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Toward a New Central Europe |
AT THE END of the First World War President Woodrow Wilson assumed that the universal recognition of the right of national selfdetermination would bring progress and co-operation to Europe and especially to East Central Europe about which he was concerned in his known Fourteen Points. And there is no doubt that it was a solid basis, providing the principle had been applied consistently and not only to the victors of the First World War, and providing also that those who were privileged would have recognized that there was a correlation of rights and obligationsóespecially an obligation to respect the rights of other peoples or nationalities.
Instead of a consistent application of the principle of self-determination, there was, however, in East Central Europe a tendency to build national states in an area where during several centuries nationalities and ethnic groups lived intermingled. Some peoples and their leading politicians even identified the ideals and interests of one people with the interests of a State which was necessarily and historically multinational.
As a result, the solution which was given to this area in 1919 was unjust and detrimental to millions of human beings who were persecuted and became second class citizens because of their ethnic origin or because of their desire to develop their respective mother tongues or cultures. The settlement could not eliminate the difficulties. The settlement found itself obliged to make concessions against the ethnic principle in favor of economic, administrative and strategic considerations; in certain cases even in favor of historical considerations, while in others it admitted that the people concerned were not ripe for independence. The nations which were losers by the changes introduced in 1919 naturally struggled against that settlement.
Thus an organization which was supposed to solve national problems and put an end to century-long struggles for national rights brought about discontent to half of the peoples of Central Europe and prevented peaceful co-operation among all of them. As years passed,
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hatred of those who oppressed instead of governing was increasing. This led to the crisis of democracy and in the final analysis, hastened the disintegration of the Versailles Order. Looking for a new organization of Central Europe became a matter of necessity and of logical conclusion.
Plans for integration of Central Europe were, therefore, revived during the Second World War. Milan Hodza in his work, "Federation in Central Europeî 1) General Sikorski in his agreement with the Czech politicians, 2) several Hungarian diplomats, as well as certain Slovak politicians in Sweden, Switzerland and the Vatican 3) advocated the only reasonable solution of Central European problems- the integration of the area between Germany and Russia on a federative basis. Milan Hodza was especially explicit in advocating the idea of a federation 4) which, since 1848, was in one form or another advanced and favored by representatives of all the peoples who had inhabited the area between Germany and Russia for centuries. 5)
But the dynamic Soviet Union, which became more imperialistic than Russia had been at any time under any Czar, destroyed in its brutal Drang nach Westen all the plans and dreams of Central European politicians and diplomats who wished to integrate Central Europe as an area of free and democratically governed peoples. A new colonial rule was imposed upon Central Europe, and expulsions and transfers of populations accompanied by inhuman suffering and crimes against humanity made the problems of this area more complex and more dangerous than ever for Europe and the world at large. We cannot but agree with the well-known British expert on Central Europe, C. A. Macartney, who in 1942 warned that "a powerful and aggressive state which robs the East European nations of their independence also threatens the safety of the world, since it remains, as it always has been, dangerous to the world if any one Great Power, or two or three Great Powers acting in permanent collusion (if such a thing is possible), acquire a complete and monopolistic control of this area. The more powerful the state aiming at such control, the heavier the yoke which it imposes on the Danubian peoples if it succeeds, and also the greater the peril to the world." 6)
The Great Power, which by force and by violation of agreements and pledges imposed the brutal communist rule upon the peoples of Central Europe, prevented the East Central European countries from combining their forces and economies to their advantage. There are, nevertheless, in the present situation also several features which could be regarded as being potentially able to make it easier for any future federative organization of Central Europe to function after its liberation from Soviet colonial rule.
By brutal force and disregard for human dignity and feelings the Soviet Union, with the help of Communist regimes, brought Central
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Europe to a common denominator in the fields of economy, culture and social structure and exacted similar development from all peoples of that area. Despite the fact that Central Europe had for centuries developed under the same rule and had been influenced by the same political doctrines and Western cultural currents there were great differences among the various Central European peoples in their economic and educational standards, social structure, and industrialization and political systems, all of which would have made any democratic federation a mosaic hard to keep together and govern successfully. By mercilessly destroying the upper classes and bourgeoisie, by nationalization and expropriation, by murder and coercion, the puppet governments of the Soviet satellites eradicated differences and integrated Central Europe in their own way.
No doubt the peoples of Central Europe paid a very high price in blood, suffering and degradation, but plans for a federation of Central Europe will never have a better outlook for success than they will have after that area is freed from Soviet rule and Communist systems.
Such plans become more realistic and appear more realizable than ever before for other reasons as well, but the above should not be overlooked or underestimated. The present trend in Western Europe towards the successful integration of countries like France and Germany suggest that neither the differences and memories of past quarrels and clashes, nor all the attempts at assimilation and persecution should stand in the way of making Central Europe a commonwealth of harmoniously co-operating peoples.
Slovakia's Stand and Place in Central Europe
Today there is perhaps no need to argue that Slovaks are not merely one of the "historic" peoples of Central Europe, but also the people who attained the same level of cultural and political maturity as the other peoples of East Central Europe. Milan Hodza, who for decades supported the Czech tendencies towards amalgamation of Slovaks and Czechs, reversed his stand and at the beginning of the Second World War advocated self-rule for Slovakia stating that "long before World War II Slovakia had reached if not passed the Central European civilization level." 7) And according to C. A. Macartney, Slovak nationalism became a new factor in Central European politics which could not be overlooked. 8)
At the end of the Second World War even such adversaries of Slovak national aspirations as Dr. E. Benes bowed for a short time before these realities and the restoration of Czechoslovakia proceeded according to the principle of a "State combining the two separate nations of Czechs and Slovaks" and the Slovak National Council was accepted as the "rightful representative of the individual Slovak nation" and "bearer of sovereign right on Slovak territory." 10)
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There is perhaps no need to prove by statistics enumerating all the various oppressions to which Slovakia was subjected between 1918-1938 or from 1945 on that Slovaks were and remained one of the most dissatisfied peoples of Central Europe to whom the right of selfdetermination was denied. In 1945 they were robbed even of that limited independence which was tolerated in Slovakia by the Third Reich which, at least formally, peoples of Yugoslavia enjoy under the present Communist system.
The true position of Slovakia in pre-war Czechoslovakia was adroitly camouflaged by clever Czech propaganda and the voice of Slovaks in the free world is often silenced today by politicians who were an obedient tool of Communist and Soviet expansion but who denounce Slovaks as former allies of Germany and, therefore, unfit for the rights which the majority of Germans have been enjoying for more than a decade since the end of the War.
Nevertheless, many observers became acquainted with the true situation in Slovakia and with the aspirations of the majority of Slovaks, as well as with Slovak opposition to the present order and to the regime of 1918-1938.1_) In 1939 Slovaks expressed their stand by proclaiming independence, which did not happen because they were forced to do it, contrary to the false assertions by adversaries of Slovakia's aspirations for independence. Slovaks had no reasons to defend either Czechoslovakia or the political order in Central Europe which denied them not only many fundamental rights but tried to deprive them even of their existence and name.
This opposition to the present status quo which stems either from ideological or political reasons is a matter of principle for all politically mature Slovaks. And news about Slovakia's resistance penetrated not only the Iron Curtain but also the media of information in the free world which are influenced by the adversaries of Slovak aspirations for freedom and independence.
It can therefore be assumed that Slovakia will be a natural and reliable ally of anybody who will seriously try to upset the present situation in Central Europe, a situation which is oppressive for Slovaks not only because of its Communist system and Soviet domination, but also because Slovakia is ruled again from Prague, a fact resented even by Slovak Communists. And we can safely assume also that the system which the majority of Slovaks would advocate if free expression were allowed in Slovakia, and which has constantly been advocated by Slovak politicians in exile, is a Central European Federation: a federation of free peoples on equal political footing in which due respect would be given to cultural, ethnic and linguistic peculiarities, national rights, and traditions, and which would warrant stability and economic prosperity.
This assertion is in no basic contradiction with the aspirations of
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Slovaks (or those of any other Central European people) for national independence and self-determination, a hope shared with the majority of Slovaks in the free world. The principle of self-determination is not necessarily one of disintegration. The political right of national self-determination can be reconciled with the exigencies of economic interdependence and security. Peoples may "determine" themselves into larger units as readily as they can into smaller ones, says E. H. Carr. 11) There is no doubt that the individual wants to see the people or group of which he is a member free and independent But it is also true that he wants to belong to a group large and powerful enough to play a significant role in a wider community.
Once a broader economic and military framework is securely established, there is no limit to the number or to the functions of the smaller national units of self-government which may be built up within it. And there are examples to prove that in a federation the natural and ineradicable desire of the human group for self-determination in the conduct of its affairs can be given the fullest scope and expression.
The conception of fully sovereign nation-states which sprang from nineteenth-century political philosophy cannot, in our age, be applied to East Central Europe without doing injustice to millions of human beings and neglecting the security and economic welfare of all the inhabitants of that area. This became clear to Slovak politicians, and several of them expressed it either in their works or political activities. Conscious of the dangers to which Central Europe has been exposed from the neighboring Great Powers on the one hand, and equally conscious of the evolving economic and political independence of the European peoples on the other hand, the Slovaks are guided in the present struggle by no narrow nationalism or resentments, nor do they wish to recreate the past. The vision of their free and independent Slovakia takes into consideration European, and especially Central European, problems and interests, and it is on a wide European basis that they look for a guarantee of their freedom, national independence and security.
Yet, we must stress that more than anything it will be a solution of national aspirations in the sense of self-determination which will decide "en fin de compte" about the coming into existence and functioning of a democratic Central European Federation. 12)
As many objective observers of Central Europe have agreed, it was not the principle of self-determination which can be held responsible for the troubles we have witnessed in Central Europe between the wars. The troubles in Central Europe were caused by:
1.) the inconsistency with which the principle of self-determina tion was applied
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2.) the failure to recognize that the principle was a variable one requiring modification in the light of political and economic conditions and
3.) the fact that the extension given it at Versailles was, as we see now, at variance with the twentieth century trends of political and economic organization. It caused disintegration of existing economic and political units and favored the creation of incoherent smaller units at a time when strategic and economic factors were demanding integration. And by applying it inconsistently, it left many peoples and national ities dissatisfied and desiring to change the order which was imposed upon them.
As applied in the peace settlement of 1919, the principle of selfdetermination resulted also in the crisis of democracy in Central Europe and its violation turned ultimately on a moral issue.
The troubles became even worse because they arose out of the violation of the principle of self-determination by those peoples who tried to build a national state in traditionally and historically multinational areas and out of identification of the ideals of the people - even if it presented less than 50% of the population of the stateó with the interests of the state.
Eighteen years of Soviet colonial rule over Central Europe proved that Moscow added to the errors and blunders of Versailles a brutal system of political oppression and economic exploitation, solving the problems of national minorities by expelling millions of people instead of granting them rights and correcting previous blunders.
For political observers, as well as for those Slovaks living in the free world who decry Soviet colonial rule and advocate the right to freedom and independence of Central European peoples, a democratic and integrated Central Europe seems, therefore, again the only solution which will simultaneously satisfy the needs of modern economic organization and the urge of human beings to preserve and develop their own cultures, traditions, and national identities.
1) See Milan Hodza, Federation In Central Europe, London, 1942.
2) See Joachim Kuhl, Federationsplane im Donauraum und in Ostmitteleuropa,
Sudost-Institut, Munchen, 1958.
3) See J. M. Kirschbaum, Slovakia - Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe,
New York l960, Chapter on Federalist tendencies in Slovakia, pp. 75-84 and
223-230, and F. Durcansky's study in Revue de droit international, XXII, l,
Geneve, 1944.
4) Wrote Hodza, "War events in Central Europe obviously fully vindicate the
idea of a solidly organized future cooperation of all those eight states
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which are placed in complete geographic coherence between Russia, Germany and
Italy. A federalized Central Europe is one of the absolute necessities of a new
post-war order." Op. cit., p. 32.
5) See Rudolf Wierer, Der Federalismus im Donauraum, Verlag Bohlau, Graz-Kohl,
1960.
6) See C. A. Macartney, Problems Of the Danubian Basin, London, 1942, p. 122.
7) Cf. M. Hodza, op. cit., pp. 208-209.
8) See, C. A. Macartney, op. cit.
9) See, Wm. Diamond, Czechoslovakia between East and West (London, 1947), pp.
2-3.
10) The aspirations and struggle for a new and democratic Slovakia are voiced
in dozens of Slovak newspapers in the free world, in the quarterly Slovakia, as
well as in numerous memoranda of the Slovak National Council Abroad, Slovak
League of America, Slovak Liberation Committee, Canadian Slovak League, etc.
Since 1946, several members of the US House of Representatives and Senate
recorded in the Congressional Record either resolutions or pledges for
Slovakia's freedom and independence. (See Part IV, Documents, in the
writerís book.) In the Slovak language, the struggle of the Slovaks for
independence is comprehensively treated in these books: Dr. F. Durcansky, Biela
Kniha (White Book), Buenos Aires, 1954, and Dr. J. Kirschbaum, Nas boj o
samostatnost Slovenska (Our struggle for Slovakia's Independence), Cleveland,
Slovensky Ustav, 1958. In French in J. A. Mikus, La Slovaquie dans le drame de
l'Europe (Paris 1955), etc.
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Toward a New Central Europe |