From Trianon to the First Vienna Arbitral Award

German "activist" parties

In a well-meant endeavour to make a permanent contribution to mutual understanding in nationality relations within the Republic and to climite all that i8 calculated to estrange from one another the people of this State at the crossroads of racial interests in Central Europe, the Czechoslovak Government has examined the present state of Minority Policy in Czechoslovakia, and, following the tradition of Czechoslovak democratic policy, has laid down further directives in this connection.

The Government is devoting very special attention and care to the economic situation of the areas affected by the world crisis in some branches of industry. If happens that these are areas inhabited for the most part by our fellow-citizens whose mother-tongue is German. The circumstance that the great bulk of State guarantees granted to industrial production have been allotted to German manufadurers is a proof that nothing can be more disloyal than to accuse the Government of lack of consideration for the economic situation of the German pop ulation. The Government is investing in public works and buildings in all parts of the State in due proportion to the needs of the particular areas and will see to it that ev erywhere--including thus the areas with a German population--local enterprise and local workers shall have first con sideration. The central authorities that allocate contracts are enjoined to exercise strict supervision over all the organs subordinate to them in order that, among other things, this principle of economic justice shall be observed to the full. The Golvernment calls theattention of all organs in particular to their personal responsibility for the fulfilment of these instructions, and also calls attention to the consequences involued in any neglect of this official order.

In carrying out i tsmeasures of social welfare andofhealth servicetheGovernment will pay due regard not only to the number of inhabitants but also to the degree of unemployment in the individual areas. In the sphere of social and health service for the young, the Government will as heretofore--see to it that the members of the particular nationality concerned shall be entrusted with child-relief, and will do its utmost to ensure that the institution of child-relief shall be placed on a sound basis and further expanded.

In the matter of the acceptance of candidates for the State services the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic lays down in the second section of Clause 128 guiding prin ciples in this matter to the effect that "differences in religion, belief, confession and language shall be no hindrance to any subject of the CzechoslovakRepublic withinthelimits ofthecommon law ofthe land, especially in the matter of entry into the public services, and offices, or of dignities". In addition to this constitutional principle, the Government acknowledges the permanent validity of another principle which itregards as its own andwhichhas, atthesametime, been adopted by all international authorities concerned, namely, the prindple that unconditional loyalty to the State is a natural and primary condition for the bestowal of rights upon racial minorities.

The Government can, without the slightest bias, say that the moral force of the Czeckoslovak State idea is increasingly proving its efficacy in bringing about collaboration among the nationalities. This fact and the steadily expanding knowledge of the official language enables the Government to take a further step in accepting members of the national minorities for the State services, and to pay ever increasing regard not only to general and regional interests and qualifications, but also to the interests of the Minorities so as to ensure them a just proportion of the posts in question.

In communications with public bodies nnd organs the lnngunge requirements of the racial minorities are gunranteed to the utmost practical degree by the constitutional law relating to language. The Government regards it ns n simple behest of political mornlity and wisdom that the laws of the Republic should be unconditionally observed in all departments of public administration; in the matter of the prescription relating to the co respondence of the distnct and certnin other authorities with the parishes where the majority of the population speak a different langunge, the Government has ordered that translations in the language of the national minority in the parish shall be annexed to communications couched in the official language, and that this shall be donc without waiting for a demand for it, and that no charge shall be made for the translation.

The Government is prepared to amend the scope of langunge tests nccording to the renl needs in view of the posts to which cnndidates will be allotted, and to contribute to the issue of approprinte textbooks.

The Budget Estimates will reflect the determination of the Czechoslovak Government that the democrntic Republic shall regard it ns its grent political-and moral task to sup port popular education nnd enlightenment to the very utmost of its finnndal resources, that is, to encourage not only the splendid trnditions of the Czech nnd Slovak people in this connection, but also, in a spirit of due proportion, popular education nnd enlightenment among their follow-citizens and nations speaking another tongue, not only, therefore, the Germans and Mngyars, but nlso all racial minorities. The Government also pays regard in this respect to fellow-cit izens of Polish nationality. Now that no foreign influences intermeddle with our minority policy in this sphere, we are anble, in conjunction with our Polish-spenking fellow-citizens, to solve all that may awnit solution in n spirit of justice nnd fraternity.

In the organisation of education regard is alrendy paid in very special fashion to the culturnl needs of the individunl nationalities, and the Government does not in any way exclude the possibility of further intensifications within the frnmework of the organisation that has so far existed.

Wherever shortcomings or faults in local governmenta the detriment of nationality interest or minority groups, the Government will see to their removal.

The Government consistently abides by its principles of a policy of strict justice to the minorities, nnd will develop that policy and nccommodate it to the interests of the State nnd the national minorities.

Source: Young, op. cit., 348-351.

1. Establishment of full equalJty of rights and of statut between the German national group and the Czech people.

2. Recognition of the Sudeten German national group as a legal personality in guarantee of this equality of status in the state.

3. Determination and recognition of the German-inhabited territory.

4. Setting-up of a German autonomous administration for all departments of public life in so far as the interests and affais of the German national group are concerned.

5. Enactement of legal measures for the protection of those citizens of the state who live outside the defined limits of the territory inhabited by their nationality.

6. Removal of injustices inflicted upon Sudeten Germans since 1918 and reparation of the damage suffered owing to these injustices.

7. Recognition and application of the principle: German public officials in the German territory.

8. Full freedom to profess German nationality and the German political philosophy.

Source: R.G.D. Laffan, Survey of International Affairs 1938, vol. II, Oxford University Press, London: 1951, 95

The moment at which his Lordship sets foot on Czecho-Slovakian soil is one of extraordinary importance in the history of post-war Europe. The mission which brings him to this country-- the role which he has undertaken, is entirely unprecedented.

In this part of Europe problems have literally piled up, on the solution of which depends the development of the coming years, the safety of states, the prosperity or decline of nations, and the peaceful and happy lives of the people--or their despair.

Twenty years ago it was believed to be possible to shunt off vital, effective historical forces, or to stifle them in their development. This cannot longer be maintained. The Peace Conference took into consideration only the two post-war extremes--victory or defeat. They forgot that only states can be temporarily defeated--not nations.

The Czechoslovak republic was formed on the basis that the victory of the Czech, Slovak, and Ruthenian nations was recognised, while the German, the Hungarian, and the Polish nations living in this territory suffered all the moral and material casualties of the lost war. The activity of the statesmen in the course of twenty years, in building the state, aimed at one thing; to lay the foundations of the Czechoslovak national existence at the expense of the Germans Hungarians, and Poles. This development is unhealthy and unnatural, and was bound to end in conflicts. To arrive at this, it had been sufficent to alter the balance of the Great Powers directing Europe's history. The events in March this year brought into clear light this altered balance, and thus the Czechoslovakian problem was cast up.

The world knows this problem as the German--Czechoslovak problem, but those who are living here, or who occupy themselves more thoroughly with the existing situation, must know that the setting out of the problem is not anything like so simple as that.

There is not only a German--Czechoslovak problem, but also a Hun- garian--Czechoslovak problem, a Polish--Czechoslovak problem, and even a Slovak--Czechoslovak problem, and a Ruthenian--Czechoslovak problem.

The problem calls for absorbing consideration, involving extensive re- search. The noble lord is doubtless fully conscious of the fact that the task he has undertaken with such a degree of selfsacrifice, is complicated and difficult. We can scarcely find in the course of history, that a statesman acting in his private capacity, has ever undertaken a task of such gigantic magnitude.

The Hungarian national community living in this state, lifts its hat with respct to, and salutes this noble son of the great British nation, who comes to us to advise the re- sponsible leaders of this state and the representatives of the nations, and, as far as in human possibility lies, to untie this Gordian knot.

The noble Lord comes with the purpose of insuring peace within this state, and to lay the foundations of agreement between the various nations of Czechoslovakia, because British policy is set upon the establishment of this, as the key to world peace.

We know this, and we appreciate it respectfully. We Hungarians have lived for a thousand years our independent state life, in the most stormy part of Europe, which has been repeatedly stirred up by Oriental barbarism. We have suffered and bled, and in the past of every Hungarian family, is the record of martyr-heroes, who gave their lives and blood for Christian civilisation, or Hungarian liberty and independence. The present generation of Hungarians living here, are the descendants of such ancestors. This generation can endure and can suffer-- it cannot live in dishonour.

We have within us the feeling that twenty years ago, we were denied the right that President Wilson proclaimed with prophetic inspiration: the right of self-determination of the nations. Only this right can restore our life of honour, by giving equal conditions and equal possibility of development to every nation.

With reverence and deep honour, we salute Lord Runciman as he looks out upon this world which he wants, as an honourable, single minded man, to reform by bringing into harmony the contrasting conceptions and vital interests of nations. We wish him good luck in this great task.

We, for our part, desire nothing other than what issues spontaneously from the character of an English gentleman: the pursuit of justice in an unbiassed, sincere way. In this we are ready to support loyally his efforts.

We believe deeply and unshakenly in the truth that we Hungarians have the right to live in liberty.

It is that which we wish clearly to convey, in all manly candidness to a statesman, a gentleman, and a Man, who has undertaken a great historical task.

PMH, 4 August, 1938

No. 1

Lord Runciman to the Prime Minister'

Westminster, S. W. 1,

September 21, 1938.

My dear Prime Minister,

When I undertook the task of mediation in the controversy between the Czechoslovak Government and the Sudeten German party, I was, of course, left perfectly free to obtain my own information and to draw my own conclusions. I was under no obligation to issue any kind of report. In present circumstances, however, it may be of assistance to you to have the final views, which I have formed as a result of my Mission, and certain suggestions which I believe should be taken into consideration, if anything like a permanent solution is to be found.

The problem of political, social and economic relations between the Teuton and Slav races in the area which is now called Czechoslovakia is one which has existed for many centuries with periods of acute struggle and periods of comparative peace. It is no new problem, and in its present stage there are at the same time new factors and also old factors which would have to be considered in any detailed review.

When I arrived in Prague at the beginning of August, the questions which immediately confronted me were (1) constitutional, (2) political and (3) economic. The constitutional question was that with which I was immediately and directly concerned. At that time it implied the provision of some degree of home rule for the Sudeten Germans within the Czechoslovak Republic; the question of self-determination had not yet arisen in an acute form. My task was to make myself acquainted with the history of the question, with the prindpal persons concerned, and with the suggestions for a solution proposed by the two sides, viz., by the Sudeten German party in the "Sketch" submitted to the Czechoslovak Government on the 7th June (which was by way of embodying the 8 points of Herr Henlein's speech at Earlsbad), and by the Czechoslovak Government in their draft Nationality Statute, Language Bill, and Administrative Reform Bill.

It became clear that neither of these sets of proposals was sufficiently acceptable to the other side to permit further negotiations on this basis, and the negotiations were s uspendedon the 17th August. After a series of private discussions between the Sudeten leaders and the Czech authorities, a new basis for negotiations was adopted by the Czechoslovak Government and was communicated to me on the 5th September, and to the Sudeten leaders on the 6th September. This was the so-called 4th Plan. In my opinion--and, I believe, in the opinion of the more responsible Sudeten leaders--this plan embodied almost all the requirements of the Karlsbad 8 points, and with a little clarification and extension could have been made to cover them in their entirety. Negotiations should have at once been resumed on this favourable and hopeful basis; but little doubt remains in my mind that the very fact that they were so favourable operated against their chances, with the more extreme members of the Sudeten German party. It is my belief that the incident arising out of the visit of certain Sudeten Gerruan Deputies to investigate into the case of persons arrested for arms smuggling at Maahrisch-Ostrau was used in order to pro vide an excuse for the suspension, if not for the breaking off, of negotiations. The Czech Government, however,

at once gave way to the demands of the Sudeten German party in this matter, and preliminary discussions of the 4th Plan were resumed on the 10th September. Again, I am convinced that this did not suit the policy of the Sudeten extremists, and that incidents were provoked and instigated on the 11th September and, with greater effect after Herr Hitler's speech, on the 12th September. As a result of the bloodshed and disturbance thus caused, the Sudeten delegation rufused to meet the Czech authorities as had been arranged on the 13th September.Herr Henlein and Herr Frank presented a new series of demands--withdrawal of State police, limitation of troops to their military duties, &c., which the Czechoslovak Government were again prepared to accept on the sole condition that a representative of the party came to Prague to discuss how order should be maintained. On the night of the 13th September this condition was refused by Herr Henlein, and all negotiations were completely broken off.

It is quite clear that we cannot now go back to the point where we stood two weeks ago; and we have to consider the situation as it now faces us.

With the rejection of the Czechoslovak Government's offer on the 13th September and with the breaking off of the negotiations by Herr Henlein, my functions as a mediator were, in fact, at an end. Directly and indirectly, the connection between the chief Sudeten leaders and the Government of the Reich had become the dominant factor in the situation; the dis pute was no longer an internal one. It was not part of my function to attempt mediation between Czechoslovakia and Germany.

Responsibility for the final break must, in my opinion, rest upon Herr Henlein and Herr Frank and upon those of their supporters inside and outside the country who were urging them to extreme and unconstitutional action.

I have much sympathy, however, with the Sudeten case. Itis a hard thing to be ruled by an alien race; and I have been left with the impression that Czechoslovak rule in the Sudeten areas for the last twenty years, though not actively oppressive and certainly not " terroristic," has been marked by tactlessness, lack of understanding, petty intolerance and discrimination, to a point where the resentment of the German population was inevitably moving in the direction of revolt. The Sudeten Germans felt, too, that in the past they had been given many promises by the Czechoslovak Government, but that little or no action had followed these promises. This experience had induced an attitude of unveiled mistrust of the leading Czech states men. I cannot say how far this mistrust is merited or unmerited; but it certainly exists, with the result that, however conciliatory their statements, they inspire no confidence in the minds of the Sudeten population. Moreover, in the last elections of 1935 the Sudeten German party polled more votes than any other single party; and they actually formed the second largest party in the State Parliament. They then commanded some 44 votes in a total Parliament of 300. With subsequent accessions, they are now the largest party. But they can always be outvoted; and con sequently some of them feel that constitutional action is useless for them.

Local irritations were added to these major grievances. Czech officials and Czech police, speaking little or no German, were appointed in large numbers to purely German districts; Czech agricultural colonists were encouraged to settle on land transferred under the Land Reforrn in the middle of German populations; for the children of these Czech invaders Czech schools were built on a large scale; there is a very general belief that Czech firms were favoured as against German firms in the allocation of State contracts and that the State provided work and relief for Czechs more readily than for Germans. I believe these complaints to be in the main justified. Even as late as the time of my Mission, I could find no readiness on the part of the Czechoslovak Government to remedy them on anything like an adequate scale.

All these, and other, grievances were intensified by the reactions of the economic crisis on the Sudeten industries, which form so important a part of the life of the people. Not unnaturally, the Government were blamed for the resulting impoverishment.

For many reasons, therefore, including the above, the feeling among the Sudeten Germans until about three or four years ago was one of hopelessness. But the rise of Nazi Germany gave them new hope. I regard their turning for help towards their kinsmen and their eventual desire to join the Reich as a natural development in the circumstances.

At the time of my arrival, the more moderate Sudeten leaders stili desired a settlement within the frontiers of the Czechoslovak State. They realised what war would mean in the Sudeten area, which would itself be the main battlefield. Both nationally and internationally such a settlement would have been an easier solution than territorial transfer. I did my best to promote it, and up to a point with some success, but even sci not without misgiving as to whether, when agreement was reached, it could ever be carried out without giving rise to a new crop ofs suspicions, controversies,

accusations and counter-accusations. I felt that any such arrangement would have been temporary, not lasting.

This solution, in the form of what is known as the "Fourth Plan," broke down in the circumstances narrated above; the whole situation, internal and external, had changed; and I felt that with this change my mission had come to an end.

When I left Prague on the 16th September, the riots and disturbances in the Sudeten areas, which had never been more than sporadic, had died down. A considerable number of districts had been placed under a regime called Standrecht, amounting to martial law. The S udeten leaders, at any rate the more extreme among them, had fled to Germany and were issuing proclamations defying the Czechoslovak Government. I have been credibly informed that, at the time of my leaving, the number of killed on both sides was not more than 70.

Unless, therefore, Herr Henlein's Freikorps are deliberately encouraged to cross the frontier, I have no reason to expect any notable renewal of incidents and disturbances. In these circumtances the necessity for the presence of State Police in these districts should no longer exist. As the State Police are extremely unpopular among the German inhabitants, and have constituted one of their chief grievances for the last three years, I consider that they should be withdrawn as soon as possible. I believe that their withdrawal would reduce the causes of wrangles and riots.

Further, it has become self-evident to me that those frontier districts between Czchoslovakia and Germany where the Sudeten population is in an important majority should be given full right of self-determination at once. If some cession is inevitable, as I believe it to be, it is as well that it should be done promptly and without procrastination. There is real danger, even a danger of civil war, in the continuance of a state of uncertainty. Consequently there are very real reasons for a policy of immediate and drastic action. Any kind of plebiscite or referendum w ould, I believe, be a sheer formality in respect of these predominantly German areas. A very large majority of their inhabitants desire amalgamation with Germany. The inevitable delay involved in taking a plebiscite vote would only serve to excite popular feelings, with perhaps most dangerous results. I consider, therefore, that these frontier districts should at once be transferred from Czechoslovakia to Germany, and, further, thatmeasures for their peaceful transfer, including the provision of safeguards for the population during the transfer period, should be arranged forth with by agreement between the two Governments.

The transfer of these frontier districts does not, however,dispose finally of the question how Germans and Czechs are to live together peacefully in future. Even if all the areas where the Germans have a majority were transferred to Germany there would still remain in Czechoslovakia a large number of Germans, and in the areas transferred to Germany there would still be a certain number of Czechs. Economic connexions are so close that an absolute separation is not only undesirable but inconceivable; and I repeat my conviction that history has proved that in times of peace the two peoples can live together on friendly terms. I believe that it is in the interests of all Czechs and of all Germans alike that these friendly relations should be encouraged to re-establish themselves; and I am convinced that this is the real desire of the average Czech and German. They are alike in being honest, peaceable, hard-working and frugal folk. When political friction has been removed on both sides,I believe that they can settle down quietly.

For those portions of the territory, therefore, where the German majority is not so important, I recommend that an effort be made to find a basis for local autonomy within the frontiers of the Czechoslovak Republic on the lines of the "Fourth Plan" modified so as to meet the new circumstances created by the transfer of the preponderantiy German areas. As I have already said, there is always a danger that agreement reached in prindple may lead to further divergencies in practice. But I think that in a more peaceful future this risk can be minimised.

This brings me to the political side of the problem, which is concerned with the question of the integrity and security of the Czechoslovak Republic, especially in relation to her immediate neighbours. I believe that here the problem is one of removinga a centre of intense political friction from the middle of Europe. For this purpose it is necessary permanently to provide that the Czechoslovak State should live at peace with all her neighbours and that her pol icy, internal and external, should be directed to that end. Just as it is essential for the international position of

Switzerland that her policy should be entirely neutral, so an analogous policy is necessary for Czechoslovakia--not only for her own future existence but for the peace of Europe.

In order to achieve this, I recommend:--

( 1 ) That those parties and persons in Czechoslovakia who have been deliberately encouraging a policy antagonistic to Czechoslovakia's neighbours should be forbidden by the

Czechoslovak Govemment to continue their agitations; and that, if necessary, legal measures should be taken to bring such agitations to an end.

(2) That the Czechoslovak Government should so remodel her foreign relations as to give assurances to her neighbours that she will in no circumstances attack them or enter into any aggressive action against them arising from obligations to other States.

(3) That the prindpal Powers, acting in the interest of the peace of Europe, should give to Czechoslovakia guarantees of assistance in case of unprovoked aggression against her.

(4) That a commercial treaty on preferential terms should be negotiated between Germany and Czechoslovakia if this seems advantageous to the economic interests of the two countries.

This leads me on to the third question which lay within the scope of my enquiry, viz., the economic problem. This problem centres on the distress and unemployment in the Sudeten German areas, a distress which has persisted since 1930, and is due to various causes. It constitutes a suitable background for political discontent. It is a problem which exists; but to say that the Sudeten German question is entirely or even in the main an economic one is misleading. If a transfer of territory takes place, it is a problem which will for the most part fall to the German Government to solve.

If the policy which I have outlined above recommends itself to those immediately concerned in the present situation, I would further suggest: (a) That a representative of the Sudeten German people should have a permanent seat in the Czechoslovak Cabinet. (o) That a Commission under a neutral chairman should be appointed to deal with the question ofthe delimitation ofthe area to be transferred to Germany and also with controversial points immediately arising from the carrying out of any agreement which may be reached. (c) That an international force be organised to keep order in the districts which are to be transferred pending actual transfer, so that Czechoslovak State police, as I have said above, and also Czechoslovak troops, may be withdrawn from this area.

I wish to close this letter by recording my appredation of the personal courtesy, hospitality and assistance which I and my staff received from the Government authorities, espedally Dr. Benes and Dr. Hodza, from the representatives of the Sudeten German party with whom we came in contact, and from a very large number of other people in all ranks of life whom we met during our stay in Czechoslovakia.

Yours very sincerely,

RUNCIMAN OF DOXFORD.

Miscellaneous No. 7 (1938) Correspondence respecting Czechoslovakia, September 1938. Cmd. 5847, London, His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1938.

1. Note--A similar letter was addressed by Lord Rundman to President Benes on Sep tember 21, 1938

From Trianon to the First Vienna Arbitral Award