political process.⁵¹ It accomplished this result by the high-handed introduction in 1922 of an extraordinarily restrictive voting law, one of whose cardinal features was the abolition of the secret ballot in rural districts even for that small proportion of the peasantry permitted to vote.⁵² Once again the bogey man of Trianon was invoked in justification of the lack of real social change. Consequently, the integration of the peasantry into Hungarian society had not even begun until the end of the interwar period, long after Bethlen's consolidation had been secured.⁵³ It is certainly possible to argue that the Hungarian political elite was distracted from domestic economic and social concerns by the perceived evils of the Treaty of Trianon, but this argument rings rather hollow.⁵⁴ Revanchism represented not simply neglect of social concerns, but a conscious rationalization of the retrograde, counter-revolutionary character of the consolidation period. In this respect, at least, Trianon was a means, not a cause.

Conclusion

This brief review of the inter-relationship of the Treaty of Trianon and Hungarian politics in the 1920's, especially during the "consolidation period" of the Bethlen regime, has examined the conventional view that the treaty and its consequences were somehow responsible for the development of the characteristic features of the interwar Hungarian political system. Right-radical excesses against Jews, liberals, democrats; social and political oppression, especially of workers and peasants; authoritarian political institutions and processes; in short, the entire counter-revolution, have all been seen as primarily the product, directly or indirectly, of the vindictive Treaty of Trianon, and of Allied policy in general, of which the treaty was,

of course, a central part. How far has this view been sustained by the analysis presented here?

This examination of the origins of the counter-revolution and its main institutional features-the ideology of the movement, the perceptions of the gentry-dominated bureaucracy, the chief political institutions of the Bethlen regime, the constitutional and parliamentary traditions of the Hungarian political elite, and the main economic and social policies of the Bethlen regime-has demonstrated that the relationship between Trianon and Hungarian domestic politics was at least more tortuous than commonly assumed. Indeed this essay goes even further-it suggests that the responses by Hungarians to the treaty were in significant part the product of the counter-revolution itself.

The revisionism, military adventurism, xenophobia, and so on, identified by many with the essence of the Hungarian political system of the interwar period, were a logical extension of the counter-revolutionary ethos, which antedated Trianon by two years. Once the political-elite, led by Count Bethlen, determined to return Hungary to the domestic status quo ante, or at least a close approximation thereof, an unremitting campaign to extend that notion to the realm of international relations was almost a foregone conclusion.

One may well question the wisdom, justice, morality, or common sense of the counter-revolutionary ethos, particularly in light of Hungary's disastrous involvement in World War II, to which it seemed to lead. But to put the blame for the genesis and development of the counter-revolution on the treaty is to distort history. The Hungarian counter-revolution and its leaders must take the responsibility for both its achievements and its better-known failures, without facile appeals to "Trianon." For right-radical, anti-democratic movements, so closely identified with interwar Hungary, were also characteristic of Successor States that benefited from the treaty or were largely unaffected by it (Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, especially).⁵⁵ It is thus the counter-revolution itself, and the whole complex of social, political, military, economic, and psychological factors that undergirded it, that stand in the dock of history. The Treaty of Trianon cannot be called as a witness for either the prosecution or the defense; it may serve, at best, as an amicus curiae.

Notes

1. Thomas Sakmyster. "Istvan Bethlen and Hungarian Foreign Policy, 1921-1931," Canadian-American Review of Hungarian Studies 5 (Fall 1978):5, 7.

2. For a comprehensive survey of Hungarian foreign policy in the inter-war years, based on the latest available documents, see Gyula Juhasz, Hungarian Foreign Policy, 1919-1945 (Budapest, 1979).

3. Paul Ignotus. Hungary, Nations of the Modern World (New York and Washington: 1972), p. 154. Emphasis supplied.

4. Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars. A History of East Central Europe, Vol. 9 (Seattle and London: 1974), p. 158. The hope for "instant revision" was apparently supplied by Alexandre Millerand and Maurice Paleologue of France, see essay of Anne Orde.

5. Rothschild. p. 166. A Marxist presentation of this view is provided by Laszlo Markus. "A kormanyzati erok a bethleni uralmi koncepcio szolgalataban." Tortenelmi Szemle 19 (1970) 465-80.

6. At least one recent Marxist appears to share this view of the primacy of domestic reaction over treaty revision: Ferenc Poloskei. "Bethlen Istvan torekvesei az ellenforradalmi rendszer konszolidalasara, 1921-1922," Parttorteneti Kozlemenyek 20 (1974):53.

7. Erik Molnar. Ervin Pamlenyi, and Gyorgy Szekely, eds., Magyarorszag tortenete, 2 vols., 2d ed., rev. and enl. (Budapest, 1967), 2:304, and Michael Karolyi, Memoirs of Michael Karolyi-Faith Without Illusion, trans. Catherine Karolyi (New York., 1962), p. 317.

8. The phrase was coined by Max I. Dimont in Jews, God, and History (New York: New American Library. A Signet Book, 1962), p. 317.

9. C. A. Macartney. October Fifteenth-A History of Modern Hungary, 1929-1945, 2 vols., 2d. ed. (Edinburgh, 1961), 1:27.

10. For a right-radical view of the functioning of these parties and groups, see Dr. Odon vitez Malnasi, A magyar nemzet oszinte tortenete (Budapest, 1927). p. 226. For an analysis of the origins of the two "action groups" and details of their social composition. see Tibor Zinner. "Adatok a szelsojobboldali egyesuletek megalakulasanak korulmenyeihez." Tortenelmi Szemle 22 (1979):562-76. A history of MOVE is provided by Rudolf Dosane, A MOVE. Egy jellegzetes magyar fasiszta szervezet, 1918-1944 (Budapest, 1972).

11. For a first-hand account of the creation and functioning of the ABC, see Gusztav Gratz, A forradalmak kora: Magyarorszag tortenete, 1918-1920 (Budapest, 1935). pp. 187-201.

12. The fullest account of the political activity of the Szeged counterrevolutionaries is provided by the one-time interior minister of the Szeged

government, Dr. Bela Kelemen, in Adatok a szegedi ellenforradalom es a szegedi kormany tortenetehez (1919): (Naplojegyzetek es okiratok.) (Szeged, 1923).

13. A succinct summary of the tactics of the National Army in this period is given in Rothschild, p. 152. Evidence of the political power of Horthy's military forces is provided by the following documents: Hungary, Orszagos Leveltar (hereafter O.L.). Belugyminiszterium. A szegedi ellenforradalmi kormany iratai 1919-721, in Dezso Nemes and Elek Karsai, eds., Iratok az ellenforradalom tortenetehez, 5 vols. (Budapest, 1953-), Vol. 1(1953): Az ellenforradalom hatalomrajutasa es remuralma Magyarorszagon 1919-1921, ed. Dezso Nemes, p. 135, and O.L. Miniszterelnokseg biz. 1919-117, in ibid., p. 137.

14. The generally accepted view of the weakness of the Friedrich government, by a sympathetic observer, is given in Gratz, pp. 248-49. An interesting "revisionist" view, contending that Friedrich's was not the first of the counter-revolutionary governments, but the last of the liberal democratic ones in interwar Hungary, is offered by Eva S. Balogh. "Istvan Friedrich and the Hungarian coup d'etat of 1919: A Reevaluation," Slavic Review 35 (June 1976):269-86.

15. The term "retrograde revolution" is taken from Ignotus, p. 154, Bethlen himself appears to have rejected the view offered here of the relationship between foreign and domestic policy when he stated that the "prerequisite for a correct foreign policy is a correct domestic policy": quoted in Sakmyster, p. 8. But there is no compelling reason to think that this statement reflects anything more than a recognition of the interpenetration of domestic political factors and the conduct of foreign policy generally.

16. In a strict sense, an ideology is a set of political ideas that are overt, systematic, dogmatic, and embodied in a set of institutions: Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, Political Power: USA/USSR (New York, 1965), p. 19.

17. It is impossible to find any coherent presentation of the ideology by any spokesman or leader of the counter-revolution, even Bethlen himself. The Bethlen regime never developed a body of "sacred" texts officially and authoritatively interpreted. The ideology of the regime must be adduced, then, from its pattern of practice and its characteristic slogans, found chiefly in the press of the period and in the writing of some publicists. For the more important of these sources, see the exhaustive annotated bibliography in Magyarorszag tortenete, ed., Pal Zsigmond Pach, 19 vols. (Budapest, 1976), Vol. 8: 1918-1919/1919-1945 (1976), ed., Gyorgy Ranki, Tibor Hajdu, and Lorant Tilkovszky, pp. 1319, 1331-33.

18. This summary of content is from Molnar, Pamlenyi, and Szekely, p. 384, and Istvan Deak, "Hungary," The European Right: A Historical Profile, ed., Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber (Berkeley, 1966), pp. 372, 378.

19. For an understanding of anti-Semitism during this period, see Professor Karfunkel's essay.

20. Oscar Jaszi, no friend of the counter-revolution, sums up the character of this shift in Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary, trans. F. W. Dickes (London, 1924), p. 138. Whereas Jaszi sees this integration of the extreme right as a limitation on its goals and activities, the more dogmatic Marxist writers continue to regard it as a mere smokescreen that allowed the extremists to continue their nefarious activities under government auspices. On this point see, for example, Lajos Serfozo, "A titkos tarsasagok es a roluk folytatott parlamenti vitak, 1922-1924-ben," Parttorteneti Kozlemenyek 22 (1976):69-113.

21. Thomas L. Sakmyster. "Army Officers and Foreign Policy in Interwar Hungary, 1918-1941." Journal of Contemporary History 10 (January 1975):21-23. Bethlen was less fastidious about other forms of adventurism, especially financial. For one notorious example, which has about it many of the humorous qualities of a Keystone Kops movie, see Andor Klay. "Hungarian Counterfeit Francs: A Case of Post- World War I Political Sabotage," Slavic Review 33 (March 1974):107-13.

22. This summary of the main elements of "Christian nationalism" is taken from Ilona Pandi. Osztalyok es Partok a Bethlen-konszolidacio idoszakaban (Budapest, 1966). p. 50. On the integrative role of the ideology, se Andrew C. Janos, "Hungary: 1867-1939-A Study of Social Change and the Political Process" (Ph.D. dissertation. Princeton University. 1961). pp. 120-21. 333. For a discussion of the attraction of the ideology for the moderate left, see William M. Batkay, "The Origin and Role of the Unified Party in Hungary. 1919-1926" (Ph.D. dissertation. Columbia University. 1972), pp. 192-93.

23. The term "gentroid" is distinctively Hungarian. In a narrow sense, it refers to the aping of the mores, fashions, and political style of the former landed gentry by lower-middle class civil servants and others in Hungary in the later period of the Dual Monarchy and during the interwar period. In a broader sense, it implies a sense of spiritual, social, and cultural descent from the landed gentry and largely gentry-staffed bureaucracy of the Tisza era among those later holders of bureaucratic positions that were not of actual gentry origin.

24. Pandi, p. 50; Janos. p. 115.

25. On this point, see the comments of Pal Pronay, a right-radical officer active in the para-military "detachments" in the 1920's. in Pal Pronay. A hatarban a Halal! Kaszal. ... Fejezetek Pronay Pal feljegyzeseibol, ed. Agnes Szabo and Ervin Pamlenyi (Budapest, 1963). p. 233; see also Bethlen's remarks in a New Year's Day address in 1922, in Istvan Bethlen, Bethlen Istvan grof beszedei es irasai 2 vols. (Budapest, 1933). 1:219.

26. Bethlen. 1:159; 2:57, 160. See also Bethlen's opening speech in the Assembly in April 1921: Bethlen. 1:154-68.

27. Batkay, pp. 111-17, and the sources cited there.

28. Miklos Kozma, a leading right-radical and head of MTI, the Hungarian news agency, in the 1920's, supports this conclusion in a 1924 situation report: "... [E]veryone except the extreme right and left wings wants to support Bethlen and his policy" (O.L. Kozma-iratok. 1. Cs. Adatgyujtemeny. 1920-1924. Belpolitikai helyzetkep, May 1924, p. 74).

29. Rothschild, pp. 158-59.

30. This application of the French notion of the pays legal to Hungary is taken from Janos. p. 264-66.

31. Given Horthy's right-radical sympathies, his election as Regent in the spring of 1920 may have aggravated this situation; it certainly did nothing to alter it. On this point, see Ferenc Poloskei, "Az Allamforma es az alkotmanyossag kerdesei 1919-1920 fordulojan," Tortenelmi Szemle 19 (1976):333. See also Balogh, p. 286, where she notes: "It would be two years before the power of the extreme right could be checked."

32. Bureaucratic acceptance of this subordination is discussed in Miklos Szinai and Laszlo Szucs, eds., Bethlen Istvan titkos iratai (Budapest, 1972), Introduction, p. 16.

33. Gratz, however, notes that Teleki strengthened the office of prime minister by his own personal prestige: Gratz, pp. 332-33.

34. These other factors included Entente pressure for "democratisation" of the Friedrich government in the fall of 1919 and the ignominy of the signing of the Treaty of Trianon by the Simonyi-Semadam government in the summer of 1920.

35. In the spring and summer of 1920 there were threats to dissolve the Assembly by force if the parties did not soon bring some order to their ranks: Dezso Nemes, Az ellenforradalom tortenete Magyarorszagon, 1919-1921 (Budapest, 1962), p. 250.

36. There is, for example, no published monograph on the Unified Party in either Hungarian or western scholarly literature. The author's dissertation, cited above, attempts to rectify this lacuna, and will be forthcoming in the East European Monographs series published by the East European Quarterly.

37. Samuel Huntington argues, for example, that political leaders "only mobilize and organize masses when they have a real need-ideological or political-to do so. If they are already in power and have no ideological drive to split and remake their societies, they have no reason to make the effort to develop and maintain a strong party" ("Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems," Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems, ed., Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore [New York, 1970], pp. 14-15).

38. Szinai and Szucs, pp. 35-36, and notes 56, 57, 60.

39. See Batkay, where the origin and functions of the Unified Party are analysed in detail.

40. On the appeal of Hungary's constitutional traditions to even hostile foreign observers, see the comments by R. W. Seton-Watson quoted in Ignotus, p. 159.

41. See, For example, Pal Teleki, The Evolution of Hungary and Its Place in European History (New York, 1923; reprint ed., Gulf Breeze, Florida, 1975), especially pp. 143-46.

42. See, for example, the comments in the Hungarian newspaper Budapesti Hirlap, January 27, 1920, quoted in France, Ministry of War and Foreign Affairs, Bulletin periodique de la presse hongroise de langue magyare, no, 39 (March 7, 1920), p. l.

43. For a discussion of this point, see Janos, p. 352; Szinai and Szucs, Introduction, pp. 25-26, et passim.

44. For an example of such myopia, see Dezso Nemes, Introduction, Nemes and Karsai, Iratok az ellenforradalom tortenetehez, Vol. 2 (1956): A fasiszta rendszer kiepitese es nepnyomor Magyarorszagon, 1921-1924, ed. Dezso Nemes and Elek Karsai, p. 29.

45. See note 3s. Cf. Horthy's intimidation of the Assembly in March 1920, and the activity of the para-military detachments that preceded it: Pronay, p. 177; Endre Szokoly, ... es Gombos Gyula a kapitany (Budapest, 1960), p. 96.

46. On the multi-functionality of these symbols. see Macartney, Hungary: A Short History (Edinburgh, 1962), p. 214; "Hungary Since 1918," The Slavonic Review 7 (March 1929):582-83; Pronay, p. 167; Jaszi, p. 159.

47. Aniko Tausz, "Adalekok a magyar ipari munkassag helyzetehez 1919 es 1929 kozott," Tortenelmi Szemle 19 (1976):631-59. Tausz argues that despite these improvements, there was no significant change in basic conditions in Hungary, which remained, in her view, among the most backward countries as far as social policy was concerned.

48. These groups constituted 92 percent of the highest taxpayers in Hodmezovasarhely in 1929, for example: Gabor Gyani, "Hodmezovasarhely legnagyobb adofizetoi (1888-1941)," Tortenelmi Szemle 20 (1977) :627.

49. At least one author suggests that Bethlen became seriously involved in the government campaign for treaty revision only after he left office: Nandor Dreisziger, "Count Istvan Bethlen's Secret Plan for the Restoration of the Empire of Transylvania." East European Quarterly 8 (January 1975):414. On the cooptation of right-radicals, see Macartney, October Fifteenth. p. 146; Elek Karsai, A budai Sandor-palotaban tortent, 1919-1941, 2d ed. (Budapest, 1964), pp. 189-90.

50. On the emasculation of land reform, see Rothschild, pp. 159-60.

51. The poor peasants. at any rate, apparently found this state of affairs congenial. The Hungarian poet Gyula Illyes, in his account of his early life among the destitute servants on the great estates, cites as typical the peasant view that "politics are an affair of the gentry": People of the Puszta, trans. C, F. Cushing (Budapest, 1967), p. 147.

52. The provisions of the 1922 electoral law may be found in the minutes of the January 24, 1922, meeting of the Council of Ministers: O.L. Mt. jkv. January 24, 1922 (kozig. pol.), in Nemes and Karsai, A fasiszta rendszer, p. 257.

53. Joseph Held, "The Interwar Years and Agrarian Change," The Modernization of Agriculture: Rural Transformation in Hungary, 1848-1975, East European Monographs, Vol. 63 (Boulder, Colorado, 1980), p. 312.

54. Cf. note 5, above.

55. On the right-radical movements in these countries, see, for example, the chapters on Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia in Rothschild.

A Case Study on Trianon